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Abstract 
When multiple third-parties (states, coalitions, and international organizations) intervene 
in the same conflict, do their efforts inform one another? Anecdotal evidence suggests such a 
possibility, but research to date has not attempted to model this interdependence directly. The 
current project breaks with that tradition. In particular, it proposes three competing explanations 
of how previous intervention efforts affect current intervention decisions: a cost model (and a 
variant on it, a limited commitments model), a learning model, and a random model. After using 
a series of Markov transition (regime-switching) models to evaluate conflict management 
behavior within militarized interstate disputes in the 1946-2001 period, this study concludes that 
third-party intervention efforts inform one another.  
More specifically, third-parties examine previous efforts and balance their desire to 
manage conflict with their need to minimize intervention costs (the cost and limited 
commitments models). As a result, third-parties intervene regularly using verbal pleas and 
mediation, but rely significantly less frequently on legal, administrative, or peace operations 
strategies. This empirical threshold to the intervention costs that third-parties are willing to bear 
has strong theoretical foundations and holds across different time periods and third-party actors. 
Furthermore, the analysis indicates that the first third-party to intervene in a conflict is most 
likely to use a strategy designed to help the disputants work toward a resolution of their dispute. 
After this initial intervention, the level of third-party involvement declines and often devolves 
into a series of verbal pleas for peace. Such findings cumulatively suggest that disputants hold 
the key to effective conflict management. If the disputants adopt and maintain an extreme 
bargaining position or fail to encourage third-parties to accept greater intervention costs, their 
dispute will receive little more than verbal pleas for negotiations and peace.   
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Chapter 1 
The Management of International Conflict 
 
As desertification limited access to water resources along the Mauritania-Senegal border, 
the two states found themselves immersed in an escalating, militarized crisis during the period 
1989-1991. The dispute began when Senegalese border guards killed two Mauritanian cattle 
herders in April 1989. Shortly thereafter, violence broke out between Senegalese and 
Mauritanian citizens living in the border region. These incidents strained the neighbors’ 
relations, eventually leading the disputing states to declare a state of emergency, sever 
diplomatic ties with one another, and engage in a series of direct, military confrontations. 
Throughout the crisis, third-parties intermediaries intervened repeatedly, in an attempt to move 
the disputing states toward a peaceful resolution. For example, Egypt mediated twice during the 
conflict, and Algeria attempted to mediate once. The Organization of African Union also tried its 
hand at mediation, while the United Nations dispatched a fact-finding mission. Despite these best 
efforts, the repeated interventions “had a marginal effect in decreasing tensions and facilitating 
successful negotiation” (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000; see also Frazier and Dixon 2006). In 
short, conflict management did little to bring peace. 
 The two-year crisis eventually ended with the restoration of Mauritania-Senegal 
diplomatic relations. Yet one cannot help but ask why third-parties intervened1 as they did. Why 
                                                 
1 I use the term “intervention” to refer generally to third-party intermediary conflict management attempts. Although 
I recognize that some may believe that the term intervention should be reserved for military involvement (or 
coercive diplomacy) specifically, it appropriately describes third-party diplomatic initiatives for two reasons. First, 
third-party intermediary conflict management attempts are interventions, even though they are not military 
interventions (for example, see Frazier and Dixon 2006 or Regan 2000, who each make a similar point; see also 
Princen 1992, who uses “intervention” to refer entirely to mediation). Second, the terminology allows me to cover 
broad categories of conflict management attempts, thereby simplifying the discussion dramatically. I therefore adopt 
this terminology, and readers should assume that the term “intervention” does not refer to military (or other 
coercive) interventions unless otherwise indicated. 
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did intermediaries try to mediate repeatedly if it was yielding minimal success? What good did 
the UN fact-finding mission contribute to conflict management, especially if it was as “low-key” 
as Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000) claim? What factors guided the intervention decisions of third-
parties?  
More broadly, two research questions motivate this study: how does third-party 
intervention evolve over the course of a conflict, and what guides the choices that drive this 
evolution? I attempt to address such questions directly and offer three advancements to our 
understanding of conflict management over existing work. First, it starts from the premise that 
numerous third-parties can intervene in the same dispute, and therefore does not focus on only 
one type of actor as is commonly done (for example, states or intergovernmental organizations). 
Second, it explicitly recognizes that third-parties have a menu of intervention strategies from 
which to choose (for example, calls for a ceasefire/troop withdrawal, mediation, peace 
operations, arbitration).2 It therefore does not focus on only one strategy (for example, 
mediation) at the expense of others. Third, it proposes that intervention attempts within the same 
conflict inform one another; that is, any third-party choosing to intervene in a dispute knows 
what conflict management effort(s) preceded theirs and incorporates information from the earlier 
intervention(s) when deciding what to do next. These three theoretical advancements therefore 
begin to integrate much of the fragmented research on international conflict management – 
across actor types, strategies, and the divide between research on conflict management “onset” 
and success. Through such integration, I aim to develop a more comprehensive understanding of 
how the international community cumulatively responds to interstate disputes – one that provides 
a much more realistic picture of conflict management than we currently have.  
                                                 
2 I return to a more detailed discussion of conflict management strategies below. 
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In addition to the contributions made to the scholarly community, the benefits of the 
project extend to the policy world as well. Policy-makers often make decisions in the face of 
significant uncertainty, especially when intervening in conflicts around the globe. Understanding 
how the international community is likely to respond to these conflicts offers them an 
opportunity to make more informed decisions that increase the likelihood of achieving their 
intervention goals. For example, knowing that other third-parties are unlikely to intervene 
actively to help disputants move toward peace (perhaps by using only verbal pleas for ceasefires) 
might prompt policy-makers to increase their own involvement. Similarly, certain interventions 
have downstream consequences, which alter intervention decisions if known in advance. For 
example, a peace operation may undermine third-party motivations to mediate a dispute, thereby 
prolonging conflict resolution (Greig and Diehl 2005). Were policy-makers to know about such 
downstream consequences, they may change how they choose to intervene in interstate conflicts. 
In short, knowing what to expect from others (and how this influences future interventions) gives 
policy-makers more information as they create and execute foreign policies in a complex world.  
 Working toward the goals outlined above requires reorienting the study of third-party 
intermediary intervention. Intermediary attempts are not independent of one another, as is often 
assumed in quantitative analyses of the subject. This is because, quite simply, intermediaries do 
not ignore what others are currently doing or what others (or they) have done in the past to 
address the conflict at hand. In the Mauritania-Senegal crisis described earlier, the various third-
party interventions affected one another. For example, Egypt mediated twice on its own and once 
under the auspices of the OAU; it therefore at least knew what it had done previously. Egypt also 
served on the OAU conciliation team, which linked Egyptian mediation efforts to that 
intervention as well. Finally, Algeria facilitated a mediation session between the two Egyptian 
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mediation sessions (and within days of when one of these ended), increasing the likelihood that it 
influenced and was influenced by the Egyptian efforts. Similar interdependence exists when 
third-parties intervene in other conflicts as well. Therefore, to say that various third-parties are 
unaware of or do not affect each others’ interventions is (at best) empirically naïve and 
inaccurate.  
Although empirics illustrate the connection between conflict management attempts most 
clearly, there are strong theoretical reasons to suspect such connections as well. These 
connections originate from two sources: either disputant or third-party behavior. On the one 
hand, as rational disputants become familiar with third-party intervention techniques (or an 
opponent’s position), they adjust their negotiating strategy to achieve their most preferred 
outcome. Disputants examine previous third-party interventions, assess how they fared in the 
process and outcome, and adapt their strategies to do better the next time. Sometimes 
adjustments move disputants toward peaceful resolution, but not always. For example, through 
such a process of rationally adjusting to conflict management, it is possible for disputants to 
become entrenched in their position as successive negotiations occur. Because leaders invest a 
great deal in creating (and sustaining) a position, the political costs associated with moving from 
their position may become too great to warrant compromise. This is especially the case after 
repeated attempts to settle the conflict, as leaders may be forced to take more aggressive (or 
hardline) stances over time (on a similar point, see Leng 1983). Once these hardline positions are 
established, it is difficult for leaders to reverse course.3 
                                                 
3 Entrenchment can also occur when disputants either strive to save face (that is, to not retreat from a previously 
stated position) or use third-party efforts to prepare for further military conflict (Richmond 1998). In the latter, a 
disputant adopts a non-negotiable (or entrenched) position to prolong negotiations or because the real purpose of 
negotiations is to prepare for battle, rather than to reach settlement. Neither of these, however, seems to tie 
negotiating positions together across disputes in a coherent, predictable way. For example, face saving techniques 
can avert the former, while the latter depends on whether the “devious” disputant wants to negotiate or prepare for 
further military conflict. 
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Israel often finds itself in this scenario with regard to Israeli settlements in the “occupied 
territories.” These settlements enhance the negotiating position of Israel by making it less likely 
that certain disputed land can be returned to the Palestinians in the future (New York Times 
Magazine 2011). For this reason, Israel has encouraged settlement construction over time. 
Dismantling existing settlements (or not encouraging additional ones) is now not only unpopular 
with key domestic groups (see Bueno de Mesquita 2010; Wall Street Journal 2010), but it also 
creates logistical problems in future peace deals (for example, how to relocate Israeli settlers if 
Israel relinquishes the land on which settlements exist to Palestine). It therefore becomes more 
challenging for Israel to change its position. In other words, Isreal’s position on settlements 
became entrenched over time. 
Of course, disputants’ negotiating positions do not always harden. One intervention 
might sow the seeds for a comprehensive agreement to emerge in a later intervention. Greig and 
Diehl (2006) uncover evidence in support of this proposition. During their investigation of 
conflict management within rivalries, they find that past experience with diplomatic 
interventions makes future interventions more likely. This occurs because rivals need time to 
“soften up” – a process by which the disputing states eventually view diplomatic intervention as 
a viable, potential solution to their dispute. Disputants need time to experience the costs of 
conflict and to understand the promise that diplomatic efforts hold. Additionally, disputants often 
need time to learn about the diplomatic intervention process and to realize that their goals can be 
achieved through that process. Thus, just as third-parties often learn “on the job” (see below), so 
too do the disputants. In this way, disputants may become more comfortable with a third-party or 
understand the intervention process better after repeated attempts, thereby creating the possibility 
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that disputants will trust the third-parties and commit further to diplomatic (rather than military) 
avenues for resolving their differences.  
Yet it is not merely disputants that link intervention attempts together. Third-parties also 
pay attention to what is currently being done and what was previously done to address a conflict. 
In two particular scenarios, such connections are stark. First, it is common for the same third-
party to intervene repeatedly in a dispute. For example, in late 1997, Iraq threatened to expel 
United Nations weapons inspectors from its territory, fueling a dispute with the United States 
(which was trying to enforce United Nations resolutions at the time). The dispute’s intensity 
ebbed and flowed, and each time it escalated, Russia intervened diplomatically to facilitate 
negotiations or mediate. Russia was certainly aware of its own previous actions. Further, when 
the crisis escalated, Russia repeated intervention techniques that had been successful previously 
at de-escalating the dispute. This suggests that it not only recalled what it did previously, but that 
it possibly learned from its previous actions as well. I return to this latter possibility in the next 
chapter; for now, however, it is worth noting simply that connections exist, regardless of the 
theoretical mechanism driving them. 
Second, even when different third-parties intervene, there is empirical evidence to 
suggest that they pay attention to the activities of other third-parties. This is most evident when 
multiple third-party interventions occur simultaneously. For example, in October 1998, Turkey 
became frustrated with Syria’s support of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), requested the 
immediate extradition of the PKK’s leader from Syria, and massed troops at the Syrian border. In 
the days that followed, both Egypt (beginning on 6 October) and Iran (beginning on 8 October – 
under the auspices of the Organization of the Islamic Conference) started mediating the dispute. 
The concurrent interventions continued for weeks, and Syria even issued public statements that 
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the two interventions were not in contravention of each other. Therefore, to assume that Egypt 
and Iran were not aware of each other’s efforts (as most current research efforts would) 
inaccurately portrays both interventions. 
A similar situation occurred during a conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) during 1998-2001. The DRC and its allies (Angola, Chad, Zimbabwe, and Namibia) 
fought rebels within the DRC, the latter of which were backed by forces from Rwanda and 
Uganda. This division caused states on opposing sides to attack one another at various times. 
Gaddafi (Libya) mediated a preliminary cease-fire agreement in May 1999 between some 
disputants4 and secured an agreement from the involved states to meet again in Zambia. Acting 
under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community, Zambia then mediated in 
July 1999 and built upon the Libyan agreement to produce the Lusaka accords. Over the next 18 
months, both Libya and Zambia continued to play active roles in mediating the ongoing dispute 
between the combating states. Public statements issued by leaders from both states frequently 
referenced one another’s efforts, thereby confirming their awareness of those efforts.5 
A number of potential third-parties are also affected by other third-party interventions; 
more specifically, actors often choose not to intervene because of the activities of another third-
party. In the Syrian-Turkish dispute mentioned above, Saudi Arabia played a limited role. Saudi 
leaders conferred with Egypt almost immediately when the dispute began. These consultations 
occurred before Egypt’s mediation began. Approximately one week after Egypt started its 
intervention, Saudi leaders issued a statement in support of the Egyptian efforts and explicitly 
ruled out an independent Saudi mediation attempt. Thus, Saudi Arabia conditioned its 
                                                 
4 Libya excluded Rwanda from the talks. 
5 Data for conflicts that occurred prior to 1993 come from Frazier and Dixon (2006). Data after 1993 result from 
information available from Frazier and Dixon (2006), as well as data collection efforts undertaken as part of this 
project. Please see Chapter 3 for more information. 
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intervention response on the actions of another third-party (namely, Egypt). This left Saudi 
leaders on the sidelines (in lieu of intervening themselves), although they maintained contacts 
with all involved parties to remain informed about the dispute and intervention efforts.  
As this example shows, actors that are not directly involved in interventions often remain 
abreast of conflict situations, including the conflict management that occurs within disputes. It is 
therefore not unreasonable to expect those that diplomatically intervene in the dispute to do so as 
well, whether or not their interventions overlap. Actors that intervene have a stronger incentive 
(than those not intervening) to understand exactly what has been (or is being) done so that they 
may productively manage the dispute. The third-parties often must help disputants gradually 
alter their negotiating position – or to “soften up.” If disputant positions harden instead, third-
parties must chip away at the desire to cling to those positions (through the use of various carrots 
and sticks), so that movement toward resolution is possible. All of this requires that third-parties 
pay attention to disputant positions over time and the efforts of third-parties to alter these 
positions from one intervention to the next. 
While equating intervention with mediation (that is, facilitated negotiations) is useful to 
simplify the discussion, the interdependence between interventions is not restricted to mediation 
alone. Other types of third-party conflict management strategies can affect one another as well. 
For example, a peace operation potentially affects mediation in myriad ways. 6 The tasks 
associated with peace operations have expanded greatly over time – from serving primarily as an 
interpositionary force between disputants to monitoring elections and rebuilding a society after 
                                                 
6 The term “peace operations” covers a broad umbrella of missions. Traditional peacekeeping generally involves the 
deployment of an interpositionary force to separate disputants and contain conflict. Such missions are often 
deployed before conflict resolution occurs (that is, before mediation). In contrast, peacebuilding refers to missions 
that are designed to address the root causes of conflict and rebuild conflict-torn societies. These missions are often 
deployed after some amount of conflict resolution occurs (and therefore, after traditional peacekeeping missions). 
Thus, as above, peace operations can precede or follow mediation. For more information on the terms associated 
with peace operations, see Diehl (2006a) and Boutros-Ghali (1992, 1995). I will use the term “peace operations” 
throughout this work to refer broadly to all peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. 
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conflict (see Diehl 2008 for a history of this expansion; see Diehl, Druckman, and Wall 1998 for 
a taxonomy of different peace operations tasks). Although the mandates associated with peace 
operations include a variety of tasks, they usually do not include actively working toward a 
comprehensive resolution of the conflict. Instead, diplomatic efforts to resolve a conflict (for 
example, mediation) are often kept separate from a peace operation (Greig and Diehl 2005). Yet, 
as Greig and Diehl (2005) note, peace operations do alter the conflict environment and, 
therefore, the incentives of disputants. More specifically, peace operations seek to limit open 
military conflict between disputants. This can create a peaceful backdrop that either encourages 
further conflict management (that is, disputants are more likely to negotiate if not actively 
fighting one another) or offers a reprise from fighting that allows disputants to “regroup” before 
fighting again (see Greig and Diehl 2005 for a full discussion of the logic behind these 
mechanisms; on the latter, see also Richmond 1998). 
By limiting the outbreak of violence, peace operations create an opportunity for 
mediation to occur, whether or not the disputes pursue that mediation with the intention of 
reaching an agreement. Furthermore, the peace operation might uncover information that gets 
used in a later mediation session. Knowing who violated a previously adopted cease-fire 
agreement can tell the international community where pressure might be best applied. Similarly, 
independently gathered information can provide a foundation for agreement, either by verifying 
specific claims of the disputants (thereby clarifying key information needed for bargaining), 
confirming or disproving accusations that disputants level at each other, or by serving as a 
mechanism by which third-parties can monitor compliance with an agreement (for example, 
troop withdrawal verification). In short, peace operations might provide mediators with 
information that allows them to influence the course of negotiations. 
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Besides illustrating the theoretical link between intervention strategies, these avenues 
connecting peace operations to mediation also account for various orderings of the two 
interventions. Creating a peaceful environment or collecting information to be used in mediation 
sessions requires the peace operation to precede the mediation. Verifying claims of disputants 
can come before, during, or after the mediation itself. Finally, using peace operations to observe 
compliance with a mediated agreement suggests that the peace operation follows the mediation.7 
Thus, there is no pre-determined ordering to conflict management interventions; it is possible to 
connect interventions in numerous sequences. 
As the above discussion indicates, diplomatic interventions within the same conflict are 
not related by chance. I propose that third-parties strategically select their method of intervention 
based on the characteristics associated with prior interventions in the same conflict. Such a 
proposition contains much face validity. Third-party intermediaries likely understand that their 
intervention decisions influence those of others. Thus, a potential third-party may choose how it 
will intervene based on previous intervention attempts – whether a specific strategy that was 
previously tried succeeded, accomplished enough, or outright failed. Intermediaries may try a 
different strategy when they see one strategy fall short, or they may try the same strategy 
repeatedly with the belief that it will produce the outcome they seek (as the mediators did when 
addressing the crisis between Mauritania and Senegal). 
                                                 
7 Note that this does not imply that a mediation session that precedes a peace operation fully resolves the conflict. 
Disputants can sign a mediated agreement that authorizes a peace operation without resolving the underlying 
conflict in its entirety. This situation occurred in the conflict between the DRC and its neighbors (above). Libyan 
mediation secured an agreement for the deployment of a peace operation, which Libya subsequently deployed in late 
May 1999. The Libyan agreement also established the foundation for further mediation. In short, the conflict 
continued despite an agreement for peacekeepers. In a similar vein, the deployment of traditional peace operations 
requires the consent of the disputants (Diehl 2008). This suggests that peace operations follow some agreement, 
whether formal or not. Yet this does not imply that such agreements fully settle the conflicts to which peacekeepers 
go. Mediation efforts often continue under the umbrella of peace operations (Greig and Diehl 2005; see also Wall 
and Druckman 2003; Wall, Druckman and Diehl 2002). 
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 If third-party interventions are meaningfully interrelated, then two broad questions 
emerge: how does third-party intervention evolve over the course of a conflict, and what guides 
the choices that drive this evolution? From these rather overarching questions come a host of 
smaller ones related to the evolution of intermediaries’ attempts to manage a specific conflict. 
For example, why do third-parties repeatedly use conflict management strategies that fail? When 
do they change strategies? If they do change strategies, what determines the one that they choose 
next? The objective of this project is to develop a better understanding of these questions by 
exploring the interdependence among third-party conflict management attempts in greater detail. 
 
Current (Limited) Conceptualizations of Conflict Management 
Developing a theoretical model for how interventions evolve requires the integration of a 
broad body of conflict management research. Yet two characteristics of current research limit 
such a process. First, researchers typically focus on one conflict management strategy at the 
expense of others. Thus, it is common for scholars to focus on mediation (for example, Beardsley 
2008; Bercovitch and Gartner 2006; Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Greig 2005), peacekeeping 
(for example, Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Stedman 2003), or 
arbitration and adjudication (for example, Allee and Huth 2006; Gent and Shannon 2011), but 
not on all of these strategies simultaneously. Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (2001, 2007) provide a 
comprehensive illustration of the tendency to divide research according to the conflict 
management strategy under investigation. In their edited volumes, various authors cover a broad 
range of conflict management strategies (for example, mediation, diplomacy, legal intervention, 
humanitarian aid) and a spectrum of actors (for example, states, the United Nations, regional 
organizations), but each strategy (and actor) is generally discussed independently of the others. 
   
12 
As their volume indicates, scholars specialize in particular conflict management strategies, which 
results in “islands of research” that speak to the use of only one strategy at a time (Most and 
Starr 1984).  
Most and Starr (1984) recognized similar “islands” within research on foreign policy, and 
their comments are applicable here as well. From their perspective, scholars focused on a series 
of mid-range, foreign policy questions and became experts in very specific niches, while 
simultaneously eschewing efforts to connect their work to broader puzzles. This led to a “general 
failure to conceptualize questions and indicators broadly enough to capture the relationships and 
processes that scholars are actually interested in studying” (Most and Starr 1984:404). The 
tendency of conflict management researchers mirrors that of the foreign policy scholars: mid-
range questions receive emphasis, causing scholars to specialize in increasingly narrow pockets 
of research. Such specialization creates islands with few or no bridges between them. 
As each island takes shape, scholars also lose sight of the larger questions. For example, 
those interested in mediation care broadly about the process by which third-parties foster conflict 
resolution. They simply address this broad question through a limited investigation. Such 
inquiries play a pivotal role in normal science (Kuhn 1996). For the field to advance, however, 
researchers must continually return to the broader questions, lest their research remain 
disconnected from the similar efforts of other scholars in related fields. In short, scholars must 
connect the “islands.” 
That islands of conflict management research exist is not a controversial claim. Yet we 
know that these islands do not reflect the real world; empirically, it is evident that many 
strategies can be (and are) used within the same conflict. If one thinks broadly about the role of 
third-party interventions in conflict management, then a natural question to ask is: how do these 
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strategies interact? This question is critical to understanding how third-parties work toward 
successfully managing and resolving conflict, but this question disappears when research fails to 
account for the possibility that multiple strategies exist (even within the same dispute) and can 
influence one another. As an example, knowing who mediates – a popular topic among conflict 
management scholars8 (see, for example, Bercovitch and Gartner 2006; Bercovitch and 
Schneider 2000; Frazier 2006; Frazier and Dixon 2006; Greig 2005) – may tell us who is most 
likely involved as a third-party mediator within a conflict, but not why they selected mediation, 
as opposed to another conflict management strategy (for example, arbitration). More importantly, 
mediation may also not be chosen specifically because of the other alternatives available (or the 
previous intervention decisions) or because another actor is already involved with another 
intervention strategy; if this is true, then mediation studies miss a significant component of 
conflict management as actors select out of those studies’ samples. Either way, decisions to 
mediate likely affect, and are affected by, the interventions of other third-parties. This point gets 
lost to the extent that scholars address only one intervention strategy at a time. 
 Of course, not all scholars ignore the interactions among conflict management strategies. 
Greig and Diehl (2005), for example, examine third-party mediation efforts that occur within the 
context of peacekeeping operations. They conclude that a peace operation makes mediation (and 
negotiation) significantly less likely; a peace operation that successfully contains conflict 
removes the urgency of further intervention. Yet the conclusion is also limited. Greig and Diehl 
focus primarily on enduring rivals, rather than all interstate disputes. In addition, their study does 
not describe the path that produced either intervention, nor does it consider strategies beyond 
mediation or peacekeeping (and there are many – see Table 1.1 below). Thus, they may provide 
                                                 
8 Other common topics include the effects of more or less coercive mediators on success (e.g., Bercovitch and 
Gartner 2006; Gelpi 1999; Quinn et al. 2006), the proper timing of conflict management (e.g., Greig and Diehl 2006; 
Zartman 2005), and success itself (see below).  
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a better snapshot of conflict management than studies that focus on only one strategy, but the 
picture is still incomplete.  
I hasten to note, however, that despite these limitations, Greig and Diehl’s (2005) work 
underscores the importance of connecting conflict management islands of research. Peace 
operations have downstream consequences that hinder conflict resolution efforts; these effects 
increase if the peace operation is successful. Such a finding provides additional nuance that gets 
lost if one examines only peace operations or mediation (but not both). If interventions have 
downstream consequences on other, future interventions, then one must consider the process of 
conflict management (Diehl 2006b) and account for all intervention strategies simultaneously. 
Only by doing so can these downstream consequences be uncovered. 
 The second obstacle to integrating research involves the dichotomy between conflict 
management “onset” and success. Researchers usually choose to concentrate their efforts on one 
or the other, but rarely both. For example, Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) and Frazier (2006) 
examine the initiation of mediation attempts, but they suspend the question of whether these 
attempts were ultimately successful. In contrast, Bercovitch and DeRouen (2005), Bercovitch 
and Langley (1993), Frazier and Dixon (2006), and Quinn et al. (2006) focus on the success of 
mediation, rather than just its occurrence. Similar divisions can also be found in the peace 
operations literature.9  
Theoretically, the initiation of an intervention relates clearly to intervention outcomes in 
numerous ways. At a most basic level, there cannot be success without an attempt in the first 
place (that is, one cannot finish a race they never start). Yet the connections between initiation 
                                                 
9 On the deployment of peace operations, see Gilligan and Stedman (2003). On the success of peace operations, see 
Doyle and Sambanis (2006). Fortna (2004) attempts to examine both deployment and success in the same study, but 
she gains minimal traction on the former. In the end, she concludes that peace operations are deployed to the “hard 
cases” and that “we do not have a highly predictive model of peacekeeping deployment” (281). 
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and success go much deeper than this, particularly when one views intervention as a process. For 
example, assume that there are three interventions in a given conflict. The second and third 
interventions require the first intervention to fail (at least in part); absent such failure, there is, of 
course, no conflict in which to intervene later.  
Additionally, success or failure may affect strategy selection in later interventions. 
Returning to the hypothetical example, if third-parties try to arbitrate the dispute first, but the 
disputants decide not to abide by the arbiter’s ruling, we would expect third-parties to eschew the 
use of arbitration in the second and third interventions. The disputants have demonstrated an 
unwillingness to commit to that form of intervention, making it suboptimal to use unless the 
disputants alter their positions. In this case, failure leads to a subsequent strategy change. 
However, success can also influence strategy selection. If mediation partially succeeds in the 
first intervention, third-parties may try it again, especially if disputants and third-parties need 
time to familiarize themselves with the process (Greig and Diehl 2006), learn to communicate 
and build trust through repeated interactions (Moore 1996), or use third-party interventions to 
construct better relationships (Bush and Folger 1994; Lederach 1997). Alternatively, successful 
interventions might undercut the value of other strategies. For example, Greig and Diehl (2005) 
find that once a peace operation contains violence, the impetus for third-parties to initiate 
mediation disappears. The success of one strategy (peacekeeping) and the initiation of another 
strategy (mediation) therefore affect one another. Despite these theoretical arguments and 
empirical findings, studies of conflict management generally do not consider the full intervention 
process; unfortunately, they instead examine either intervention or success. As with the previous 
obstacle, some studies do attempt to overcome this limitation by addressing both onset and 
outcome (for example, Fortna 2004), but this is extremely rare. 
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Because of these obstacles, scholars have skirted the question of whether there is a 
theoretical connection between conflict management efforts, especially across actor and strategy 
types. Most research, for example, assumes independence among conflict management 
observations, rather than taking interdependence as a phenomenon to be explored and modeled 
directly. Researchers therefore adjust the standard errors of their conflict management models to 
sustain the assumption that intervention attempts are independent of one another, even as they 
recognize that such an assumption is flawed (Freedman 2006).  
An illustration of scholars recognizing such interdependence while explicitly eschewing 
the direct modeling of that interdependence can be found frequently in the mediation literature. 
Mediation onset (initiation) models often include a “previous mediation” variable; in theory, 
scholars believe that previous mediation efforts make additional efforts more likely, either 
because they allow the disputants to become comfortable with third-parties or the process itself 
(see, inter alia, Frazier 2006; Greig 2005; Greig and Diehl 2006; Greig and Regan 2008; see 
Bercovitch and Gartner 2006 for a larger discussion of this point). Mediation scholars therefore 
generally include a dichotomous variable to capture this interdependence crudely and then adjust 
the standard errors in the models to ensure that mediation attempts within the same dispute do 
not statistically affect one another. Indeed, the “previous intervention” variable is almost always 
statistically significant, which signals that there is some interdependence that begs for 
explanation. Furthermore, this logic, if accurate, applies to more than just mediation. The use of 
any one strategy might make the use of another strategy more (or less) likely as well – either by 
demonstrating the promise or futility of a given strategy, uncovering evidence that another 
strategy might better address the conflict, or directly creating opportunities for other strategies to 
be implemented. In fact, Bercovitch and Regan (2004) provide prima facie evidence in support 
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of connections across strategies; in their models, they find that as the number of previous conflict 
management attempts increase, the likelihood of a successful mediation decreases. Although 
their data are dominated heavily by mediation and bilateral negotiations (which are not third-
party conflict management efforts by definition), their findings do suggest a possible connection 
across conflict management strategies – something the mediation literature itself largely misses 
or ignores. 
To a certain extent, the limitations noted above are to be expected. Developing a theory 
of interrelated conflict management attempts requires researchers to examine multiple actors and 
strategies simultaneously. As most conflict management studies restrict their attention to one 
intermediary strategy, a full theory of interrelated conflict management attempts remains beyond 
their perceived (and defined) scope. To return to Most and Starr’s (1984) language, the “island” 
does not (and cannot) include all actors and strategies. Limited in this fashion (and pushed 
toward increasing specialization), researchers may do no better than to correct for statistical 
interdependence among observations. 
Although such limits are often understandable, this should not preclude attempts to 
overcome them by developing a more inclusive model of conflict management, thereby returning 
conflict management research to the broader questions that fundamentally inform it. The limits 
described above also conveniently highlight the components necessary for a more thorough 
model. Constructing a full path of conflict management within a dispute requires one to examine 
numerous actors and strategies, while accounting for both onset and outcomes (success). In short, 
one must re-conceptualize conflict management as a process of interrelated events throughout 
the life of a dispute, rather than individual instances of distinct interventions. This is a natural 
extension of existing work, but an important one that remains overlooked and therefore 
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underdeveloped. If a variety of third-parties undertake interventions within the same conflict and 
these interventions are linked in a number of ways (and I propose that they are, as noted above), 
then advancing our understanding of conflict management demands that we begin to think more 
broadly about the process of intervention. Existing research has mapped out the islands in some 
detail; it is now time to connect them.  
 
Conflict Management Trajectories 
Conflict management efforts naturally evolve as a conflict unfolds. A dispute between the 
Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and the Yemen People’s Republic (South Yemen) in the 
1970s illustrates this evolution in practice. In 1978, North Yemen accused South Yemen of 
participating in the assassination of the North Yemeni president, Ahmed ibn Hussein al-
Ghashmi. Diplomatic relations with the South were severed, and North Yemen attacked South 
Yemeni positions shortly thereafter. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) attempted to 
mediate the crisis first in September 1978. This did little to ease tensions, however, and the 
dispute persisted. In February 1979, South Yemen invaded North Yemen, which led to further 
interventions. Saudi Arabia immediately appealed for a ceasefire, worrying that the conflict 
would spill over into its territory. A few days later (in early March), a coalition composed of 
Iraq, Jordan, and Syria mediated a ceasefire between the disputing states. Within days of the 
coalition’s mediation, the League of Arab States (the LAS), which had been monitoring the 
situation, demanded the withdrawal of Southern Yemeni troops from the North and established a 
seven-member military observation commission to oversee the ceasefire and troop withdrawal. 
The LAS then mediated a ceasefire between the two sides in mid-March. Finally, Kuwait 
facilitated negotiations at the end of March 1978. The Kuwaiti efforts produced a provisional 
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agreement that provided the foundation for the merging of the two states (Frazier and Dixon 
2006; see also Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). 
The evolution of conflict management during the course of a dispute (as demonstrated in 
the Yemeni case above) can be thought of as a trajectory. The term “trajectory” typically refers 
to an object’s movement through space and time. Physicists, for example, often speak about the 
trajectory of a bullet fired from a gun or of a ball that is kicked or thrown. The concept expresses 
the idea that an object’s location at a specific moment (time t) depends on both its position at an 
earlier time (time t-1) and a series of forces that affect its movement (for example, gravity in the 
case of physics). If the individual positions of an object at each point in time are known and 
aggregated, the result is a path that the object followed. This path, or trajectory, allows us to state 
that an object traveled from one point to another and describe each point it touched along the 
way (and therefore the path that its movement produced).  
The term “trajectory” can be used in a similar sense to explain conflict management 
behavior within a given dispute. Instead of points in space, conflict management trajectories 
(going forward, simply referred to as trajectories) contain two or more third-party conflict 
management attempts.10 In the Yemeni example, these are various mediation sessions, calls for 
ceasefires and troop withdrawals, and a military observation mission. Based on a number of 
theoretical arguments (outlined in the next chapter), there is reason to believe that numerous 
interventions within the same conflict are related to one another; that is, the strategies that an 
intermediary uses at any given moment depend, in part, on the actions of the most recent, 
previous intervention within the same dispute. Aggregating the individual attempts of third-
                                                 
10 Two points are needed to create a path (or line) and, therefore, a trajectory. Isolated interventions have no 
preceding interventions for third-parties to take into account. As such, isolated interventions are not included in the 
analysis below, but are discussed in the conclusion. 
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parties to manage a given conflict thus produces a trajectory – a path of intervention throughout 
the life of a conflict.  
As already noted, trajectories are composed of distinct third-party interventions. These 
interventions possess four noteworthy characteristics. First, each is performed by an actor who is 
not involved in the conflict as a disputant. For simplicity, such actors can be classified as either 
an individual state, a coalition of states, or an intergovernmental organization. The Yemeni case 
nicely illustrates the conflict management role played by each actor type; individual states (for 
example, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait), coalitions of states (for example, the Iraq-Jordan-Syria 
effort), and intergovernmental organizations (for example, the League of Arab States) each 
intervened at some point during the dispute.  
Interventions by other actors (for example, non-governmental organizations) are currently 
excluded from trajectories. The rationale for this decision lies in their membership structure. 
Because non-governmental organizations contain non-state members, they often intervene less 
publicly than states, coalitions, or intergovernmental organizations, making it harder to track 
their activities and, therefore, to ensure that all interventions have been collected. Furthermore, 
the membership structure also means that non-governmental organizations face different 
incentives for interventions than states, coalitions, or intergovernmental organizations. The 
former tend to intervene based on functional area of expertise and to use one type of intervention 
strategy (humanitarian functions, which fall under the administrative category; see below) almost 
exclusively. These characteristics not only make it challenging to include data on non-
governmental organizations in the current study, but they also suggest that non-governmental 
organizations should behave quite differently from the actors I include. I therefore exclude them 
from the present work and relegate their interventions to future research. 
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Second, each actor can intervene using any of a number of conflict management 
strategies. A strategy refers to the particular method that a third-party uses when trying to 
manage the conflict. The options available (broadly) include issuing verbal pleas (for example, 
calls for a ceasefire), conducting mediation, performing legal functions, serving more 
administrative functions (for example, humanitarian efforts or administering a territory), or 
deploying peace operations. In the case of the Yemeni dispute, third-parties used various verbal, 
mediation, and peace operations strategies as the conflict unfolded. 
The full menu of strategies, taken from the Frazier and Dixon (2006) dataset, is presented 
in Table 1.1.11 The table lists the five broad categories of conflict management strategies already 
mentioned: verbal expressions (numbered category 1.0), mediation (category 2.0), legal process 
(category 3.0), administrative (category 4.0), and peace operations (category 5.0). Under each 
category heading in the table, I also list the specific conflict management strategies that fall 
underneath it (according to Frazier and Dixon 2006; see also Dixon 1996). For example, the 
verbal expression category captures all interventions that amount to the issuance of a public 
statement; the intervention is confined entirely to this statement. Third-parties can issue 
statements that request a ceasefire, the use of negotiations to resolve the dispute (as opposed to 
military conflict), or a troop withdrawal. Offers to either facilitate negotiations (that is, use 
“good offices”) or mediate the dispute are also included here if the third-party does not actually 
facilitate negotiations or mediate (on the latter, see below). Each of these types of statements 
appears underneath the verbal expression category in Table 1.1, and we can refer to them 
collectively as verbal (diplomatic) interventions. The other categories in Table 1.1 can be 
similarly disaggregated, and, as with the verbal category above, doing so provides a list of 
                                                 
11 The terminology in Table 1.1 is slightly different than that found in Frazier and Dixon (2006) in two places. These 
changes were made to keep language use consistent throughout the current manuscript. 
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specific strategies that fall under each broadly defined category. Because it is important to 
understand the various conflict management strategies included in this study, it is appropriate to 
describe each category in slightly greater detail.  
The second category, labeled mediation, contains four strategies that are designed to 
facilitate negotiations between disputing states. First, third-parties can conduct a fact-finding 
mission, in which the third-party investigates the facts pertaining to a dispute. Because disputants 
often disagree about the facts, such missions hold the potential to open negotiating space for the 
disputants. At the conclusion of their mission, the third-party often issues a report containing the 
facts uncovered. The report can then be used to clarify the positions and accusations of 
disputants. Second, a third-party could exercise good offices; in this strategy, a third-party 
facilitates negotiations between the disputants, but does not propose any particular solutions to 
the dispute.12 The goal is to bring the parties together for talks. Sometimes a third-party’s clout 
with disputants allows that third-party to orchestrate negotiations without necessarily 
participating in them. Although usages of the term often references the activities of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, any actor type (discussed above) can undertake good 
offices (on the role of the Secretary-General, see Skjelsbaek and Fermann 1996). 
A third-party might go beyond good offices, however, and actually mediate a conflict. 
Under this strategy, the third-party not only facilitates negotiations, but participates in them as 
well. According to Frazier and Dixon (2006), mediators must propose specific, substantive 
options for ending hostilities or resolving the dispute.13 Yet these suggestions are nonbinding, as 
                                                 
12 “Good offices” as conceptualized and operationalized by Frazier and Dixon (2006) comes close to what some 
scholars would label “non-directive” mediation (Moore 1996:53-5; see also Bercovitch 2007, who makes a similar 
point). Similarly, Kressel (2006) outlines three types of mediator intervention: reflexive (for example, building 
rapport), contextual (for example, promoting an environment conducive to conflict resolution), and substantive (for 
example, dealing directly with the disputants’ issues). Good offices might involve the first two, but not the third. 
13 Some scholars might not consider this activity mediation. For example, Slaikeu (2002:45) notes that “on the 
content, or substantive issues, mediators are typically neutral.” Throughout the rest of his work, Slaikeu adopts the 
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the disputants themselves retain ultimate decision-making authority. This makes mediation a 
voluntary process; either the third-party or disputants can end it at any time. Finally, third-parties 
might conduct conciliation. Frazier and Dixon (2006) describe conciliation as a process that 
combines fact-finding with mediation. The third-party investigates the facts involved in the 
dispute, facilitates negotiations between the disputants, and proposes specific non-binding 
options that might resolve the conflict. 
It is important to note that the categorization of fact-finding, good offices, mediation, and 
conciliation under the larger umbrella of mediation is theoretically defensible and, therefore, 
appropriate. Skjelsbaek and Fermann (1996), for example, construct and employ a definition of 
mediation that explicitly does this. Bercovitch and Houston (1996:13) define mediation broadly 
as well – namely as “a process of conflict management whereby parties seek the assistance of, or 
accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or organization to change their behavior, settle 
their conflict, or resolve their problem without resorting to physical force or invoking the 
authority of law” (see also Bercovitch 1992, 2002, 2007; Bercovitch and Langley 1993; who use 
nearly identical definitions). It is clear from Bercovitch and Houston’s definition that the 
activities associated with fact-finding, good offices, and conciliation could easily fall within their 
definition, as each involves a third-party helping address a conflict and none resorts to force or 
law. 
The third category contains legal processes of conflict management. Three specific 
strategies fall into this category. First, arbitration is a process whereby disputants elect to submit 
the dispute to a third-party, whose resolution of the dispute they agree to accept in advance. 
Arbitration of an international dispute can be performed by an international court or by a state, 
                                                                                                                                                             
stance that mediators are “facilitators and coaches,” and should generally not propose substantive options (as 
evidenced particularly in his discussion of how to break an impasse, which does not mention mediator suggested 
solutions at all; pp. 149-155). 
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group of states, or organization. For example, Argentina and Chile settled most of their 
outstanding territorial disputes bilaterally by 1991. However, they were unable to resolve their 
disagreement over the Laguna del Desierto region and agreed to submit it to arbitration by the 
Organization of American States (OAS). The OAS then decided the matter in 1995 (Biger 
1995:40-42; Frazier and Dixon 2006; Huth and Allee 2002:435-436). Similarly, Argentina and 
Paraguay submitted their dispute over sovereignty of the Chaco Boreal area to the United States 
President for arbitration in 1878 (Biger 1995:42-43; Huth and Allee 2002:437), and Colombia 
and Venezuela submitted their territorial dispute regarding the Goajira Peninsula to first Spanish 
arbitration in 1883 and then a Swiss Federal Council for further arbitration in 1917 (Biger 
1995:173-175; Huth and Allee 2002:444-445). In each case, the disputants decided to allow 
third-parties to resolve their disagreements. The third-parties responded in an ad hoc fashion, 
creating tribunals, hearing positions, and issuing rulings on the specific issues handed to them. 
In contrast to arbitration, adjudication is conducted by a standing international court 
when one disputant brings suit against the other. Although arbitration can also involve an 
international organization, it differs markedly from adjudication. In arbitration, the disputants 
must agree to submit the dispute to the organization, which is often not a court. In contrast, 
adjudication allows one disputant to bring suit against another, regardless of whether the second 
agrees fully to the court’s jurisdiction of the matter. This distinction is clearer in domestic 
politics, but stands in the international arena as well.14  
Two examples of adjudication highlight its divergence from arbitration. In December 
1986, El Salvador and Honduras referred their border dispute to the International Court of 
                                                 
14 To be sure, the parties agreed to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court when accepting the Statutes of the 
International Court of Justice. This, however, is not the same as agreeing to submit a particular dispute to the court. 
Thus, arbitration is more ad hoc and consensual, while adjudication is more constant and compulsory. (Note that 
parties can also have specific treaties or reservations that affect the jurisdiction of the Court in particular cases.) 
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Justice; the court heard the dispute and issued a ruling in 1992 (Day 1987:425-428; Biger 
1995:205-206; Huth and Allee 2002:448; International Court of Justice 1986).15 Although 
disputants referred the matter to the court, the court acted because it had jurisdiction in the matter 
(which they confirmed during the proceedings), not simply because they were contacted by the 
disputing states. Similarly, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) brought suit against 
Uganda in June 1999 for committing armed aggression on the DRC’s territory (during the civil 
war in the DRC) in violation of the United Nations Charter. The court recognized that it had 
jurisdiction (regardless of Uganda’s position), heard arguments, and concluded that Uganda had 
violated the Charter and that it could award compensation to the DRC if the disputants could not 
agree on acceptable compensation on their own. In the latter case (much as in domestic politics) 
the respondent need not agree to go to court for adjudication to occur. Finally, related to 
adjudication, a third-party can establish a war crimes tribunal to investigate and prosecute 
violations of international law by the disputants.16 The international community established such 
a tribunal in the aftermath of the Bosnian conflict.  
The fourth category of strategies includes intervention techniques that involve primarily 
administrative functions. These include administering a given territory (as the United Nations 
did through the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor during the period 
                                                 
15 El Salvador appealed the decision in 2002. It lost this appeal in December 2003 (International Court of Justice 
2003). 
16 On a greater elaboration of the distinction between arbitration and adjudication, see Isenhart and Spangle (2000: 
chapter 6). For a legal perspective on this distinction, see Goldberg, Sanders, Rogers, and Cole (2003). Finally, a 
number of studies suggest these legal techniques are useful. Allee and Huth (2006) find that disputing states often 
elect to use legal mechanisms when they require domestic political cover (that is, when a dispute is salient to a 
particular domestic group and leaders want to insulate themselves from the resolution of that issue; Fearon 1994). 
Gent and Shannon (2010) find that legal mechanisms are often more successful at resolving conflict than mediation 
or negotiations.  
   
26 
1999-2002),17 providing humanitarian assistance to those civilians affected by the interstate 
conflict, and supervising or monitoring elections. Third-parties can also help delimit or 
demarcate the border between disputing states; for example, after the Swiss Federal Council 
arbitrated the Colombia-Venezuela territorial dispute, a Swiss commission demarcated the 
boundary on the ground between 1922 and 1924 (Biger 1995:174).18 Finally, third-parties might 
verify the disarmament of the forces from disputing states or help repatriate refugees that were 
displaced by the conflict. Each of these tasks amounts to providing administrative support to 
agreements (or understandings) that disputing parties reach. In essence, the third-party helps 
provide resources (or underwrite an agreement) to ensure that disputants can properly transition 
from conflict to a state of normalcy.  
Finally, the fifth category contains intervention techniques that relate to peace 
operations.19 As noted earlier, peace operations have changed substantially over time (Boutros-
Ghali 1992, 1995; Diehl 2006a, 2008; Mingst and Karns 2000). Traditional peace operations (or 
“first-generation peacekeeping”) focuses on a few key tasks: military observation, in which the 
third-party deploys lightly-armed forces for the purpose of monitoring a ceasefire or withdrawal 
agreement reached by the parties; interpositionary peacekeeping, in which forces create a “buffer 
zone” between disputants and then patrol that buffer zone to discourage the resolution of 
hostilities; and demobilization verification, in which forces monitor the withdrawal of troops 
                                                 
17 I recognize that this was essentially an intrastate dispute. However, this is where examples of the temporary 
administration of territory could be found. The typology in Table 1.1 is exhaustive, so it is possible that some 
strategies are not used often (if at all) in interstate disputes. 
18 Delimitation and demarcation are two different activities (Prescott and Triggs 2008:146-148). Delimitation refers 
to the act of outlining a border on a map (or through detailed description), while demarcation involves marking the 
(earlier) delimitation on the ground, usually through the use of boundary markers (for example, pillars). 
19 As noted above, military operations are excluded from consideration. Peace operations differ from traditional 
military involvement in the following ways: 1) those participating in peace operations do not join the conflict as 
disputants; 2) peace operation forces have a specific mandate, which often involves limiting the outbreak or 
escalation of violence (rather than contributing to it), and 3) peace operations forces tend to have limited rules of 
engagement.  
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according to a previously reached agreement (see Diehl 2006a; Mingst and Karns 2000). The 
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) in the Sinai Peninsula provides a nice illustration of 
a traditional mission, as it performed each of these key tasks; UNEF verified the withdrawal of 
British, French, and Israeli troops from the Sinai, created and maintained a buffer zone between 
Israeli and Egyptian forces, and monitored the cease-fire between Israel and Egypt. 
Peacekeepers operating under traditional mandates often were lightly armed and required 
the consent of the disputing states before and during deployment. This consent played a critical 
role in the deployment of traditional operations; sponsoring organizations believed that they must 
withdraw and terminate a peace operation if a disputant revoked consent for its deployment (as 
Egypt did for the first United Nations Emergency Force in 1973). Additionally, traditional 
missions often deployed after a ceasefire, but before a comprehensive settlement could be 
reached. Originally, proponents hoped that having a third-party capable of preventing renewed 
military hostilities would encourage disputants to use diplomatic avenues to resolve their dispute. 
Recent empirical (Greig and Diehl 2005) and anecdotal (Mingst and Karns 2000) research 
suggests, however, that by creating a peaceful environment, peacekeepers actually remove the 
impetus for negotiations to occur (see preceding discussion). Nonetheless, it is possible for 
peacekeepers to promote conflict resolution, although this may be difficult for them to do 
directly, given the various roles they must perform.20 
In addition to traditional missions, organizations have deployed a number of expanded 
missions (or “second-generation” and “third-generation” operations). These missions emerged as 
the Cold War ended and cooperation among the great powers expanded. As actors deployed 
peace operations to new conflict contexts (for example, failed states like Somalia or civil/ethnic 
                                                 
20 See Wall, Druckman, and Diehl (2002), who elaborate on this point and provide suggestions for how peace 
operations forces might successfully mediate a conflict to which they are deployed. 
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conflicts such as Rwanda), they mandated additional tasks to peace operations forces. Some of 
these tasks fall under the administrative category above, such as election monitoring (for 
example, the United Nations role in Namibia in the late 1980s; see Diehl, Druckman, and Wall 
1998) or verifying disputant disarmament. Yet new tasks were not restricted to administrative 
roles; many required a stronger military presence, rather than a civilian one. The expansion of 
humanitarian crises and civil wars, for example, created a need for actors to protect 
humanitarian aid delivery in order to guarantee its delivery to civilians (as in Somalia in 1992-
1993). Similarly, actors required assistance to clear mines after a conflict ended, so that the 
conflict did not continue having devastating, accidental effects after the cessation of hostilities. 
Finally, organizations began to dabble in preventive missions after the Cold War – deploying 
forces strategically in order to prevent a conflict from escalating within or spreading to new 
areas. This latter mission type is rare, however; one of the only examples of it is the United 
Nations peace operation to Macedonia in 1995, which was deployed to reduce the possibility of 
spillover from the Bosnian conflict. 
As the discussion so far indicates, third-parties have a broad spectrum of intervention 
strategies available to them. The typology used in this study comes from Frazier and Dixon 
(2006), but it is important to note that other scholars have recognized similar typologies, though 
they have not organized them so exhaustively or attempted to collect data systematically on their 
usage. For example, Mingst and Karns (2000) note that the United Nations uses strategies from 
“peaceful settlement” (which they claim includes good offices, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, and adjudication) to peace operations (which they break into peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding). Similarly, Claude (1984) uncovers a variety of mechanisms used by international 
organizations to encourage and facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes. The strategies he 
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mentions include many of those identified by Mingst and Karns, as well as fact-finding missions 
and public statements.21 Although both authors focus upon international organizations, each of 
the strategies mentioned can also be (and have been) used by states and coalitions of states. 
In the analysis presented later, I focus upon the five broad categories (verbal, mediation, 
legal, administrative, and peace operations), rather than the specific strategies encompassed 
under each category. For that analysis, it is important to note that the broad categories presented 
in Table 1.1 are arranged along a relative cost continuum from lower cost (at the top of the table) 
to higher cost (at the bottom of the table). The relative costs of the strategies are interpreted with 
respect to the intervening third-party. For example, third-parties incur a lower cost from using 
verbal expressions as opposed to mediation. The resource and time commitments are much 
smaller when a third-party simply issues a statement (strategies under category 1.0 in Table 1.1) 
than when they agree to investigate facts or help the parties reach an agreement that resolves the 
underlying issues in the dispute (through good offices, mediation, or conciliation; all under 
category 2.0 in Table 1.1). Similar relative cost comparisons can be made between the other 
categories. Descriptive statistics on the frequency of each strategy’s use (outside of and within 
trajectories) can be found in Chapter 3.  
The menu of intermediary strategies underscores the complexity of third-party 
intervention. Actors not only decide whether to intervene, but also how to do so (see Regan 
2000:42-48). These decisions are certainly interrelated; deciding how to intervene implies that an 
actor decided to intervene in the first place. Yet conceptualizing the decision process in this 
                                                 
21 Claude (1984) seems particularly interested in legal strategies and does not directly mention public statements. 
However, he notes that one of the theoretical ways out of conflict is for international organizations to “shine the 
spotlight of publicity upon disputes, exposing the machinations and deceptions of war-minded leaders” (222). This 
publicity could conceivably occur through the use of verbal statements; he believed the publicity would then compel 
the world to demand a “decent and rational solution.” In this way, Claude also suggests a role for public statements, 
although in his analysis, they occur in a collective form. 
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manner highlights the importance of considering how actors select from among the various 
strategies available to them. Intervention strategies vary markedly in cost, as noted above. Third-
parties must consider these costs when determining what strategy to select.  
Intermediaries that issue verbal pleas need very few resources to intervene; it takes very 
little to issue a statement. In contrast, mediation strategies demand that an intermediary become 
more involved in the negotiation process, either by investigating the facts pertaining to the 
dispute, dispatching a representative (or team of them) to facilitate the negotiation process, 
generating substantive proposals, or physically hosting the mediation sessions. The costs of such 
activities involve the time, salaries, and transport of diplomats, as well as any fees associated 
with hosting negotiations (the lodging, travel, and security of foreign diplomats or the use of 
facilities). Legal strategies involve still greater costs. Legal proceedings generally take longer 
than mediation and follow a more formal process. Those deciding a case must hear positions, 
process documents, research claims, and issue rulings. Administrative tasks require the 
commitment of even more resources. For example, providing humanitarian aid can require actors 
to collect, transport, and deliver aid. Furthermore, if a receiving state lacks the infrastructure to 
effectively distribute aid (for example, roads or airports) or requires that aid be protected in 
transit, actors must deploy vehicles capable of reaching remote locations and a force that can 
ensure its delivery. Finally, peace operations entail still greater costs – namely, the deployment 
of military personnel for an extended period of time. Regardless of how intermediaries account 
for these costs in their decision-making, it is clear that they do bear intervention costs according 
to the strategy they choose to employ. I return to how these costs affect the selection of 
intervention strategies in Chapter 2. 
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Cost is not the only factor that influences an intermediary’s choice of strategy, however. 
The concept of a trajectory implicitly assumes that the success or failure of past efforts matter as 
well. As noted earlier, the continuance of a trajectory depends (in part) on the failure of previous 
intervention efforts; there must be something left to resolve in order for intermediaries to 
continue getting involved. Yet this does not imply that failure entirely drives a conflict 
management trajectory. Small successes short of a comprehensive settlement can still leave 
space for additional intermediary intervention. For example, when the border dispute between 
North and South Yemen turned violent in 1972, the League of Arab States mediated on two 
separate occasions. In both instances, they were able to achieve a ceasefire agreement (Brecher 
and Wilkenfeld 2000; Frazier and Dixon 2006). Such agreements certainly fall far short of a 
“comprehensive settlement” (that is, all of the issues were not resolved with finality), but it is 
inaccurate to describe the mediation efforts that produced these agreements as failures. In the 
case of Yemen, mediation did reach an agreement that led to conflict abatement. It also, 
however, left space for additional intervention, which Libya subsequently exploited. After the 
cease-fires were in place, Libya used good offices to help the disputants reach an agreement for 
unification.  
Additionally, failure does not deterministically lead to further intervention. Third-parties 
persistently weigh the costs and benefits of intervention, and these can change over time. Thus, 
intervention might be an attractive option at some times and unattractive at others. One 
mechanism by which this rational calculation changes involves repeated intervention failures. As 
third-parties address a conflict and fail, the benefits of intervention decline (that is, there is little 
hope of successful resolution), while the costs remain intact (that is, a third-party incurs costs 
from intervention, regardless of the intervention’s success). Over time, third-parties can therefore 
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see intervention as a resource trap, which may cause them to “give up” on intervention 
altogether. In a world of finite resources, third-parties may simply conclude that their efforts and 
resources are better spent elsewhere. 
In short, success and failure influence the development of trajectories, but the relationship 
is not straightforward. Success, broadly defined, need not always terminate a trajectory. 
Depending on the outcome of previous successful attempts, there may still be space for 
intermediaries to intervene. Third-parties that achieve limited agreements (such as cease-fires) 
may open the door for other intermediaries to push for a more comprehensive settlement. It is 
only when such comprehensive agreements are reached that conflict management trajectories 
necessarily end. Similarly, failure does not guarantee that a trajectory will end. Sometimes third-
parties lack the motivation for intervention, either because they do not possess sufficient 
resources to intervene in all situations, or because the prospect of a successful intervention seems 
dim (especially after repeated failure). I return to the theoretical role played by success and 
failure in Chapter 2. 
The third characteristic to note about conflict management trajectories derives from the 
first two: coercive conflict management strategies are excluded from trajectories. Such coercive 
strategies include military intervention as well as economic sanctions. This is an important point, 
and one that the Yemeni dispute also illustrates nicely. During the Yemeni conflict, the United 
States supplied weapons to North Yemen and deployed a naval task force to the region. Such 
interventions, however, are not included in my current conceptualization of trajectories (and are 
therefore excluded from the discussion of the case above and the analysis that follows). 
There are two reasons for removing coercive interventions from the current analysis. 
First, as Regan (2000) notes, the costs, goals, and incentives of coercive interventions differ 
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substantially from non-coercive interventions. Although including both of these types of 
intervention is important for creating a unified model of conflict management, I postpone that 
integration for future work. Second, military intervention (a form of coercion) can create 
situations in which the third-party necessarily becomes involved as a disputant in the conflict. In 
such scenarios, the intervening state can no longer be called a “third-party” (in the true sense of 
the term) and their behavior may be viewed differently by the other actors seeking to manage the 
conflict diplomatically. Thus, the shape of conflict management trajectories that include coercive 
strategies may be markedly different from the patterns described below for non-coercive 
intervention. For these reasons, I limit the focus of the current study to non-coercive, or 
diplomatic, interventions. 
  The final defining characteristic of trajectories involves the process by which 
interventions in a trajectory are related to one another. Conflict management trajectories may be 
thought of as paths of related interventions, but these are not “path dependent” processes. In 
recent years, scholars have labeled many dynamic political processes as path dependent in order 
to indicate that “history matters” (Page 2006; Pierson 2000, 2004). Attempts to delineate a more 
precise definition of path dependence have produced a range of classifications. Liebowitz and 
Margolis (1995) find three types of path dependence, each of which depends only upon whether 
the outcome produced by the process is efficient and how much information decision-makers had 
when deciding between options that set the path in motion. In contrast, Pierson (2000) describes 
only two types of path dependence – either a broad or narrow conceptualization (see also Pierson 
2004 and Mahoney 2000). The broad conception indicates that history matters generally, while 
the narrow conception proposes a process that produces a lock-in effect whereby current choices 
constrain the future choices of decision-makers.  
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 Pierson (2000, 2004) believes that the lock-in effect found within the narrow 
conceptualization of path dependence is caused by increasing returns. That is, once decisions are 
made at critical points in time, a self-reinforcing process begins that encourages decision-makers 
to continue down the same path. Institutional design presents a case in point. States designed the 
United Nations Security Council in the aftermath of World War II. Current efforts to reform it 
must start and grapple with the existing structure. Thus, serious reform proposals that seek to 
enlarge the Council include items such as whether the current permanent members keep their 
veto, whether other members should get a veto (e.g., Germany or Japan, both of which could be 
considered major states in the current international system; see Correlates of War Project 2008), 
and whether additional seats would have permanent or rotating status (Weiss 2003). In other 
words, the decision in 1945 to create permanent/rotating members, as well as to create vetoes for 
some states, constrains the options available for reform today.22  
 Although increasing returns may play a prominent role in path dependent processes, they 
are neither necessary nor sufficient for path dependence to occur (Page 2006; Thelen 1999). Path 
dependence should therefore not merely be equated with processes that generate increasing 
returns. Instead, path dependent processes display two characteristics that are discussed and 
demonstrated repeatedly in research on the topic. First, initial conditions have larger effects on a 
path dependence process than later ones. This extreme sensitivity to early decisions blazes a trail 
from which it is later hard to deviate (Diehl 2006; Pierson 2000). For this reason, path dependent 
processes stress (perhaps even overemphasize) early events in a trajectory. Second, the 
sequencing of events matters. Ordering historical events differently can potentially produce 
disparate outcomes. Such thinking necessarily leads to a discussion of counterfactuals. For 
example, one might, as Barnett and Finnemore (2004) do, say that peacekeeping experiences in 
                                                 
22 See also Thelen (1999) who discusses path dependence with respect to institutional change. 
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Somalia and Bosnia led the United Nation’s (UN) Secretariat to prefer a policy of non-
engagement when the Rwandan genocide began in 1994. The earlier failures led the UN to 
believe action to be impossible without the consent of the disputing parties. Had the experiences 
in Somalia and Bosnia been different, significantly delayed, or absent (the counterfactuals), 
Rwandan intervention might have taken a different form. The order of these conflicts mattered 
greatly for subsequent decisions.23 
 Using the two defining features of path dependence, Page (2006) divides dynamic series 
of events into four categories. First, events might be unrelated to each other across time. That is, 
the probabilities of each of two events occurring could be independent of one another. Second, a 
process could be state-dependent. 24 Such processes depend on where one is currently (that is, the 
current state), but not the path taken to get there. Third, a process might depend on the history of 
events, but not the order in which those historical events occur. Page labels these “phat 
dependent” processes to stress both the similarities to and differences from path dependence. 
Finally, both historical events and their order may matter, which defines a path dependent 
process. 
 The current study focuses on conflict management trajectories as state-dependent 
processes, as opposed to either independent, phat dependent, or path dependent processes. This 
decision rests on two factors. In the first place, a trajectory implies that events are interrelated. 
                                                 
23 In fact, one might say the development of peace operations as a whole exhibits a path dependent process. In laying 
the groundwork for the first armed peace operation conducted by the United Nations (the United Nations Emergency 
Force – UNEF), then Secretary-General Hammarskjöld established precedents to which the organization frequently 
returns – such as obtaining the consent of disputants before inserting a peace operation and maintaining force 
neutrality and impartiality (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: chapter 5). Thus, the development of peace operations was 
highly sensitive to initial conditions, and the ordering of peace operations mattered for the trajectory that the 
development of these missions followed (for example, the failure of the UN in the Congo during the period 1960-
1964 led the UN to handle primarily the interstate component of international conflicts for many decades after its 
occurrence; see the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations website at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/). 
24 Unfortunately, the term “state” is used in formal statistical methods language to describe the “state of being,” as 
well as in international relations to refer to the units of the international system. I will primarily use the term for the 
latter purposes, but will note where it is used to refer to the methodology being used. 
   
36 
Third-parties decide when and how to intervene, but to the extent that they incorporate previous 
interventions into their decision-making calculus regarding a current intervention, third-party 
interventions are not independent of one another. This eliminates the possibility of modeling 
third-party interventions simply as independent events (as current research does). 
Additionally, decision-makers retain the ability at each intervention to choose among any 
of the conflict management strategies available in Table 1.1. The history of previous 
interventions does not eliminate strategies from the table;25 indeed, third-parties have all options 
available to them, even if they are relatively unlikely to select them. History therefore matters in 
conflict trajectories. It is the history of interventions along a trajectory that leads to the present 
intervention.  
Despite the importance of history, however, I propose that the entire history of the 
trajectory need not be known to predict the next intervention strategy selected. Rather, all that 
must be known is the current intervention strategy being used. I base this proposition on the fact 
that conflicts change over time. As conflicts evolve and interventions occur, the negotiating 
positions, resources, relationships, and needs of the disputants change as well. This means that a 
recent intervention contains the most accurate information about the dispute, and it is therefore 
upon this intervention that third-parties should form their decisions. For example, if a mediation 
failed in the distant past (that is, prior to the last intervention), the reasons for that failure may 
not apply in the present. Furthermore, any change in the positions, resources, relationships, or 
needs of the disputants that resulted from that distant intervention was already accounted for in 
subsequent interventions. The current intervention not only contains such information, but also 
updates it, thereby allowing third-parties to focus intently on what happened most recently and 
                                                 
25 Leaders may eliminate certain strategies from consideration for other reasons. For example, not every state has the 
resources to undertake high-cost interventions (for example, peace operations). This, however, is not the same as 
saying that the conflict management trajectory removed the possibility of choosing such a high-cost strategy. 
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causing them to discount distant interventions heavily.26 In this way, third-parties access the best 
information at any given moment efficiently when deciding how to intervene next.27 
This process stands in stark contrast to path dependent processes, such as the 
development of organizations. Path dependent processes generally require an entire history of 
events and their sequential order to matter when predicting the next event. Depending on this 
history, some options disappear. Furthermore, certain scholars propose that path dependent 
processes demonstrate a sensitivity to initial conditions and encompass increasing returns 
(Pierson 2000, 2004) although neither of these is necessary nor sufficient (Page 2006). 
Organization change represents a nice illustration of a path dependent process that exhibits the 
characteristics noted here. To predict the next reform of the UN Security Council, for example, 
one needs to know how the organization was founded, its rules and procedures, any past changes 
in the Council’s composition or rules, and the order in which these past changes occur (as they 
might create precedents that guide or hinder further changes). Certain options (for example, 
removing the permanent members’ veto without their consent) also disappear, since the 
organization must follow rules, procedure, and (to a lesser extent) precedent. 
Despite the fact that the entire history (and the sequential ordering of events it includes) 
do not factor into my proposition, note that I do not claim that interventions prior to the previous 
one have no value; each intervention links to the one before it.  Yet information from distant 
interventions falls into one of two categories. On the one hand, third-parties account for any 
useful information derived from that distant intervention when making subsequent intervention 
                                                 
26 The process I describe somewhat mirrors a decay function. However, in my model, I propose (and therefore 
assume) that the value of interventions prior to the most recent one approaches zero.  
27 This process is best thought of as a chain. Each intervention (link of the chain) draws on the intervention prior to it 
and provides information to the one that follows. The entire history (chain) is present, but the links do not depend on 
the entire history. The process I propose here is often referred to methodologically as a Markov chain process, and I 
will use this term to avoid the confusion associated with the term “state” (see above). 
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decisions. Since third-parties update their information at each intervention, it makes little sense 
to return to distant interventions at a later point in the trajectory. The most recent intervention 
already incorporates any pertinent information needed by the third-parties. On the other hand, 
distant interventions can yield impertinent information. Third-parties do not need this 
information, which again discourages them from reexamining distant interventions. Because 
third-parties continually update their information, third-parties can heavily discount distant 
interventions.  
Although one might reasonably ask whether it is appropriate to assume that potential 
third-party intermediaries considering an intervention care only (or primarily) about the most 
recent intervention when deciding what form the next intervention should take, such an 
assumption is extremely plausible for both theoretical and methodological reasons. First, as 
noted above, conflict situations change rapidly, which encourages third-parties to gather 
information largely from the most recent, past intervention when deciding what to do next. 
Third-parties also continually update their information as interventions unfold, thereby 
incorporating pertinent information and carrying it forward for future updating. For these 
reasons, third-parties focus intently on the information that will be of greatest value for their 
current decision, and this comes from the most recent, previous intervention.28 
Second, methodological research further supports the modeling of conflict management 
trajectories as state-dependent processes (Gill 2006; Page 2006).29 The state-dependent process 
noted above – in which current decisions are based only on the most recent past decision – are 
reminiscent of a chain. These Markov chains are based upon both a finite number of categories 
and a transition rule that describes how each category can be reached from any other (Gill 2006). 
                                                 
28 One theoretical alternative involves a third-party considering only their own intervention actions over the full life 
of a given conflict. I return to this possibility in Chapter 6. 
29 Here, state refers to a particular “state of being.” See footnote 24. 
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For conflict management trajectories, the number of categories involved is decidedly finite; these 
are simply the broad categories listed in Table 1.1. Third-parties can chose to intervene in many 
ways, but their choices are limited. At some point, they exhaust the full list of possibilities. Using 
these categories, one can then uncover the likelihood of moving from each category to every 
other category. This produces a distribution that describes the likelihood of moving from any one 
category to each of the others. Cumulatively, these two characteristics define a Markov process 
(by definition), and this process can be found within conflict management trajectories. This 
process is outlined further in Chapter 3. 
 
Organization of the Project 
In this chapter, I outlined the concept of a trajectory, as well as its importance to the 
scholarly study of international conflict management and policy-makers interested in both 
achieving and maintaining peace. By examining multiple actors and strategies and directly 
theorizing about the possible connections between interventions, this project greatly advances 
our understanding of conflict management. It also offers a more realistic picture to policy-
makers. Only by understanding the likely responses of third-parties can those in the policy 
community make informed decisions about their involvement in conflicts.  
I also surveyed existing conflict management research and its myopic tendencies. 
Conflict management research remains highly specialized according to intervention strategy. 
Thus, there are studies of mediation, arbitration, or peacekeeping, but very few that consider the 
full menu of intervention strategies available to third-parties. This has produced numerous 
islands of research. Although many of these islands are well-mapped out, they remain isolated 
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from the broader conflict management questions that motivate the inquiries associated with 
them. The remainder of this project is dedicated to connecting these islands. 
 Chapter 2 examines three general, theoretical mechanisms by which conflict management 
efforts might be linked. First, rational actors may simply condition intervention decisions on 
intervention costs. Third-parties may desire peace, but at the cheapest possible price. This cost 
model implies that third-parties begin with less-costly intervention strategies and employ 
increasingly more-costly strategies as interventions fail. Yet there are reasons to suspect that 
such a simplistic explanation lacks complete accuracy. Third-parties may indeed consider costs, 
but competing commitments, resource limitations, carrying capacity challenges, or domestic 
public opinion may prevent them from escalating their involvement beyond a certain threshold. 
In this variation on the cost model, intervention costs matter, but limited commitments prevail. 
 Yet rational actors need not consider costs alone. As Russian intervention within the Iraq-
United States dispute (presented above) suggests, third-parties might learn from previous efforts. 
In a most basic sense, a behavioral learning model requires third-parties to repeat strategies that 
previously resolved disputes successfully, while eschewing the strategies that failed. I consider a 
number of variations on the learning model to account for potential learning across actors, 
disputes, and interventions. Alternatively, because conflict environments contain great 
complexity, third-parties might possess imperfect information or uncertainty about the best 
intervention strategies to use. This may produce seemingly random behavior.  
After explaining each of these theoretical models in detail, including both their arguments 
and the specific hypotheses derived from them, Chapter 3 discusses the research design for this 
analysis. Besides mentioning the operationalization of variables, I explain the empirical 
construction of trajectories in detail. I also provide some general descriptive statistics about 
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conflict management trajectories, highlighting notable differences between strategy usage 
outside of and within trajectories. Finally, because one main contribution of this project involves 
the collection and refinement of conflict management data for disputes during the 1993-2001 
period, I describe these efforts at some length.  
Chapter 4 presents the quantitative analysis of conflict management trajectories. These 
empirical models evaluate the various hypotheses derived from the competing models in order to 
determine which comes closest to explaining intervention behavior. Chapter 5 supplements this 
analysis by taking a more practical tack. While the previous chapter used historical data to 
understand general trends in trajectories, this chapter contains brief case studies that illustrate 
each theoretical model in action. It also provides forecasting analysis that may be of interest to 
policy-makers. Given a conflict with certain characteristics, I then forecast the likelihood of 
various conflict management paths. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the key findings of this 
project, points toward potential avenues for future research, and examines the implications of my 
conclusions for both the scholarly and policy communities. 
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Tables 
Table 1.1: Third-Party Conflict Management Intervention Strategies 
Cost Category Number Strategy 
Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
Verbal Interventions 1.1 Ceasefire appeal or demand 
1.2 Negotiations appeal or demand 
1.3 Troop withdrawal appeal or demand 
1.4 Offer to facilitate negotiations 
1.5 Offer to mediate negotiations 
Mediation Interventions 2.1 Inquiry/fact-finding 
2.2 Good offices 
2.3 Mediation 
2.4 Conciliation 
Legal Interventions 3.1 Arbitration 
3.2 Judicial settlement 
3.3 War crimes tribunal 
Administrative Interventions 4.1 Temporary administration 
4.2 Humanitarian assistance 
4.3 Plebiscite/election supervision/monitoring 
4.4 Boundary delimitation/demarcation 
4.5 Disarmament verification/inspection 
4.6 Repatriation assistance 
Peace Operations 5.1 Military observation 
5.2 Preventive peacekeeping 
5.3 Interpositionary peacekeeping 
5.4 Humanitarian protection 
5.5 Demobilization monitoring/verification 
5.6 Mine-clearing/sweeping 
Notes: The organization of strategies comes from Frazier and Dixon (2006). 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Theory behind Conflict Management Trajectories 
 
  
In order to examine trajectories, it is necessary to reframe the study of international 
conflict management in two ways. First, conflict management must be conceptualized as a 
process that occurs throughout the life of a conflict. Although envisioning conflict management 
as a process is not entirely new (see, for example, Regan and Stam 2000), it is rarely done and, 
when it exists, tends to be myopic. Those studies that do consider conflict management as a 
process examine only certain components of that process (for example, mediation; see Regan and 
Stam 2000). Trajectories require that this scope be broadened. Second (and related to the first 
point), the focus of analysis within trajectories shifts from the individual conflict management 
attempt to the conflict itself (see also Regan and Stam 2000 on this point). Third-party 
interventions do not occur in a vacuum. Rather, they exist within a specific conflict context, and 
this context evolves over time. The theoretical conceptualization of trajectories proposes that 
third-parties pay attention to the interventions of others within the same conflict when deciding 
how they should intervene (assuming that they decide to do so). Implicitly, this requires that 
conflict management research refocus on the conflict itself, as opposed to isolating and studying 
the individual efforts to manage or resolve it. 
 In the previous chapter, I outlined some defining characteristics of trajectories – namely, 
that trajectories include multiple actors, account for a full menu of conflict management 
strategies, exclude coercive interventions (that is, military interventions or sanctions), and are 
“state dependent” (rather than path dependent) processes (on this last characteristic, see Page 
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2006).1 Trajectories also must include more than one conflict management attempt, as it is 
impossible to connect interventions if only one occurs within a particular conflict. Building upon 
these defining characteristics, this chapter explores three broad, competing theoretical models 
that explain how interventions within a trajectory are interdependent: a cost model (and a 
variation on that model, the limited commitments model), a behavioral learning model, and a 
random (or baseline) model. After discussing third-party motivations for intervention generally, I 
outline the logic underlying the above models, as well as the specific hypotheses derived from 
each. 
 
Intervention Decisions 
Two interrelated decisions drive third-party interventions. First, a third-party must decide 
whether or not to intervene. The outcome of this decision largely reflects the interests of the 
third-party (Princen 1992: chapter 2). The third-party may have an overall interest in peace, but 
this need not be the case. Third-parties can also have other interests, which are best realized 
through a successful, diplomatic intervention. These include preventing the spread of conflict to 
new areas (perhaps even their own territory), extending their influence throughout the world, 
developing a reputation as a competent conflict manager, or preserving general security in a 
region. In addition to such indirect interests, a third-party might also be interested in the 
particular issue(s) under dispute and therefore possess certain preferences regarding how these 
issues are resolved (what Princen 1992 calls a “principal mediator”). This gives the third-party 
an incentive to help shape the substance of a peace agreement or ensure that one disputant 
“wins” the dispute (or does not). Regardless of the benefit received in any particular 
                                                 
1 The term “state” here does not refer to state actors (or countries). Instead, it refers to a particular process by which 
conflict management attempts are connected within a trajectory. See Chapter 1 for more information. 
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circumstance, third-parties receive something in exchange for their efforts. Even those third-
parties that seem to be neutral have some (indirect) interests at stake – for example, a desire for 
peace or to build a solid reputation as a competent conflict manager. If third-parties receive 
absolutely no benefit from intervention, they will almost assuredly not attempt one.2  
Once third-parties decide to intervene, they must next determine what conflict 
management strategy to use during their intervention. As noted earlier, third-party intermediary 
intervention options range from low- to high-cost – from verbal demands to peace operations 
(see Table 1.1). The selection of a strategy, while presented here as a simple decision, is certainly 
complex. Not all strategies will be appropriate for each conflict, either because they are unlikely 
to achieve their desired end, seem inappropriate to disputants (who often must acquiesce to a 
strategy’s use), or are undesirable for the third-party (who must possess the resources to execute 
the strategy and a willingness to use those resources for an intervention; Most and Starr 1989).  
I focus primarily on this second decision: the choice of intervention strategy. This focus 
allows me to address why third-parties select intervention strategies at particular moments. The 
choice of strategy also determines the shape of conflict management trajectories (in other words, 
this is where the interdependence among third-party interventions lies), as I make more evident 
below. Despite this focus, I do not ignore the initial decision to intervene. That initial decision is 
intricately connected to the choice of strategy. In fact, policy-makers often make the two 
decisions simultaneously – whether to intervene comes along with how to do so. Therefore, for 
                                                 
2 An exception to this general statement occurs if the third-party is altruistic. For example, one could argue that the 
recent Responsibility to Protect (R2P) movement encourages interventions based solely on the welfare of civilians 
(Weiss 2007). I do not consider this type of behavior here. Not only does addressing altruistic motives require me to 
relax the assumption of rationality (see below), but it is not clear that actors base their interventions on such motives. 
Returning to the R2P movement, Bellamy (2010) finds that the international community applies the norm of 
“altruistic humanitarian intervention” inconsistently – most likely because the norm has not yet been internalized by 
international actors. Without being internalized, R2P cannot currently guide intervention decisions. Furthermore, the 
data used in this study predates the R2P movement, making its influence in this study irrelevant. Despite these 
limitations, I return to the implications of relaxing the rationality assumption in the conclusion of this work. 
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analytical ease, I assume that the two decisions are made simultaneously (that is, one cannot 
determine how to intervene without also deciding to intervene in the first place). I also explore 
the factors associated with intervention theoretically and empirically before considering strategy 
selection in greater detail. 
Throughout the decision-making process (and the analysis that accompanies it), I make 
four additional key assumptions. First, I assume that third-parties are rational actors. Scholars 
regularly make this assumption in international relations research, including in studies of conflict 
and its management (Greig and Regan 2008; Regan 2000; see also Bueno de Mesquita 1981; 
Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith; Fearon 1994, 1995; Powell 2006; Wagner 
2000).3 It is therefore not a controversial assumption, although it does have certain implications 
for the analysis that follows. In its most basic form, rationality requires that third-parties examine 
the costs and benefits of intervention (and strategy selection). If the costs of intervention 
outweigh the benefits (that is, the expected utility of intervention is negative), then rational third-
parties do not intervene. On the other hand, if the benefits of intervention outweigh the costs 
(that is, the expected utility is positive), then the rational third-party will opt to intervene.4 After 
deciding whether to intervene, rational third-parties then construct and evaluate cost-benefit 
                                                 
3 Other conflict management studies regularly assume something similar to rationality. For example, Beardsley 
(2008) examines mediators’ effects on producing short-term versus long-term agreements. His argument (which 
emphasizes sharing information with and manipulating the cost functions of disputants) mirrors the bargaining 
literature on international conflict, which leads one to believe that Beardsley assumes mediator rationality even 
though he does not explicitly assume it. Taking a somewhat different tack, Princen (1992:16) claims that he wants to 
move “beyond rationality.” To a certain extent, he accomplishes this through his distinction between principal and 
neutral mediators. Yet the neutral mediator must have interests that compel it to mediate, especially when mediation 
incurs costs; otherwise, the mediator is altruistic, a quality that Princen explicitly does not wish to address. The key, 
then, is to understand that mediators can have interests (for example, avoiding the expansion of conflict, helping the 
parties reach agreement, or developing a reputation for being a competent mediator) that are not related to the issues 
being disputed and  that therefore allow the mediator to be both rational and neutral by Princen’s definitions.  
4 See Regan (2000:42-48), who presents expected utility equations for this decision. According to his model, the 
decision to intervene depends on the probability that the conflict can be settled without intervention, the costs of 
intervening versus not intervening (for example, material and audience costs), the utility of continued fighting, and 
the probability of a successful intervention. 
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calculations for the use of each intervention strategy. They select the strategy that provides the 
greatest expected utility (after accounting for information from previous interventions).  
Assuming rational third-party actors leaves room for numerous theoretical explanations 
of their behavior. There are, however, two behavioral explanations that are specifically excluded. 
First, rational third-parties do not act altruistically; that is, a rational third-party is not willing to 
incur large costs purely for the benefit of others. Instead, the third-party must receive some 
benefit from intervention, even if that benefit is not directly related to the issues under dispute 
(for example, building a reputation as a conflict manager or preserving peace in a given region). 
Second, assuming rationality precludes irrational behavior by definition. Beyond altruism, this 
can occur when a third-party decides to incur large costs (with minimal or no benefits) or makes 
sub-optimal decisions (that is, decisions that do not maximize expected utility) given certain 
information. Since diplomatic interventions are usually transparent (at least in the sense that 
others know they are occurring) and leaders must commit resources to undertake them, decision-
makers can face audience costs for inappropriate decisions (Fearon 1994; Weeks 2008). This 
should make irrational interventions extremely rare events. Despite this, I consider the 
implications of relaxing the rational assumption in the concluding chapter. 
The remaining assumptions come from the work of Regan (2000), who examines 
coercive interventions within civil wars. The second assumption maintains that third-parties 
reasonably expect their intervention to be successful before undertaking it. Third-parties seek to 
manage conflict productively. Those that think intervention has a minimal chance of success will 
not attempt it. This assumption dovetails nicely with rationality; the benefits of intervention 
come primarily through successful intervention because third-parties undertaking unsuccessful 
interventions incur costs while receiving minimal benefits. This holds for various types of third-
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party benefits, as even those third-parties with a substantive interested in the issues under dispute 
gain benefits only if an agreement can be reached. Therefore, rational actors should avoid 
interventions that promise more failure than success. 
The third assumption proposes that third-parties possess short time horizons for 
interventions. Third-parties respond to immediate conflict situations. Violence and the negative 
consequences associated with conflict generally capture their attention, and they therefore seek 
to address these problems before attempting conflict resolution.5 The short time horizon stems 
from more than just a desire to respond to the immediate demands of a conflict, however; it 
results from the costs and benefits associated with intervention in two ways. First, regardless of 
the strategy they use, third-parties incur more costs for intervening over a long period than for a 
short intervention (for example, the peace operations force in Cyprus has been deployed since 
1964, and third-parties occur additional costs each time the United Nations extends the mission’s 
mandate). Third-parties certainly want their interventions to be successful, but they also wish to 
avoid extended conflict management situations. Second, it is possible that as a conflict becomes 
protracted, third-parties may see intervention as less likely to resolve the underlying dispute (that 
is, the benefits of intervention decrease). There is still room for conflict management as a 
protracted dispute ebbs and flows, but such interventions treat the symptoms of conflict, not its 
root causes. Conflict management requires only a short time horizon (for example, to secure 
Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2006), while resolution demands a longer one (for example, 
to create a two-state solution). Because rational third-parties experience fewer benefits and 
greater costs to intervening in protracted conflicts (that is, those that would require longer time 
                                                 
5 Generally speaking, conflict management involves mitigating the immediate effects of conflict. Those that seek 
conflict management try to end the fighting and address the consequences that accompany such fighting. Conflict 
resolution, on the other hand, tries to address the root causes of conflict so that it does not occur again (see Burton 
1990). The former treats the symptoms of conflict, while the latter treats its fundamental causes. 
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horizons), it makes sense that third-parties possess short time horizons or eschew intervention 
altogether. 
A number of scholars find empirical support that is consistent with the above logic. Diehl 
and Goertz (2000), for example, find that when mediation successfully produces a partial or full 
agreement between enduring rivals during the period 1946-1992, it does not affect the likelihood 
of a future war (although successful mediation did make future disputes less severe and prolong 
the time until the next dispute).6 Similarly, Beardsley (2008) contends that mediated agreements 
may suffer from time inconsistency problems – that is, they are successful in the short-term but 
fail in the long-term (see also Greig 2001, who finds that the factors associated with mediation’s 
short-term differ from those that produce long-term success). Both studies point to effective 
conflict management (that is, mitigating the effects of violence), but poor conflict resolution (that 
is, resolving underlying issues); third-parties make gains in the short run that get reversed in the 
long run, as another dispute occurs or the agreement fails.  
Yet conflict management within protracted conflicts may not be successful. For example, 
Regan and Stam (2000) uncover evidence that third-party interventions can (and often do) 
prolong dispute duration.7 If true, this suggests that third-party interventions make conflicts 
somewhat worse (see also Richmond 1998). In short, the evidence suggests that third-parties 
may not be able to effectively resolve (or, perhaps, manage) protracted conflicts. The termination 
of such conflicts might instead require a political shock (see Diehl and Goertz 2000) or the 
                                                 
6 Other work on conflict management within rivalries tends to use the enduring rivalry classification as a case 
selection device (Greig 2005; Greig and Diehl 2005), making it difficult to corroborate or obtain additional detail on 
Diehl and Goertz’s (2000) findings. 
7 Regan and Stam (2000) also find that the effects of mediation vary over the life of a dispute. Mediation is most 
successful (able to end the dispute) in interstate disputes when conducted very early or late in the dispute; 
mediations that occur within intermediate conflict phases tend to prolong dispute duration. Interestingly, in their 
study of civil war, Greig and Regan (2008) discover that disputants are most likely to reject a third-party’s mediation 
offer early and late in the conflict. Though the two sets of cases are different (interstate vs. civil conflict), there is an 
implication that deserves greater attention: it seems that disputants may be most likely to reject mediation at the 
exact times at which it is most likely to succeed in resolving the conflict. This remains to be directly tested. 
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passage of time (Bennett 1998). It is therefore reasonable for third-parties to see fewer benefits 
and more costs associated with interventions into protracted conflict. In the end, their time 
horizon remains short both to address the immediate consequences of conflict and because 
extending the time horizon seems irrational. 
Finally, I assume that the decision to intervene clears any domestic opposition hurdles. 
Various domestic constituencies have an interest in foreign policy, including diplomatic 
interventions. Some constituencies will view intervention as a necessary policy under certain 
conditions, while others will paint it as imprudent or against the national interest. Delving into 
the domestic forces that shape intervention decisions is important, but it is also beyond the scope 
of the current work. The mechanisms by which actors reach their intervention decisions 
comprises a separate (albeit related) research agenda. Because I am not interested in the domestic 
decision-making apparatus per se, I suspend consideration of this apparatus for now. What 
matters in this study is that third-parties reach a decision about intervention, regardless of the 
internal processes that produces that decision. 
Thinking of third-party decisions to intervene as a two-step process highlights the idea of 
a conflict management trajectory presented earlier. A trajectory is the aggregate representation of 
all third-party intervention decisions within a given conflict. Intermediaries that choose to 
intervene will be included in the trajectory, while those that do not will be absent. The strategies 
selected by the intervening intermediaries will determine the shape of the trajectory.  
As an example, I return to the Yemeni dispute presented in Chapter 1. In 1978, North 
Yemen accused South Yemen of participating in the assassination of the North Yemeni 
President, Ahmed Hussein Ghashmi. After severing diplomatic relations with the south, North 
Yemen then referred the matter to the League of Arab States, which authorized its members to 
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suspend diplomatic relations with South Yemen as well. This, however, did little to settle the 
matter, and North Yemen attacked South Yemeni positions in the days that followed. The 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) attempted to mediate the crisis first in September 
1978. Unfortunately, PLO efforts proved unsuccessful, and the dispute persisted. In February 
1979, South Yemen invaded North Yemen, which led to further interventions. Saudi Arabia 
immediately appealed for a cease-fire, worrying that the conflict would spill over into its 
territory. A few days later (in early March), a coalition composed of Iraq, Jordan, and Syria 
mediated a cease-fire between the disputing states. Within days of the coalition’s mediation, the 
League of Arab States (LAS), which had been monitoring the situation, demanded the 
withdrawal of Southern Yemeni troops from the north and established a seven-member 
observation commission to oversee the cease-fire and troop withdrawal. The LAS then mediated 
a cease-fire between the two sides in mid-March. Finally, Kuwait facilitated negotiations at the 
end of March 1978. The Kuwaiti efforts produced a provisional agreement that provided the 
foundation for merging the two states (Frazier and Dixon 2006; see also Brecher and Wilkenfeld 
2000). 
In the Yemeni case, the conflict management trajectory includes the interventions of 
Saudi Arabia, the Iraq-Jordan-Syria coalition, and the LAS.8 Each of these actors decided to 
intervene in the conflict, which explains their inclusion in the trajectory. Additionally, each actor 
chose a specific strategy to employ while intervening. I sketch this trajectory graphically in 
Figure 2.1. The horizontal (x) axis represents time, and I display the beginning and end dates of 
interventions along this axis. The vertical axis (y) indicates the strategy selected. Following the 
cost structure discussed in Table 1.1, the least costly category of strategies (verbal) appears 
                                                 
8 The project currently excludes the role of non-state actors, since many of these actors have motivations that differ 
substantially from states, coalitions of states, or international governmental organizations. Therefore, the PLO’s 
efforts are not included in the trajectory. 
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closest to the origin of the graph. As one move up the vertical axis, the intervention strategies 
increase in cost. Finally, the shaded boxes indicate the strategy selected by a third-party at a 
given moment during the dispute. 
As Figure 2.1 illustrates, the third-parties that intervened in the Yemeni dispute used a 
variety of strategies – from verbal pleas to mediation to a peace operation (observation mission). 
The timing of these interventions suggests that parties started with low-cost strategies first, 
before moving on to more costly interventions. For example, Saudi Arabia (the first intervener) 
used a verbal strategy, while the Iraq-Jordan-Syria coalition subsequently tried mediation. Yet 
the third-parties were not simply focused on costs. The Iraq-Jordan-Syria mediation successfully 
produced a cease-fire, which perhaps encouraged Kuwait to try mediation a few weeks later. 
Regardless of the motivations behind each strategy’s selection, Figure 2.1 demonstrates that a 
trajectory can be represented visually and that such graphics provide a concise summary of how 
strategies are ordered – both temporally (x axis) and with respect to costs (y axis). In other 
words, figures like the one presented above sketch the shape of trajectories. I will use similar 
figures later in this chapter when discussing the various theoretical shapes that trajectories can 
take. 
The two-step decision process mentioned above mandates a need to explore both why 
states intervene and how they select specific intervention strategies. I devote the remainder of 
this chapter to these two broad questions. While I assume that third-parties make these decisions 
simultaneously, the motivations that guide each decision differ. That is, the incentives that 
prompt an intervention diverge from those that guide strategy selection. I therefore separate these 
questions for the purpose of the theoretical discussion that follows. I begin with the decision to 
intervene, after which I turn to the factors that influence the selection of intervention strategies.  
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Why Intervene? 
As noted above, third-parties intervene as conflict managers for many reasons. Some 
third-parties have a substantive interest in the issues under dispute, while others seek more 
indirect benefits (see Princen 1992). Regardless of the specific motivation for intervention, 
however, an intervention costs the third-party something – either in time, resources, or both 
(although these costs vary according to the strategy selected; see Table 1.1). Therefore, if we 
assume that states are rational actors, then intermediaries must obtain some benefit in exchange 
for their services – something to offset the costs. Without any such benefits, intervention 
(regardless of the strategy chosen) would always produce negative utility, be considered 
irrational, and consequently be avoided. In other words, intervention cannot occur among 
rationally acting states if no benefits exist.  
The fact that intervention occurs at all suggests that benefits do exist.9 We must then ask 
where these benefits might be found. Why do third-parties care to intervene in other states’ 
conflicts? What good does diplomatic intervention do for the third-party? What do they receive 
in exchange for their efforts? In pursuing an answer to these questions, I find that three general 
benefits seem most likely to motivate third-party intervention. 
First, a state may have interest in maintaining the status quo. Ikenberry (2001), for 
example, argues that states that are victorious in war design institutions to create and preserve 
order after the war ends. These institutions reassure weaker states that the strong states will not 
take advantage of them and commit every state to a common set of institutional rules. Although 
these rules often benefit the strong states disproportionately, all states are likely to agree to the 
                                                 
9 The other logical possibility is that states are irrational.  Since I assume rationality, I postpone such considerations 
for future work. 
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rules, as this creates stable expectations about interstate behavior. We can extend Ikenberry’s 
logic beyond the realm of institutional design to the conflict management behavior of third-
parties as well. If the strong want to preserve the status quo, then they need to do more than 
design institutional rules. They also must resolve disagreements that arise, for these military 
conflicts represent potential threats to the stability of the status quo.  
The desire to maintain the status quo should be strongest among major states (as opposed 
to minor states). Major states possess a large concentration of capabilities (military, economic, or 
both), global interests and reach, and recognition from other major states that they belong “in the 
club” (Small and Singer 1982; see also Maoz 1989).10 The major states are also the ones that 
design institutions, according to Ikenberry’s (2001) argument. This handful of states atop the 
community of nations has the most to lose from system instability. They therefore strive to 
preserve the status quo, as well as to extend their influence throughout the world. Their interests 
provide them with the willingness to intervene in international conflicts, while their 
concentration of capabilities supplies them with an opportunity to do so (Most and Starr 1989). 
Despite the importance of major states, I do not wish to imply that minor states have no 
interests or tacitly accept threats to the status quo. Regional powers in particular may also want 
to preserve the status quo order within their respective neighborhoods (for example, India in 
southern Asia, Brazil in South America, or Nigeria or South Africa in Africa; see Frazier and 
Stewart-Ingersoll 2010). Similar to major states, regional leaders have the most to gain from 
regional stability and the most to lose from its demise. The special status they enjoy may not 
hold if conflict restructures the region. Yet, as their name implies, regional powers are limited 
geographically in both their interests and capabilities; they do not maintain interests in, nor can 
                                                 
10 The Correlates of War (COW) Project identifies major states in the international system according to the 
guidelines set by Small and Singer (1982). See Correlates of War Project (2008). 
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they project capabilities into, every region of the world.11 The point is not that minor states have 
no interest in intervention, but rather that major states have greater motivation (and resources) to 
conduct interventions than their minor state counterparts.  
Second, states may want to prevent the spread of militarized conflict. As Most and Starr 
(1980) note, states that are contiguous to warring states have an increased likelihood of 
experiencing a subsequent war themselves. Houweling and Siccama (1985) offer a rationale for 
this empirical finding, which they then confirm over a longer time period than Most and Starr. 
They propose that states can only tolerate so many conflicts at a time; therefore, states already 
involved in conflict are unlikely to get involved in other conflicts that arise. These “preoccupied” 
states are more likely to use their resources to address an existing conflict, rather than to split 
their resources by joining additional conflicts, especially since each state possesses finite 
resources and wants to win the conflicts to which they commit (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, 
and Woller 1992; Fearon 1994; Weeks 2008). With certain states occupied or weakened due to 
battle, the door opens for nearby revisionist states to instigate additional conflict in the region. 
Thus, Houweling and Siccama believe wars cluster regionally, and they find evidence of such a 
pattern.  
Opportunistic states may take advantage of weakened neighbors or of regional leaders 
who are unable to fight another war. Yet states are not universally revisionist. Indeed, the 
majority of states do not seek to overturn the status quo most of the time. States have strong 
incentives to avoid unnecessary militarized conflict – not just because of the costs in terms of 
resources or human life, but also because conflict creates instability, the outcomes of such 
conflicts are uncertain, and the mismanagement of conflict potentially contains the seeds for a 
                                                 
11 See Buzan and Waever (2003), who use a similar logic during the construction of their regional security 
complexes. They argue that some security matters rest at the regional (rather than global) level and identify a 
number of regional leaders.  
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leader’s demise (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992, Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, 
Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Fearon 1995; Wagner 2000).  
Beyond these incentives to avoid participating in conflict, states also have an interest in 
actively managing nearby conflicts diplomatically for two reasons. First and foremost, states are 
more likely to become involved in a conflict to which they are contiguous (Siverson and Starr 
1990). Put differently, conflicts can spread, and those states that are closest to an existing conflict 
are at greatest risk for such contagion. The risk results from geographic proximity generally, as 
well as its effects. States maintain greater ties to nearby states (for example, trade) than to those 
farther away, and these ties serve as conduits that transmit conflict. Kadera (1998) not only 
provides a theoretical backdrop for these transmission mechanisms, but also explains their 
implications for conflict. She finds through a series of simulations that the probability of conflict 
spreading remains positive, even if states erect stronger barriers to conflict contagion. In other 
words, one cannot entirely eradicate the possibility that conflict will spread. Therefore, to avoid 
the costs of conflict entirely, states often must consider intervening as a third-party in neighbors’ 
disputes. The inability to help disputants reach agreement could draw a neighbor into unwanted 
conflict.12 
Second, even if the conflict itself does not spread to contiguous states, neighbors 
experience the consequences of that conflict (see Grieg and Regan 2008 for a similar argument 
with respect to mediation offers and civil wars; see also Gleditsch 2002 for an argument about 
the regional dynamics of international politics). The clearest example of such consequences 
involves the movement of refugees, who often try to escape a conflict environment by crossing 
into a third-party state. For example, during a dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000, a 
                                                 
12 See also Bremer (1992), who finds that contiguity best predicts dispute and war occurrence. While this finding 
does not address conflict contagion directly, it does suggest that states that worry about getting involved in a conflict 
should be extremely concerned with their neighbors’ behavior. 
57 
 
number of refugees fled to neighboring Sudan. Similarly, after the United States invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001, Iran set up refugee camps in its territory for those that had fled the conflict 
zone. These refugees can place great demands on the resources of a host state – not only in terms 
of land on which to live, but also in the form of food, water, and social services needed by the 
refugee population.  
Beyond this, massive refugee flows can also cause militarized disputes between states.13 
For example, in January 1993, the security situation in Togo deteriorated when Togolese soldiers 
rioted. Because these Togolese soldiers frequently targeted civilians in order to pressure their 
government, a number of Togolese refugees fled to neighboring Ghana. In response to the 
refugee flows, Ghana placed its forces on alert, primarily so that the military could assist the 
refugees crossing its borders. Unfortunately, Togo perceived the alert status as “war mongering,” 
accused Ghana of attacking it, and eventually closed its border with Ghana. The two neighbors 
then sporadically fought one another militarily for a couple of years.  
In the case of Ghana and Togo, refugee flows produced a dispute. Yet they also provided 
an incentive for other neighbors to intervene diplomatically as I argue above. Benin, Togo’s 
neighbor to the east, also received a massive influx of Togolese refugees after the soldiers in 
Togo rioted (United Nations 2011). In contrast to Ghana’s actions, however, Benin did not put its 
forces on alert. It opted instead to work diplomatically to manage the conflict. Throughout the 
various Ghana-Togo disputes that followed, neighboring Benin intervened repeatedly using both 
verbal pleas and conciliation (a form of mediation that includes fact finding as well as the 
facilitation of negotiations). Benin’s efforts did not successfully resolve the dispute(s). Instead, a 
series of bilateral talks between Togo and Ghana eventually restored relations between the 
formerly disputing states. Regardless of how the dispute ended, however, Benin did have 
                                                 
13 This may be one mechanism by which conflict spreads to neighboring states. 
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incentives to intervene. These incentives were based on the threat of the conflict spreading to 
Benin, as well as the refugee situation caused by that conflict. 
I have outlined two theoretically possible rationales that might motivate third-parties to 
intervene in nearby conflicts: the direct threat of a conflict spreading and the possibility that the 
effects of conflict can be felt by neighbors. Whether these rationales work individually or in 
tandem, they provide mechanisms by which actors might desire a diplomatic solution to an 
interstate dispute. Of course, each rationale makes the most sense for states that are closest to the 
conflict. South American states, for example, are unlikely to fear that an African conflict will 
spread to them. Even within a region, the effects of conflict may not be felt if a potential third-
party is located far from that conflict (for example, Egypt and Angola). Thus, states that are 
contiguous to disputing states should have greater incentives than non-contiguous states to 
intervene as third-parties in an interstate dispute.14 
The exception to this rule lies in alliance relationships, the third factor that affects third-
party intermediary behavior. Numerous works discuss the potential transmission of conflict 
through alliance relationships. For example, Siverson and Starr (1990) note that alliance partners 
are more likely to become involved in one another’s conflicts. This result holds for both major 
and minor powers and for various alliance types during the period 1816-1965. Vasquez, Diehl, 
Flint, Scheffran, Chi, and Rider (2011) reach a similar conclusion in their study of the expansion 
of World War I. Yet they also stipulate that alliance relationships were not the only mechanism 
that caused the world war to expand. Kadera (1998) confirms this latter point; she finds that the 
effects of alliance relationships interact with geographic contiguity to produce an even greater 
risk of conflict contagion. In short, it appears that alliance partners should fear conflict 
                                                 
14 International organizations also worry about conflict contagion. For example, the United Nations deployed a 
peace operation to Macedonia (UNPREDEP) in the midst of the Bosnian conflict to prevent the conflict from 
spreading to Macedonia.  
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contagion. That fear should heighten if they are also immediately contiguous to an alliance 
partner’s ongoing conflict. 
Allies can be motivated to intervene in their partner’s conflict by more than just a threat 
of conflict contagion, however. Diplomatic intervention might be needed to preserve the focus of 
the alliance. Alliances generally form for a particular purpose (Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell, and Long 
2002). When a dispute breaks out, at least one alliance member must divert resources and 
attention to the new dispute. This can cause the alliance to become distracted from its original 
purpose. If such a distraction occurs, other alliance members then have an incentive to help 
resolve the dispute, as clearing that dispute from the table will permit the alliance to return to its 
intended purpose. This result should hold whether the alliance is bilateral or multilateral and 
regardless of the specific alliance provisions.15  
In sum, third-parties can receive a number of benefits from intervention. I detailed three 
of these benefits above – namely maintaining the stability of the status quo, preventing the 
spread of conflict, and preserving key (alliance) relationships (see also Zartman and Touval 2007 
for a discussion of mediator motives). Before proceeding to a discussion of how third-parties 
might select intervention strategies, I offer a number of observations regarding these benefits – 
both to clarify their importance and to expound upon their implications.  
First, the above discussion implies that diplomatic intervention should not be the norm. 
Most states will not intervene in most conflicts most of the time. Major states (and regional 
leaders) comprise a very small subset of the interstate system. Similarly, only a handful of states 
are contiguous to a given conflict. And even though alliance ties are more common than either 
major state status or contiguity to a conflict, states do not build alliance relationships with the 
                                                 
15 Owsiak and Frazier (2009) break apart this relationship by alliance type. I do not disaggregate the alliance 
variable in this project. 
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majority of states in the world. Put differently, only a minority of states accrue benefits from 
intervention in any given conflict. The small subset of state actors that receives benefits also 
possesses incentives for third-party intervention. Thus, for any given conflict, the majority of 
rational states have little motivation to manage the conflict.  
Second, what scholars know about conflict management confirms the benefits outlined 
above. Frazier (2006) and Owsiak and Frazier (2009) find that major states are more likely to 
perform third-party interventions, both across all strategies and with respect to mediation 
specifically.16 Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) confirm this finding for mediation in particular 
(although they opt to disaggregate major states into the United States and other members of the 
United Nations Security Council). Similarly, Greig (2005) notes that contiguous third-parties are 
more likely than non-contiguous states to offer mediation, be asked by disputants to mediate, and 
to serve as mediators. Greig and Regan (2008) reach a similar conclusion regarding third-party 
offers to mediate civil wars. Finally, Frazier (2006) and Owsiak and Frazier (2009) conclude that 
allies are more likely than non-allies to mediate disputes involving their alliance partners.17 In 
each case, previous research supports the proposition that intervening states require some sort of 
benefit to intervene.  
Third, I framed the preceding discussion almost entirely from the perspective of states. 
Yet other types of third-parties must experience similar benefits in order to intervene. Coalitions 
are merely conglomerations of individual states. To encourage individual states to participate in 
an intervention, the coalition must receive a benefit from intervention and supply some of those 
                                                 
16 For a somewhat contrasting view, see Bercovitch and DeRouen (2005) who find that the superpower states are 
less likely than other third-parties to successfully mediate ethnic civil wars. Given their focus on intrastate conflict 
and how they choose to operationalize “major states,” their finding does not exactly refute Frazier’s work. See also 
Gelpi (1999), who uncovers a potential interaction between major state status and alliance ties. 
17 See also Gelpi (1999), who finds that alliances effectively address intra-alliance disputes (that is, those among 
members of a multilateral alliance). 
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benefits to its constituent members. In other words, states participating in a group-led 
intervention need to see some individual benefit to intervention before agreeing to undertake one. 
States’ choice to act in concert reflects a desire to disperse costs (see below), but the decision to 
intervene must still generate benefits in order for the action to remain rational. To be fair, 
dispersing costs among many members may lower the amount of benefits needed to prompt an 
individual state’s participation in an intervention, but states must benefit nonetheless.  
Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) also experience benefits as a condition of 
intervention, although IGO action is admittedly more complex than that of states or coalitions of 
states. On the one hand, most IGOs behavior depends on the (explicit or tacit) agreement of 
major states or key members (Zartman and Touval 2007). The United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), for example, cannot act without some support from the permanent member major 
states, each of which holds veto power over its behavior. Regional organizations may also be 
hamstrung by members’ diverging interests or regionally adopted norms. For example, the 
African Union’s (AU) policy of non-intervention in the domestic matters of member states might 
prevent its members from authorizing intervention in one another’s disputes. Thus, much as in 
the case of coalitions, key members must see a benefit to intervening. The states’ decision to act 
through an IGO (rather than unilaterally) signifies a desire to disperse costs and responsibility for 
the intervention; it does not indicate, however, that states experience no benefit from 
intervention. 
On the other hand, IGOs are not merely the pawns of states (Barnett and Finnemore 
2004; see also Abbott and Snidal 1998, Mearsheimer 1994/1995). They have individual interests 
as well. States often task IGOs with the maintenance of peace and security. This makes 
intervention a top priority; if an organization does not help members peacefully resolve disputes, 
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the organization fails to fulfill a core objective assigned to it.18 Further, secretariats of IGOs may 
have another motivation for intervention. State resources are limited, but the number of IGOs has 
expanded exponentially since World War II (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004). IGOs 
that demonstrate competence (perhaps as a successful conflict manager) potentially ensure their 
survival and gain additional resources and autonomy from members (Barnett and Finnemore 
2004; Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney 2006). Despite these benefits, however, IGOs often 
cannot act without member support, especially within the realm of peace and security. Therefore, 
while some benefits may accrue to the organization, the benefits to member states may be pivotal 
in the decision to intervene. Any such benefits are likely to mirror those noted above.  
Fourth, I predict above that states decide to intervene in order to obtain certain benefits. 
Yet it might be possible for them to achieve these same benefits by not intervening, if another 
intermediary resolves the conflict. Such free-riding behavior occurs primarily when the state’s 
interest depends only upon achieving a peaceful settlement; those third-parties with a substantive 
interest in the issues under dispute or in extending their influence throughout the world may still 
want to intervene. Regardless, an incentive to free-ride exists, and it underscores the rarity of 
third-party intervention. Third-party actors may want benefits, but to the extent that they can 
obtain these benefits without intervening, they will forego involvement in the dispute. Non-
intervention will therefore remain the norm, as each actor waits for another to manage the 
conflict.  
Although free-riding behavior may be attractive (and possible), it is not a preferred policy 
for any actor that truly wants to obtain the benefits of successful conflict management. The 
reason lies within the success rates of intermediary interventions. Generally speaking, conflict 
                                                 
18 The logic behind this argument comes from principal-agent theory. On this theory, see Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, 
and Tierney (2006). 
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management attempts are most often unsuccessful. Dixon (1996:663), for example, finds conflict 
management strategies to be ineffective more often than not at either discouraging dispute 
escalation or producing a peaceful settlement. On balance, interventions limit dispute escalation 
10-20% of the time and produce a settlement 25-40% of the time. In contrast, if no intervention 
occurs, Dixon reports success rates of 32% and 33% respectively (see also Frazier and Dixon 
2006, who report that interventions are statistically more likely than no intervention to result in a 
negotiated agreement).19 Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) report similar statistics for mediation, 
which they claim yields an agreement 35-40% of the time (see also Bercovitch and Houston 
1996). Doyle and Sambanis (2000: table 1) echo Dixon’s success rates for peacebuilding 
operations; depending on how one defines success, missions are successful in 35-42% of the 
cases in which they are tried (see also Fortna 2004). Finally, Greig and Diehl (2005) note that 
peace operations often reduce the likelihood that a settlement agreement will be reached. If the 
goal of interstate peace operations is to facilitate a negotiated agreement that settles the 
underlying conflict, then peace operations fail more often than not.  
All of this empirical evidence suggests that third-parties cannot reasonably sit on the 
sidelines and wait for peace. Even if another third-party accepts responsibility for intervention, 
their efforts will fail more often than they succeed. Therefore, rational actors seeking specific 
benefits must often adhere to a common adage: “if you want something done right, you better do 
it yourself.” Of course, this need not imply that free-riding never occurs. Actors sometimes wait 
for another third-party to intervene. Yet states that want the benefits of successful conflict 
management have a competing incentive to intervene. They cannot be assured that free-riding 
                                                 
19 Dixon (1996) finds that legal interventions produce a settlement in approximately 60% of cases in which they are 
tried. Given that states must agree to abide by a ruling before submitting the dispute to a legal process, this result is 
not surprising. It is also an outlier when compared to the other intervention strategies. Using updated data, Frazier 
and Dixon (2006) run models in which the predicted probability of a negotiated settlement given legal intervention 
is 40%. 
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will produce any benefits. Although their involvement may also not yield the desired outcome, it 
does give them more direct control over the outcome they seek. 
Finally, at the outset of this section, I outlined a number of benefits that third-parties 
receive from intervention. Two of these benefits, however, do not explicitly appear in the 
detailed discussion above: the enhancement of reputation as a conflict manager and specific 
interest in the substantive issues under dispute.  Reputation remains a difficult concept to pin 
down, and it provides no clear predictions about specific third-party behavior. Which actors will 
seek intervention opportunities for reputational purposes? Major states seem an obvious place to 
start, yet in peacekeeping, it is often minor powers (for example, Canada or Nigeria) that vie for 
a place of prominence in operations. In contrast, many major states intervene frequently as 
mediators, particularly the United States (Bercovtich and Schneider 2000). Regional powers 
offer a second possibility, but these states often obtain their status by developing a reputation for 
conflict management and regional custodianship of security orders (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 
2011); the identification of regional powers is therefore endogenous to predictions involving 
reputation. Finally, the inability of reputation arguments to predict third-party intervention 
behavior extends to coalitions and organizations as well. What organization specializing in peace 
and security would not want states to see it as an expert at facilitating peace? In the end, 
reputation interests seem secondary to other types of benefits. This conclusion results not merely 
from the lack of predictability gained from the concept of reputation, but also from the success 
rates of intervention. If interventions fail more often than they succeed, those actors trying to 
build reputations as effective conflict managers may find that the costs exceed the benefits. This 
is especially the case if a solid reputation depends upon repeated successful interventions. 
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In contrast to reputational benefits, substantive interests remain a prime motivator of 
third-party behavior. The predictions derived from these benefits, however, match the predictions 
contained in the earlier discussion. States with substantive interests in the issues under dispute 
are more likely to have major status or to be either contiguous or allied to disputing states. Major 
states possess interests throughout the world by definition, making them prime candidates to hold 
substantive interests in a variety of conflicts. Similarly, states closest to a conflict are more likely 
to be affected by the outcome of the dispute than states that are far from it. A division of land or 
resources may alter what is available for neighbors, and policy or regime change goals can create 
new situations to which neighbors must adjust. Distance diminishes these effects. Finally, allies 
coordinate security policy with one another. Although the depth of this cooperation ranges 
substantially according to the specific commitments partners make to one another, allies may 
have an interest in how the disputed issues get resolved, lest their commitments be altered. In 
sum, the earlier discussion largely accounts for third-parties seeking a specific resolution of the 
substantive issues under disputes. 
The preceding discussion explains why third-parties intervene. It also begins to predict 
which third-parties are most likely to do so. Yet this is only half of the intervention process. 
Once third-parties choose to intervene, they must also determine how to intervene. I therefore 
turn now to this latter decision. 
 
Not Whether, But How 
 Besides deciding whether to intervene, third-parties also choose the method by which 
they will do so. That is, they must select a conflict management strategy (see Table 1.1) to use 
during their intervention. These decisions determine the form that a trajectory takes. I propose 
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three broad, competing theoretical models that explain how interventions within a trajectory are 
interdependent, which correspond to three general forms (or shapes) of trajectories: a cost model 
(and a variation on that model, the limited commitments model), a behavioral learning model, 
and a random (or baseline) model. In the pages that follow, I outline the logic underlying of the 
above models, as well as the specific hypotheses derived from each. 
 
Cost Model 
As noted in the previous chapter, intervention strategies can be placed along a relative 
cost continuum from low- to high-cost (see Table 1.1). If rational actors want to maximize their 
expected utility (that is, their cost-benefit calculation; see Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 2010), then 
they will want peace for the lowest possible price. That is, they will seek to minimize the costs 
associated with intervention. To achieve this goal, third-parties first employ strategies at the low-
cost end of the spectrum; this is the easiest way to minimize costs. As low-cost strategies fail to 
resolve the conflict fully, actors would then resort to relatively more costly strategies, working 
incrementally and sequentially up the cost scale.  
This behavior makes sense for the full array of third-party actors: states, coalitions of 
states, and intergovernmental organizations. Although distinct types of states often behave 
differently in conflict (for example, major versus minor states; see Small and Singer 1982), all 
will likely follow the intervention policy outlined above for three reasons.20 First, actors possess 
a finite set of resources. Those states, for example, that have extremely limited capabilities (that 
is, minor states) will find it much easier to call for a cease-fire than to undertake peace 
operations, as will organizations with limited resources. Yet major states are not immune to 
                                                 
20 On the behavior of major states in conflict, see Bremer (1992) and Vasquez (2009), the latter of which thoroughly 
reviews literature on this point. For evidence that major states are more likely to intervene as third-parties to a 
dispute, see, inter alia, Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) and Frazier (2006).  
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resource constraints. They also possess limited capabilities, and, as they pursue interests 
throughout the world (which is a defining characteristic of major states), they will undoubtedly 
seek to use their resources efficiently. Major states will therefore also focus on less costly 
options first. Second, actors may face audience costs that compel them to search for a low-cost 
intervention strategy (Fearon 1994; Weeks 2008). Key constituencies might not readily support 
high-cost interventions. Events such as Somalia, in which a well-publicized tragedy prompted 
the United States and United Nations to rethink (and subsequently restrict) the deployment of 
peace operations, underscore this point (see Barnett and Finnemore 2004). High-cost 
interventions require greater commitment and tend to involve greater risk. Third-parties therefore 
have more flexibility with interventions when they use less costly strategies, as domestic 
constituencies are less likely to criticize leaders for limiting the risk borne by their state. Finally, 
there may be a limit to the number of interventions an actor can undertake at one time (that is, 
actors may be restricted by carrying capacity). Given a multitude of conflicts throughout the 
world, actors therefore have an incentive to minimize intervention costs, if for no other reason 
than that they can help in as many conflicts as possible before reaching the limits of their 
capacity. This applies to all actor types, although the threshold of this capacity varies according 
to the actor involved (that is, most organizations have a higher carrying capacity than a minor 
state). 
In general, each of these reasons suggests that third-parties understand that they should 
not spend more on intermediary intervention when a lesser amount will produce the same 
outcome. Based on this logic, the cost model anticipates that third-parties will generally 
intervene using relatively less costly strategies first. If these do not resolve the conflict, they will 
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then move to higher cost strategies. I label this trajectory the cost model, and the following two 
hypotheses capture its basic logic: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Over the course of a conflict, third-party interventions will escalate from the use 
of relatively low-cost strategies to relatively high-cost strategies. 
Hypothesis 1b: Relatively high-cost strategies will be used less frequently than relatively low-
cost strategies. 
 
Figure 2.2 depicts graphically the pure, theoretical form of the model behind the above 
hypotheses. As before, the horizontal (x) axis captures time, while the vertical (y) axis denotes 
the strategy selected. The strategy categories are numbered according to the Frazier and Dixon 
(2006) typology presented in Table 1.1. The least costly strategy appears closest to the origin, 
and the strategies increase in cost sequentially as one moves up the vertical axis. The shaded 
boxes indicate the strategy employed by a third-party at a particular moment during the dispute. 
As Figure 2.2 demonstrates, the (pure) cost model predicts an upward trend over the life 
of a given conflict; that is, the shaded boxes move along a diagonal from the lower left to the 
upper right corners of the graph. Third- parties start with the least costly strategies first (lower 
left corner). More costly strategies are employed later in the conflict (upper right corner), 
assuming that the early interventions fail to resolve the dispute. Note that the theory underlying 
this trajectory permits third-parties to repeat the use of a strategy, but it does not anticipate that 
third-parties will return to lower-cost strategies once they make the decision to escalate. 
Escalation requires the rational third-party to determine that the less costly strategies will be 
unlikely to resolve the conflict. It therefore makes little sense for them to return to these 
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ineffective strategies in the future, unless the third-parties do not know the best strategy to 
effectively manage the dispute. I return to this possibility below under the discussion of the 
random model.  
The two hypotheses presented above are clearly related, and the second derives from the 
first. Unless all of the lower-cost strategies fail, many trajectories will end with the successful 
resolution of the dispute, well before third parties need the higher-cost strategies. This implies 
that third-parties will use relatively more costly strategies less frequently than less costly 
strategies. I return to the concepts of success and failure below under the learning model, where 
they feature more prominently. Before turning to that model, however, there are two variations 
on the cost model that are worth noting. 
First, the costs borne by states are not the same when they act unilaterally, as opposed to 
when they act multilaterally or within intergovernmental organizations. States may collectively 
determine the actions of both coalitions and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), but they 
often pay only a portion of the costs associated with any multilateral intervention they authorize 
(whether done through an organization or not). This ability to diffuse costs across numerous 
actors distorts the cost structure that individual states face. They are therefore more willing to 
authorize and undertake relatively more costly interventions under a multilateral banner, as 
opposed to a unilateral one. For example, peace operations become an option that states are 
willing to endorse multilaterally precisely because they need not incur the entire cost of the 
operation. States may then delay or avoid unilateral lower-cost interventions and opt instead to 
pursue intervention through collective entities. Although states might lose some control when 
they (as principals) delegate intervention tasks to a collectivity (as an agent), the fact that they 
incur only a fraction of the intervention costs makes such delegation an attractive option. In 
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short, states may pass (or “dump”) certain cases to coalitions or IGOs in order to minimize their 
individual costs.21  
The conflicts that do get selected for multilateral intervention often involve more 
challenging dynamics (for example, see Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Stedman 2003), which only 
underscores the expectation that coalitions and IGOs will use high-cost strategies more 
frequently than individual states. As the conflict context becomes more complex, not only does 
the probability of it being handed to a coalition or organization increase, but it is also more likely 
that legal, humanitarian, or peace operations activities will be necessary to address various facets 
of the dispute. Because of this difficult context, multilateral interventions often require greater 
commitment on the part of third-parties, ultimately encouraging them to invest more heavily in 
any intervention (if one is undertaken). Because costs can be dispersed among many states, such 
a strategy is both prudent and feasible. These arguments lead to the following, third hypothesis 
for the pure cost model: 
 
Hypothesis 1c: IGOs and coalitions will begin their interventions with relatively more costly 
intervention strategies than individual states. 
 
 The cost-dispersing effects of multilateral intervention have another implication for third-
party behavior as well. In multilateral interventions, states face a distorted cost structure; that is, 
states pay a fraction of the costs associated with the entire intervention. This allows them not 
only to authorize more costly intervention strategies, but also to permit multiple interventions to 
                                                 
21 Multilateral intervention will allow some states to free ride on the “group” intervention. Yet those contributing 
also have a strong incentive to find free-riders, and contributions to various interventions should be relatively 
transparent to the organization or coalition. This latter point follows easily from the work of Keohane (1984), who 
notes that one of the main benefits of institutions (here, IGOs) is their ability to collect and disseminate information 
for members.  
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occur simultaneously (I will refer to these as “simultaneous interventions”). An additional 
intervention represents only a marginal increase in costs to each member of the organization or 
coalition. Individual states, on the other hand, are less likely to perform multiple interventions at 
the same time. Because they incur the full costs of any intervention, these rational, individual 
states will likely wait until one intervention has run its course before initiating another one.22 
Otherwise, they run the risk of footing the full bill for two interventions when only one might be 
needed.23 
This tendency toward multiple interventions depends, in part, on the number of states 
involved in the decisions and, therefore, intervention costs are shared. As more states participate 
in the intervention decision, the costs can be dispersed over more actors, thereby reducing the 
costs incurred by any one state. Thus, a coalition of three states achieves greater cost dispersion 
when compared to a unilateral intervention, but it does not disperse costs as widely as the United 
Nations, whose action requires the authorization (and, in theory, support) of more than three 
member states. Because organizations can spread costs among more members, the logic of the 
above argument implies that they should perform simultaneous interventions more often than 
either coalitions or individual states.24 Similarly, coalitions should perform simultaneous 
interventions less frequently than intergovernmental organizations, but more frequently than 
individual states. In accordance with this argument, one might expect that: 
 
                                                 
22 States also incur fewer reputational costs when coalitions or institutions intervene. As I note later, however, I 
expect these reputational costs to be minimal regardless of the third-party. 
23 This assumes (for the time being) that the two interventions are not synergistic.  
24 This argument rests on the assumption that the organization contains more members than a coalition. The data 
suggest this to be the case, as do descriptive statistics reported by Frazier and Dixon (2006).  
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Hypothesis 1d: IGOs are more likely than coalitions or individual states to perform multiple 
interventions simultaneously. Similarly, coalitions are more likely than individual states to 
perform multiple interventions simultaneously.  
 
Although the above hypothesis suggests that states are reluctant to undertake an 
intervention while another one is ongoing, there is one scenario in which they might be inclined 
to do so: when they are not exclusively performing both interventions simultaneously. States that 
authorize a multilateral intervention might decide to attempt a subsequent, lower-cost 
intervention of their own during the collective intervention, especially if it is compatible with the 
multilateral intervention (I will refer to these as “overlapping interventions,” not to be confused 
with the simultaneous interventions discussed previously). This unilateral effort could lend 
support to the larger, group one (for example, when pleas for a cease-fire demonstrate support 
for a peace operation that must try to minimize violence), or it could work separately from the 
group intervention (for example, when a state sees an opportunity for itself to manage a conflict 
more successfully than the group effort). Regardless of the circumstances, third-party states 
intervene against the backdrop of multilateral efforts because they see an opportunity to reap 
benefits from doing so – namely, controlling the substantive agreement, expanding their 
influence, or ending the conflict (and therefore, the multilateral intervention) sooner. This 
argument produces the following prediction: 
 
Hypothesis 1e: States are more likely to attempt an overlapping intervention during an IGO or 
coalition-led intervention than a state-led one.  
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The second noteworthy variation on the cost model involves the possibility that third-
parties face competing incentives. In particular, third-parties may feel an obligation to do 
something, but lack either the resources or the political will to commit large amounts of 
resources to the management of a conflict. Therefore, rather than use increasingly more costly 
intervention strategies, actors may escalate their involvement up to a point. Yet to be a useful 
prediction, this threshold must be identified more explicitly. Beyond which strategies are third-
parties unlikely to escalate? 
I propose that mediation represents the most appropriate place for a threshold to occur (if 
there were one) for two reasons. First, mediation balances a desire to signal significant 
investment in conflict management with an interest in limiting the actual costs incurred by an 
intervening state. For example, a call for a cease-fire carries no substantial involvement in the 
conflict. The intervention reduces to a statement and, once over, the third-party’s activities cease. 
Mediation, on the other hand, requires the third-party to become directly involved in the 
resolution of the conflict. Whether through investigating the facts behind the issues under 
dispute, facilitating negotiations, or generating substantive proposals to move the disputants 
toward an agreement, third-parties that choose to mediate must actively participate in the conflict 
management process. Third-parties employing any strategy that includes more than mere words 
will signal a stronger commitment to help parties reach a resolution.  
That said, rational states also have a desire to minimize their costs (described at length 
above). In this respect, mediation holds the advantage over other non-verbal intervention 
strategies. The costs of mediation are low, often including only those necessary to establish and 
facilitate negotiations. In contrast, relatively more costly strategies require a larger commitment 
of resources, for such tasks as ensuring compliance (for example, demobilization monitoring), 
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the large-scale distribution of resources (for example, humanitarian interventions), or the 
deployment of military forces (for example, peace operations). These activities each cost more 
than sending a diplomatic team abroad or providing a venue in which negotiations might occur. 
Therefore, a rational third-party interested both in being actively involved in the resolution of the 
dispute and in limiting its costs would rationally choose to mediate. 
 Second, mediation provides a good threshold for international actors because it limits the 
domestic audience costs associated with intervention (see Fearon 1994; Weeks 2008). Mediation 
generally allows the disputants to retain primary responsibility for reaching a settlement 
agreement. Thus, any blame for the failure to resolve the conflict can be deflected to the 
negotiating positions of the disputants. That many mediation sessions occur outside of the media 
spotlight further protects the intervention from generating domestic backlash against third-
parties. Because domestic groups do not know who to blame for mediation failure, it is more 
challenging for them to use any such failures to criticize those intervening. 
 For these reasons, one might expect third-parties to use increasingly more costly 
strategies until they begin mediating, at which point they will use mediation repeatedly. Even 
though mediation may not successfully manage the dispute, the third-party’s desire to save costs 
prevents it from using more costly strategies, while its desire to participate actively in the 
management of the conflict precludes it from de-escalating its involvement. I label this variation 
on the pure cost model the limited commitments model, and its logic generates the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1f: Third-parties are highly unlikely to use intervention strategies more costly than 
mediation. 
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The graphical representation of this trajectory appears in Figure 2.3. The figure follows the same 
format as those used earlier in the chapter. Unlike the pure cost model, Figure 2.3 illustrates that, 
in the limited commitments variation of the cost model, third-parties use increasingly more 
costly strategies until they reach the mediation category (y-axis value of 2; see Table 1.1). Once 
they reach this threshold strategy, they do not (frequently) escalate beyond it.  
 The limited commitments model differs from the pure cost model in several ways. First, 
it predicts an upper boundary to the costs that third-parties willingly incur. Third-parties employ 
increasingly more costly strategies until they reach the threshold (mediation), beyond which they 
are not likely to go. Second, the pure cost model suggests slightly different patterns for unilateral 
(that is, states) and multilateral (that is, IGOs and coalitions) interventions. In particular, the pure 
cost model predicted that IGOs and coalitions would begin with more costly interventions and 
use more simultaneous interventions than states. The limited commitments model alters these 
predictions. The state actors that authorize IGO and coalition action should still permit 
multilateral interventions to use more costly strategies than they would use themselves. Although 
this seems counterintuitive, the commitments are limited with respect to the actors that bear the 
costs – namely, individual states. Yet this model also predicts that authorizing states should want 
to cap their costs. More specifically, if mediation serves as a threshold category, states that 
underwrite collective interventions should want to pay less than they would pay to mediate a 
dispute unilaterally. Otherwise, they incur more costs from intervening.  
The exact calculation of the costs borne by members contributing to multilateral 
interventions varies according to the strategy used in and length of the intervention as well as the 
number of contributors. It is possible, however, to make a general prediction about the strategies 
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that states will likely authorize for multilateral interventions. The costs associated with 
administrative functions (for example, election monitoring or repatriating refugees; see Table 
1.1) or peace operations dwarf those of mediation and, to a lesser extent, legal interventions. The 
former often involve the deployment of military or civilian contingents to distribute humanitarian 
aid, administer a territory, repatriate refugees, or rebuild society (for example, to oversee 
elections). In contrast, the latter involve smaller teams of negotiators and diplomats or, in the 
case of adjudication and arbitration, a marginal cost associated with handling an additional 
case.25 Thus, we should expect that if authorizing states want to limit their commitment and want 
the total cost to be less than if they mediated alone, they will authorize mediation or legal 
interventions most often. In other words, the threshold shifts slightly upward, if at all. 
Finally, the pure cost model predicts both simultaneous and overlapping interventions. 
The limited commitments model, on the other hand, forecasts neither. States that wish to limit 
their commitments should not authorize a simultaneous intervention, nor should they undertake 
an overlapping intervention. Such efforts are at best duplicative and at worst unnecessary (for 
example, if the ongoing intervention proves successful). The possible exception comes from 
organizations, which might have enough autonomy to initiate an overlapping intervention 
without explicit authorization from member states (Hawkins et al. 2006). If an organization 
adheres to the logic underlying the limited commitments model, however, they too should forego 
overlapping interventions. Organizations often face resource constraints, making the efficient use 
of resources an essential component for the completion of their tasks. It would therefore make 
                                                 
25 The International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration, for example, are financed by members 
of the United Nations. Since these organizations already exist, states need not pay for constituting the organization 
or the remuneration of staff each time the organization is used. Rather, the marginal cost for using the organization 
amounts to the specific costs incurred when handling a particular case. A slightly imperfect analogy can be made at 
the domestic level. Setting up a court and paying justices involve greater costs that asking an existing court to decide 
one additional case. 
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sense for them to limit their involvement by participating in only one intervention (per conflict) 
at a time.  
These arguments produce the following, additional hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1g: IGOs and coalitions are highly unlikely to use intervention strategies more costly 
than mediation. 
Hypothesis 1h: Third-parties are unlikely to initiate simultaneous or overlapping interventions, 
regardless of the actor involved or the strategy used. 
 
One possible criticism of the limited commitments model concerns reputation costs; 
some may see it unlikely for third-parties to use mediation repeatedly, lest they be viewed as 
“bad” or “incapable” mediators. This, however, is not a convincing argument for three reasons. 
First, the reputation costs associated with higher-cost strategies are much greater. Failing at a 
peace operation (for example, the United States in Somalia) or a humanitarian intervention (for 
example, the United Nation’s protection of safe havens in Bosnia) receives much greater 
attention than failing at a mediation session. When more costs are involved, the media publicizes 
failure much more extensively. It is this negative publicity that alters a state’s foreign policy (for 
example, the US disengagement after Somalia, which affected its subsequent intervention 
decision on Rwanda, or the Belgian disengagement from the United Nations mission in Rwanda; 
see Albright 2003; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Boutros-Ghali 1999; Mingst and Karns 2000).  
Of all intermediary strategies that are more costly than verbal interventions, mediation receives 
the greatest protection against such publicity. Because mediation involves fewer costs than the 
alternatives (besides verbal pleas), potential critics will view it as more prudent to use relative to 
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the other higher-cost strategies. This somewhat insulates mediators from the negative effects of 
reputation costs (and certainly more so than if they had chosen another intervention strategy). 
 Second, one actor’s failure at mediation does not preclude another from serving as a 
mediator. Trajectories are not limited to one actor’s intervention behavior, but rather, they 
include the intervention behavior of all third-parties. Finally, even if the same state tries 
mediation repeatedly, it is protected against reputation costs by two characteristics of mediation. 
The first involves the success rate of mediation; successful mediations are not the norm. For 
example, Bercovitch and Schneider (2000:156) find that mediation is successful approximately 
35% of the time (see Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion of success rates). A state may not 
want to be viewed as a “bad” or “incompetent” mediator, but it will take more than a few failures 
to achieve such a reputation. In fact, contrary to the reputation cost criticisms advanced here, 
mediators often receive credit just for trying to resolve a difficult conflict. In addition to the low 
success rate of mediation, the proceedings of mediation sessions are often not fully publicized. 
Much of the negotiations remain private, especially in ongoing disputes. Thus, those that would 
tarnish the reputation of a mediator (or believe those that would tarnish it) cannot be entirely 
certain that a given mediation failed due to mediator incompetence. Failure might have resulted 
from the disputants’ unwillingness to negotiate instead. For example, although numerous parties 
have failed to negotiate an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the disputants, rather than the 
mediators, are most often blamed for the failures.26 
 Finally, the preceding discussion assumes that third-parties begin intervening in the 
trajectory with low-cost strategies (either verbal pleas or mediation) and avoid the use of 
relatively more costly strategies. Yet what happens if third-parties begin intervening with a more 
                                                 
26 On this point, see also Bercovitch and Langley (1993), who find that difficult conflict contexts are less amenable 
to mediation than their counterparts.  
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costly strategy than mediation?27 The limited commitments model makes two predictions about 
such cases. First, initial interventions that involve legal, administrative, or peace operations 
strategies (that is, strategies more costly than mediation) should not happen frequently. Third-
parties that truly seek to limit the costs associated with intervention should instead adopt the less 
costly strategies. Second, if such an initial intervention appears, the third-party may not be 
subject to the threshold. Because the intervening third-party demonstrates a willingness to incur 
greater intervention costs than those associated with mediation as the trajectory begins, it violates 
the limited commitment model’s predictions. Yet, these third-parties may subsequently decide 
that their involvement should also be limited (that is, they may conclude that they need to limit 
their costs). Regardless of the rationale for this decision (for example, limited resources, 
domestic audience costs, or a lack of political will), it implies a return to strategies that are at 
most as costly as mediation (that is, verbal and mediation strategies) – thereby bringing third-
party behavior in line with the model’s expectations. While the model therefore cannot make a 
precise prediction about third-party behavior when a trajectory begins with a more costly 
strategy than mediation, its logic does clearly indicate that third-parties should not cycle 
repeatedly between verbal and mediations strategies on the one hand and more costly strategies 
on the other.28 Such frequent violations of the mediation threshold illustrate that third-parties are 
not sensitive to it. 
 
                                                 
27 This occurs less than 9% of the time (see Chapter 5). 
28 Note that the model does not predict that more costly intervention strategies never occur, but only that they are 
(extremely) rare. 
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Learning Model 
Rational intermediaries may respond to more than just costs. Although states may 
consider the effects of intervention on their budgets, they may be most concerned with achieving 
success. After all, many of the benefits that third-parties receive from intervention accrue when 
the dispute is effectively managed. Thus, third-parties should pay attention to the outcomes of 
previous conflict management attempts and condition their (subsequent) interventions on the 
success or failure of these previous attempts. In other words, perhaps third-parties learn how to 
be effective conflict managers. 
Any type of behavioral learning model requires that actors update their preferences (and, 
therefore, actions) based on prior experiences (for other types of learning models, see Levy 
1994). The experiences may be their own or those of others. Actors can therefore gain insight 
from prior interventions, regardless of whether they were the third-party during the previous 
intervention. Such learning seems plausible primarily because the outcomes of interventions are 
generally available to leaders. Not only are militarized disputes well-publicized, but the response 
of the international community is as well. This does not imply that leaders have full access to all 
of the events of an intervention, but rather, to the outcome of the intervention. For example, 
leaders might not know the full details of negotiations that occur during a mediation, but they 
likely hear whether the mediation succeeded or failed. As third-parties receive information on the 
success of prior interventions, they should then adjust their future intervention strategies 
accordingly. Broadly speaking, third-parties should repeat successful strategies and avoid the 
repeated use of unsuccessful ones.   
The notions of success and failure demand further explication in the context of the 
learning model. On the surface, it would seem that successful interventions obviate the need for 
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additional interventions. Yet an intervention can be “successful” without fully resolving a 
dispute. For example, a plea for a cease-fire succeeds if the disputants stop fighting. Mediation 
succeeds if the disputants reach an agreement, even if that agreement only partially resolves the 
issues under dispute. Scholars and practitioners often deem peacekeeping successful if it 
prevents violence (Fortna 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2006), even if these activities damage the 
prospects for a full resolution of the conflict (Greig and Diehl 2005). In each of these cases, 
success does not indicate that the dispute has been fully resolved, but rather that the intervention 
achieved its primary goal (see Frazier and Dixon 2006 or Chapter 3 for a discussion of the 
operationalization of this concept).  
A second point about success concerns its timing. Interventions can vary in their short- 
and long-term effects (see, for example, Beardsley 2008; Greig 2001). For the purposes of this 
model, I focus on the short-term evaluation of success – or whether the intervention was 
perceived to be successful at the time it ended. I limit considerations of success to the short-term 
because this is the environment in which subsequent interventions occur. Conflict ebbs and 
flows, making any short-term considerations pertinent for those considering intervention. 
Additionally, a long-term assessment of an intervention can take years to crystallize; the passage 
of time often determines whether an intervention had a lasting effect. An example illustrates this 
complex relationship between success and the passage of time.  
During the internationalized civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 
the late 1990s, the DRC frequently fought Ugandan and Rwandan troops. In July 1999, Zambia 
brokered the Lusaka Accords, which secured an agreement for the withdrawal of Ugandan and 
Rwandan troops from the DRC and established a joint military commission to supervise the 
agreement. Mediation therefore succeeded in the short-term. It produced an agreement between 
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disputing states that might reduce violence and bring an end to the interstate dimension of the 
conflict. Yet the agreed upon troop withdrawal did not begin for another year and continued well 
into 2002 (past the end point of this study).29 Thus, what was hailed by the international 
community as a clear victory in July 1999 did not fully come to fruition for quite some time. 
While these long-term effects of the Lusaka Accords unfolded (between July 1999 and 
December 2001), the Ugandan and Rwandan forces continued to fight the DRC military, 
prompting other intervention efforts. Each of these efforts could not wait for a long-term 
assessment of the Lusaka Accords because none was available. Third-parties face similar 
situations in other conflicts as well; they often cannot wait for long-term assessments before they 
desire (or a conflict requires) further intervention.  
Finally, short-term assessments make sense empirically. Many militarized disputes last 
days or months, and interventions generally happen within days of each other. For example, in 
the Yemeni dispute presented earlier (see Figure 2.1), the Iraq-Jordan-Syria coalition mediated 
three days after the Saudi Arabian verbal intervention. The LAS interventions occurred four days 
after that, followed three weeks later by the Kuwaiti mediation. In this case, empirical data 
suggests that long-term assessments could not possibly be available to the various intervening 
third-parties. It therefore seems both inaccurate and unrealistic to expect third-parties to consider 
long-term success when making intervention decisions.  
The learning model I propose rests on a key assumption – namely, that I require that 
learning translate into behavior. In contrast, Levy (1994) notes that learning is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for policy change. He proposes that learning occurs at the individual, cognitive 
level and, therefore, that a change in beliefs (that is, learning) need not lead to a change in 
                                                 
29 See the United Nations Report of the Security Council mission to the Great Lakes region, 27 April-May 2002 
(S/2002/537), available online at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2002/537.  
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behavior. Although I do not disagree with his points, there are two noteworthy remarks to make 
about Levy’s conceptualization of learning.30 First, it would be challenging (if not impossible) to 
evaluate empirically whether actors altered their beliefs independently of behavioral policy 
changes. Such an evaluation requires the researcher to either interview decision-makers directly 
or draw psychological inferences from historical records. Neither can be effectively (or, in the 
case of inferences, reliably) done in the context of a large-n study, which handles a multitude of 
actors over a large temporal span. This is not to say that such evaluations cannot (or should not) 
be accomplished, but rather that they lie beyond the scope of the current work.  
Second, the current study theoretically requires behavioral changes to occur. Because I 
seek to explain the factors that connect one intervention to another, action (or behavior) 
comprises a central component of my research question. Third-parties cannot intervene in a 
conflict without acting, and my goal is to understand how two specific interventions (or actions) 
are related. Given these goals, one must next determine how learning would create a relationship 
between interventions if it were at work. At a basic level, it seems reasonable to expect third-
parties to repeat what works and to change what does not. Although this is a very general 
guideline for third-parties to follow, scholars propose and find that actors in international 
relations carry general lessons from one event to the next (Jervis 1976; see also Reiter 1994). 
Furthermore, similar conceptualizations of learning to the one that I employ have yielded 
important insights within international conflict research. Leng (1983, 2000), for example, also 
posits that actors repeat what works and change what does not; his work suggests that actors 
seem to follow this general rule. I therefore equate learning with policy change within the current 
study.  
                                                 
30 In addition to the two points that follow, I also note that Levy’s definition of learning is by no means the only one. 
See Levy (1994) for a full discussion of how learning has been defined and applied in international relations. 
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Learning has been incorporated implicitly into a number of theories of international 
conflict, lending credence to a potential learning model of conflict management. For example, 
conceptualizations of rivalry – that is, interstate relationships in which the threat of militarized 
conflict constantly looms large – rely on learning to link the rival states’ past experiences with 
each other to their present decisions (see Diehl and Goertz 2000; see also Colaresi, Rasler, and 
Thompson 2007). For example, Diehl and Goertz (2000:21) propose that rivalries possess a 
temporal dimension that demands (at a minimum) that “the militarized competition lasts long 
enough for the states involved to adjust their behavior and long-term strategy because of the 
competition.” In other words, rivalries occur when states learn that certain other states should be 
treated with hostility; this causes their foreign policy to adjust in response to the military 
competition. Similarly, Vasquez (1993, 2009) proposes that state leaders learn to handle 
territorial disputes differently than disputes over other issues. Socialization (a form of learning) 
teaches states that territorial disputes can be handled with realist policies, such as building 
alliances or engaging in arms races, while non-territorial disputes should be handled less 
aggressively (see also Senese and Vasquez 2008).  
The value behind the concept of learning, however, derives from more than its implicit 
role in conflict theories; it has more direct effects on conflict behavior as well. Towards the 
exploration of these direct effects, Leng (1983, 2000) examines a series of crises and concludes 
that states use more coercive bargaining strategies in subsequent crises if they fail to achieve 
what they want with a less coercive approach. In Leng’s model, states alter their behavior after 
learning that current policies fail to achieve their foreign policy goals.  
Learning can also occur within the context of conflict management. Bercovitch and 
Gartner (2006), for example, attempt to explore the question of how states might learn from 
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previous mediation attempts. They find some evidence that successive rounds of mediation lead 
to more comprehensive settlement outcomes.31 Similarly, Greig and Diehl (2006) conclude that 
both rivals and third-parties are more amenable to mediation if it has been used previously in the 
rivalry. Rival states will even initiate negotiations or mediations if these strategies have proven 
successful in the recent past. Cumulatively, the above research suggests that disputants and third-
parties turn to specific conflict management strategies after developing some familiarity with 
them; that disputants and third-parties construct better agreements after achieving this 
familiarity; and that the selection of a given strategy might depend on how successful it was 
recently in handling a similar dispute. 
Studies of learning in conflict management, however, do not produce definitive 
predictions for third-party behavior. Most learning hypotheses regarding conflict management 
focus on the disputants rather than third-parties – particularly those disputants involved in 
mediation. This places the third-party role in the background. Despite the lack of attention to the 
third-party, however, a idea of how these third-parties might learn can be gleaned from studies of 
disputant behaviors in mediation. Hypotheses regarding disputants and conflict management 
propose that disputants must develop a rapport with mediators over time. Then, as the disputants 
learn to trust mediators and understand the process of mediation, they become more willing to 
permit additional mediation attempts. In other words, the disputants must “soften up” (Greig and 
Diehl 2006). Through such a process, previous mediation attempts make subsequent ones more 
likely. Yet even this logic has not fully been explored, because previous mediations generally 
appear as a control variable in studies, rather than a key independent variable worthy of a 
detailed theoretical explanation (Frazier 2006; Greig 2005; Greig and Regan 2008).  
                                                 
31 These findings, however, are inconsistent on two dimensions. They change depending on the intensity of the 
conflict, and they do not hold across different model specifications.  
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Not all researchers relegate the role of third-parties to the background, however. A 
handful of studies consider the implications of learning on third-party conflict management 
behavior. For example, Regan and Stam (2000) find that as the same mediator repeatedly 
intervenes in a dispute, the duration of that dispute decreases. Although their work does not test 
learning directly, the results imply that third-parties may need to familiarize themselves with the 
disputants, the issues, and the intervention strategy. Those third-parties willing to undertake 
multiple mediations may be able to shorten the disputes in which they intervene (one of many 
measures of overall success). Taking a different tack, Greig and Diehl (2005) conclude that 
successful intervention strategies (namely, negotiation and mediation) promote the future use of 
those strategies to manage a rivalry. Yet when they disaggregate their models, it seems that the 
disputants, rather than the third-party, drive this finding. Disputants, not third-parties, initiate 
mediation and negotiation if it was recently used successfully in the dispute. Despite this, there 
are implications for third-parties. Mediation requires the involvement of a third-party. Therefore, 
even if the disputants initiate the mediation process, a third-party must agree to facilitate it. This 
suggests that third-parties may pay attention to recent successes as well.  
In contrast to previous studies, I propose in the learning model that third-parties learn 
through repeated interventions. Furthermore, the process of learning might mirror those 
described above in two respects. First, third-parties may need time to familiarize themselves with 
the disputants and the issues. Conflict contexts present difficult scenarios. Because the exact 
issues, negotiating positions, and disputants change from conflict to conflict, third-parties cannot 
apply a conflict management template when a new dispute erupts, nor should we expect them to 
do so. They may instead need to try a strategy, see if it works, and adjust their approach after 
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receiving feedback. Through such a learning process, actors can eventually find the strategy that 
will work best for a given situation.  
Second, third-parties should focus on the most recent intervention to determine what 
strategy to select next. Greig and Diehl (2005) make a similar argument about disputants; the 
most recent intervention provides disputants with the best assessment of whether diplomatic 
efforts will likely succeed. I extend that logic to third-party behavior. The most recent 
intervention contains the greatest information for the third-party – the most up-to-date 
assessment of the positions of the disputants, their relative power, and the prospects for 
successful intervention. These assessments change over time. Thus, while a strategy may have 
failed in the distant past, it could be successful in the future if conflict conditions change. Third-
parties should therefore focus upon the most recent, past intervention. 
Based on these two premises, the learning model advocates that third-parties primarily 
consider the short-term success of the previous intervention when deciding how to intervene next 
in a dispute (see above for a discussion of short-term versus long-term success). If a strategy 
recently failed, third-parties should employ a different strategy next time. Alternatively, if a 
strategy succeeded recently, then third-parties should repeat the use of that strategy in an attempt 
to push disputants closer to a full resolution of the dispute. This logic produces the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Third-parties repeat strategies that were most recently successful and avoid 
strategies that were most recently unsuccessful. 
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 There are three observations to make about the logic behind this hypothesis. First, unlike 
with the cost model (and its variant), the learning model cannot be easily depicted and therefore 
does not appear in any figure. The learning process captured by the above hypothesis requires 
only that third-parties repeat successful strategies and avoid unsuccessful ones. This rule lends 
itself to any number of trajectory shapes, including those found in Figures 2.1-2.3. As an 
example, Figure 2.3 illustrates the limited commitments model. The first three interventions in 
the figure employ verbal strategies, after which third-parties switch to mediation for the 
remainder of the dispute. The limited commitments model provided one explanation for the 
depicted trajectory (see above), but the learning model can explain it as well. Assume that the 
first (verbal) intervention succeeded. According to the learning, model, third-parties should then 
use a verbal strategy again for the second intervention, which is exactly what they did. If the 
second (verbal) intervention also succeeded, third-parties should again repeat its use during the 
third intervention. Now assume that the third intervention (verbal) failed. At this point, the third-
party should change strategies. They did this in the figure presented, and began using mediation 
instead of verbal interventions. Finally, if the mediations from interventions 4-6 succeeded, 
third-parties should repeat them in interventions 5-7. This also occurred. In this way, the learning 
model can provide an alternative explanation for the trajectory shown in Figure 2.3. It can 
similarly explain Figure 2.1 and 2.2, as well as a multitude of other shapes. I therefore am unable 
to depict its pure theoretical form as I did with the other models. 
Second, the learning model hypothesis presented above implies that simultaneous and 
overlapping interventions will not occur. In order to learn, third-parties need a previous 
intervention to end, so that they can gather information about the outcome of that intervention. 
Armed with the knowledge that the previous intervention succeeded or failed, the third-party 
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then selects a strategy for the next intervention. Absent such information, learning cannot occur 
in the manner predicted by this model. Therefore, third-parties should not initiate another 
intervention (overlapping or simultaneous) while another is ongoing. This leads to a prediction 
that matches one from the limited cost model: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Third-parties are unlikely to initiate simultaneous or overlapping interventions, 
regardless of the actor involved or the strategy used. 
  
Finally, learning can occur in different ways. The hypothesis above proposes one specific 
form of learning – namely, that learning occurs within disputes and across actors. That is, third-
parties learn from the actions of each other and do not carry lessons from one dispute to the next. 
Each of these two characteristics has theoretical merit. First, that third-parties learn from each 
others’ behavior derives from the public character of intervention outcomes. Although third-
parties may not have access to the full proceedings of an intervention, they likely know an 
intervention’s outcome (see above). This information permits them to adjust their future 
interventions. The second characteristic (that learning is dispute-specific) stems from the 
changing nature of conflict contexts. Disputes do not always involve the same issues or 
disputants, making it challenging for third-parties to apply old lessons to new cases. 
Furthermore, even if the disputants remain the same, their positions, power, and the issues under 
dispute can change over time; such changes occur often in rivalry relationships. Despite the 
theoretical arguments in favor of the learning model variant proposed above, I return to potential, 
alternative learning models in the conclusion of this work. 
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Random Model 
The cost and learning models propose distinct mechanisms by which interventions might 
be related to one another. Yet it is theoretically possible that no connections exist for two 
reasons. First, third-parties simply may not pay attention to previous interventions (either others’ 
or their own) when selecting strategies. If this statement is true, then third-party interventions are 
actually independent events. Existing research, however, does not lend credence to such a 
position. As noted earlier, many quantitative studies find that previous interventions increase the 
statistical likelihood of subsequent conflict management (Frazier 2006; Greig 2005; Greig and 
Diehl 2006; Greig and Regan 2008; Owsiak and Frazier 2009). This suggests that there is some 
connection between interventions that begs for an explanation.  
Furthermore, to claim that interventions are independent also contradicts empirical 
evidence in two ways. First, if interventions are independent, this implies that an intervening 
third-party ignores prior interventions, even when that same third-party intervened previously in 
the same conflict. For example, Russia frequently mediated a dispute in the 1990s between Iraq 
on the one hand and the United States and the United Kingdom (enforcing a United Nations no-
fly zone) on the other. Each time tensions rose between the disputants, Russia stepped in to 
mediate. There is little reason to suspect that Russian leaders ignored the interventions they 
performed months earlier. Why should we expect these events to be independent? It makes more 
sense for leaders to account for their own, earlier actions – at a minimum. 
Second, if interventions are independent, this also implies that third-parties either do not 
collect basic information before intervening abroad (such as what was previously tried in a 
conflict or whether earlier efforts worked) or collect such information but do not factor it into 
their intervention decision. Anecdotal evidence, however, fails to support this implication as 
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well. For example, during a conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and 
its neighbors (Uganda and Rwanda) in 1998-2001, Libya and Zambia intervened repeatedly (the 
latter acting on behalf of the South African Development Community), and their efforts 
reinforced one another. This occurred most clearly in May-July 1999. Libyan mediation secured 
a cease-fire in May 1999, along with an agreement to meet again in Zambia. Even though 
Libya’s intervention excluded key disputants (most notably Rwanda as well as some of the rebel 
groups operating in the DRC), the parties subsequently attended a Zambian mediation in July 
1999 and signed the Lusaka Accords (a cease-fire and troop withdrawal agreement). These 
agreements clearly built upon each other, as one set up the other. Furthermore, the statements of 
leaders in this conflict reveal a connection between interventions. Upon the termination of 
various mediation sessions, African leaders regularly issued public statements in which they 
thanked other third-parties and explicitly referenced previous agreements. These actions 
demonstrate that leaders pay attention to what other third-parties do, particularly if they plan to 
intervene as well.32 
The second reason that third-party efforts may not be related involves the uncertainty of 
conflict. International conflicts contain uncertainty and imperfect information, not just for the 
disputants (Fearon 1995; Powell 2006; Wagner 2000), but for third-parties as well. Thus, rational 
third-parties may want to conduct a successful conflict management effort, but they might not 
know the best way to achieve this. As Zartman and Touval (2007:451) note with respect to 
mediation, successful conflict resolution hinges on “ripe moments and leveraged buy-offs.” Yet 
third-parties may not know if the moment is ripe (for example, whether a hurting stalemate 
exists; see Zartman 2000; Zartman and Touval 2007), if the disputants actually want the conflict 
                                                 
32 The data for these examples were collected during the dissertation research and build upon the dataset of Frazier 
and Dixon (2006). 
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managed (see Richmond 1998), or what buy-offs will produce an agreement (assuming one is 
wanted; see, for example, Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991). Furthermore, in the face of so much 
complexity, third-parties cannot be certain that any one strategy is better than the others. 
Intervening actors may therefore employ strategies randomly, in what appears to be an attempt to 
stumble upon peace. 
I hasten to note that such random behavior need not be considered irrational. Among 
rational actors, random behavior may result from two sources - imperfect information and 
uncertainty – both of which are common characteristics found in the political world. Imperfect 
information refers to a condition in which rational actors do not have access to all of the 
information that might be pertinent before needing to make a decision (see Fearon 1995; Powell 
2006). Thus, the actor must make a somewhat uninformed decision, doing the best they can with 
the information at hand. In the context of conflict management, the problem of imperfect 
information suggests that rational actors would prefer to adjust their strategies from one 
intervention to the next, but lack the critical information needed to do so.  
This leads naturally to the question: what information do states need to make an informed 
decision about the strategy to use? Two pieces of information seem particularly pertinent for 
such a decision: the strategies previously tried (and the actor that tried them), as well as the 
outcome of any previous attempts. At first glance, it is difficult to imagine a scenario under 
which state leaders would not know which actors previously intervened in a militarized conflict 
and what strategies those intermediaries used. Militarized conflict represents a particularly 
serious interstate interaction that diverges markedly from normal politics. That conflict 
management attempts within noteworthy, militarized disputes would remain private seems 
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highly unlikely. Furthermore, in the event that leaders do not themselves know this information, 
it seems plausible that they could obtain it before deciding on their own intervention. 
Yet not all information is readily accessible. In particular, the outcomes of previous 
conflict management efforts might not be fully transparent at the time that a subsequent third-
party wants to intervene. A lack of information in these situations can result from two potential 
sources. Either conflict management attempts occur concurrently, making the results of a 
previous attempt unavailable at the time the next intervention begins, or the results of previous 
attempts are not distributed publicly (for example, mediations conducted in secrecy such as the 
Oslo Accords; see Pruitt 2005 for more information on the process leading to these accords). 
Rational actors can avoid the former, since they can wait for an ongoing intervention to end 
before undertaking another. In contrast, they cannot escape the latter. 
It seems unlikely that the outcomes of previous interventions are not available to 
decision-makers. Militarized disputes and interventions are well-publicized events; the media 
regularly captures the interventions of third-parties. Certain details of an intervention, however, 
may be omitted from any publicized reports. For example, disputants may not want to advertise 
the specific reasons why a mediation session failed, lest they face domestic opposition or weaken 
their bargaining position for future negotiations. Third-parties may also wish to conceal failures, 
especially if they hope to intervene successfully in the near future. Towards this end, withholding 
information (that is, possessing private information) can make other interventions less likely or 
successful. In situations such as these, other actors may know that the intervention did not 
succeed, but have no details about why that outcome occurred.  
The earlier models propose that third-parties do not need information about why 
interventions succeed or fail. The logic for such a position rests on the unreliability of such 
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information (if it were available) and the short time horizon in which subsequent intervention 
decisions are made. Disputants have strong incentives to misrepresent the proceedings of a 
negotiation. Negotiations occur internationally, but disputants must take the results of these talks 
back to a domestic audience (Putnam 1988). Leaders therefore have incentives to paint a 
favorable picture of themselves – that is, to bolster the reasonability of their position – while 
stressing the incompatible (perhaps, unreasonable) demands of the other side. Similarly, third-
parties have incentives to misrepresent. Third-parties that want to influence the final resolution 
of issues may not want other third-parties involved. They may also accept blame for failure to 
prevent the disputants’ domestic audiences from perceiving their leaders and, therefore, 
potentially removing them from office.33 For these reasons, I conclude that even if leaders knew 
why an intervention failed, that information would be unreliable. 
Furthermore, any information about why an intervention failed may take awhile to 
emerge. Organizations (particularly the United Nations) regularly assess their efforts, but any 
reports appear well after an intervention or conflict ends. For example, in 1999, the United 
Nations released an assessment of its actions during the Rwandan genocide of 1994 (United 
Nations 1999). Similarly, it published the Brahimi report in 2000, which assessed the benefits 
and shortfalls of the entire peacekeeping system since its creation in 1948 (United Nations 2000). 
Third-parties and disputants simply need time to reflect on what went wrong. They also 
promulgate more honest assessments of interventions as time passes; the distance created by time 
allows them to minimize audience costs and to gather information used to conduct an accurate 
assessment from many sources. Because reflection and assessment take time, they are not 
                                                 
33 A change in government leadership can breathe new life into conflict management efforts if domestic audiences 
endorse moderate negotiating positions. Yet it can also slow intervention efforts, since a new team must become 
acquainted with their counterparts, the issues involved, the third-party, and the process. 
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immediately available during the conflict, when third-parties are actively determining what 
intervention they should pursue next to manage the dispute effectively. 
 In addition to the problem caused by incomplete information, third-parties make 
decisions in the presence of great uncertainty as well. Quite simply, international conflict 
presents third-parties with complex situations that demand attention. Different actors, interstate 
relationships, resources, conflict contexts (for example, fatalities, or length of a dispute), and 
leaders combine to produce scenarios in which successful strategies do not necessarily travel 
well from one intervention to the next. This implies that states may not know what intervention 
will be successful in any given conflict. Indeed, if they did, they would have the ideal formula to 
produce a peaceful world.  
Uncertainty seems much more common then imperfect information, and considering the 
potential effects of uncertainty yields unique predictions about interventions. In the absence of 
uncertainty, one might expect interventions to be both more common and successful than they 
actually are. Rational actors would know exactly what to do under those conditions. In contrast, 
with much uncertainty in the world, third-parties may not know what to do. Their desire to 
intervene can trump the uncertainty surrounding conflict and encourage intervention, but that 
does not mean the selection of an intervention strategy follows any particular pattern. With no 
clear guidelines, rational third-parties may simply choose intervention strategies randomly, in an 
attempt to find something that moves the disputants toward a resolution of their dispute. 
 The arguments associated with imperfect information and uncertainty therefore produce 
the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is no discernible pattern in the (successive) interventions of third-parties. 
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I label this the random (or baseline) model and depict it graphically in Figure 2.4. The 
construction of this figure follows the same parameters as those presented earlier in the chapter. 
As the figure demonstrates, this model predicts no discernible pattern in the intervention 
behavior of third-parties; there is no clear pattern to the shaded boxes in Figure 2.4. Instead, 
third-parties employ strategies randomly. 
I argue above that random intervention behavior from rational third-parties seems highly 
unlikely.  Not only do they have access to the pertinent information needed to make informed 
decisions, but they should also be able to apply cost or learning models to interventions in spite 
of uncertainty. Although it is highly unlikely for this model to be accurate, I use this 
theoretically-driven model as a baseline model against which to test the hypotheses derived from 
the other models. Because the baseline model considers the possibility that third-party 
intervention decisions are unrelated to one another, it therefore creates a plausible, competing 
explanation for third-party behavior. Furthermore, it allows me to determine easily whether 
trajectories are meaningful concepts or not (see King, Keohane, and Verba 1994 on causality and 
inference). Finding any pattern to third-party intervention behavior undermines the random 
model, but there is no reason for me to assume a priori that such a pattern exists.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I outlined the decision process surrounding third-party intervention. A 
third-party must decide both whether to intervene and how to do so. Although I assume that 
third-parties make these decisions simultaneously, I disaggregated these decisions analytically in 
order to produce hypotheses about how third-parties select intervention strategies within a 
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trajectory. In general, I sketched three broad, theoretical models that explain this selection 
process: a cost model (and a limited commitments variant), a learning model, and a random 
model. Each model proposes a distinct mechanism by which interventions might be interrelated. 
 After discussing the logic behind each model, I then derived corresponding hypotheses 
consistent with their logic. To facilitate an easy comparison of the predictions of each model, 
Table 2.1 lists the hypotheses that appear in the current chapter. I organize each hypothesis in the 
table according to the broad theoretical model under which it falls (that is, cost, learning, or 
random), and the variant of the broad model under which it occurs (for example, pure cost versus 
limited commitments). The third column of the table lists a hypothesis number, which I will use 
in subsequent chapters to facilitate discussion. Finally, the text of each hypothesis appears in the 
final column of the table. Table 2.1 therefore provides a quick point of reference when 
discussing results in the upcoming chapters. 
 Having derived a number of testable predictions consistent with each model, I devote the 
remaining chapters of this work to evaluating the relative merits of each model. Before turning to 
the empirical analysis, however, the next chapter describes the data that I collect and use during 
the quantitative modeling. Part of the current research project also involves refining and 
extending the Frazier and Dixon (2006) conflict management dataset for the period 1993-2001. I 
therefore detail my collection efforts and provide descriptive statistics of the conflict 
management data gathered, in addition to outlining the research design and variables used in the 
chapters that follow.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 2.1: Trajectory of the Yemeni Dispute, 1978-1979 
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Figure 2.2: Cost Model 
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Figure 2.3: Limited Commitments Model 
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Figure 2.4: Random Model 
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Table 2.1: A Summary of Proposed Hypotheses 
 
Model Model Variant Number Hypothesis 
Cost Pure 1a Over the course of a conflict, third-party interventions will 
escalate from the use of relatively low-cost strategies to 
relatively high-cost strategies. 
1b Relatively high-cost strategies will be used less frequently 
than relatively low-cost strategies. 
1c IGOs and coalitions will begin their interventions with 
relatively more costly intervention strategies than individual 
states. 
1d IGOs are more likely than coalitions or individual states to 
perform multiple interventions simultaneously. Similarly, 
coalitions are more likely than individual states to perform 
multiple interventions simultaneously.  
1e States are more likely to attempt an overlapping intervention 
during an IGO or coalition-led intervention than a state-led 
one. 
Limited 
Commitments 
1f Third-parties are highly unlikely to use intervention 
strategies more costly than mediation. 
1g IGOs and coalitions are highly unlikely to use intervention 
strategies more costly than mediation. 
1h Third-parties are unlikely to initiate simultaneous or 
overlapping interventions, regardless of the actor involved or 
the strategy used. 
Learning (N/A) 2a Third-parties repeat strategies that were most recently 
successful and avoid strategies that were most recently 
unsuccessful. 
2b Third-parties are unlikely to initiate simultaneous or 
overlapping interventions, regardless of the actor involved or 
the strategy used. 
Random (N/A) 3 There is no discernible pattern in the (successive) 
interventions of third-parties. 
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Chapter 3 
Data, Measurement, and Methods 
  
This chapter introduces the data, variables, and methods used to assess the hypotheses 
presented in the last chapter. I first describe the conflict management data in some detail, as these 
data form the foundation for constructing trajectories empirically. Because this project involves 
data collection efforts, I also discuss the data gathered and how these data tie into the larger 
dataset to which it is appended. I then outline the procedure by which I create trajectories. Next, I 
delineate the variables used in the quantitative analysis as well as their measurement. These 
variables dictate the appropriate quantitative method to use, and I explain this method in depth 
along the way. Finally, I provide a brief discussion of the quantitative modeling process. Many 
of the results presented in the next chapter are the more parsimonious product of an iterated 
modeling procedure; this discussion therefore addresses how I ultimately distill those 
parsimonious results from more comprehensive models. 
 
Conflict Management Data 
 The conflict management data that I use in my analyses come primarily from Frazier and 
Dixon (2006), who collect information on conflict management efforts during the period 1946-
2000. For each intervention, Frazier and Dixon note the identity of the third-party, the starting 
and ending dates of the intervention, the strategy used by the third-party, whether the 
intervention achieved its intended purpose at the time it ended (that is, short-term success), and 
the specific conflict during which the intervention occurred.1 Furthermore, they construct a 
                                                 
1 The dataset captures more variables than this. These variables, however, are the most important for the purposes of 
the current study. More information on these variables appears below. 
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comprehensive typology of diplomatic conflict management strategies, which I discuss in more 
detail in Chapter 1 (see Table 1.1). Each intervention strategy falls within one of five broad 
categories: verbal (for example, demands for a cease-fire or a troop withdrawal), mediation 
(including conciliation, good offices, and fact-finding missions), legal (that is, arbitration and 
adjudication), administrative (for example, temporary administering a territory, providing 
humanitarian aid, overseeing elections, or assisting in the repatriation of refugees), and peace 
operations (for example, military observation, interpositionary deployments, and forces to 
monitor the demobilization of combatants) interventions. I work with these broad categories 
throughout the remainder of the study.  
The relative usage of the categories of strategies during the period 1946-2001 appears in 
Table 3.1.2 As is evident from the table, third-parties rely most on verbal pleas; 50% of 
interventions involve third-party requests that the disputants stop the violence, return to the 
negotiating table, or withdraw troops from a conflict zone, as well as offers from the third-party 
to facilitate negotiations between the disputants. Second to verbal interventions, third-parties 
mediate most frequently. In 38% of all interventions, third-parties actively work with the 
disputants (either by providing a venue for or facilitating negotiations, investigating the facts of 
the dispute, or generating proposals that might help resolve contentious issues) to manage their 
dispute through diplomatic (as opposed to violent) channels. Finally, third-parties turn to 
strategies more costly than mediation a small percentage of the time. Legal, administrative, and 
peace operations strategies comprise approximately 2%, 4%, and 6% of all interventions 
respectively. 
                                                 
2 I extend the dataset to 2001 and add more interventions during the 1993-2001 period. These additions are 
discussed below in greater detail. 
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 For the purposes of this study, the Frazier and Dixon (2006) typology offers two 
advantages over those found within alternative datasets. First, their typology arranges the various 
strategies along a continuum from relatively less costly to more costly strategies (where costs are 
interpreted with respect to the third-party using the strategy; see Table 3.1).3 This arrangement 
facilitates the theoretical purpose of the study, for it allows me to speak about the relative 
intervention costs that third-parties willingly incur. Without a discussion of relative costs, it 
would be unfeasible to evaluate the merits of certain theoretical models presented earlier. For 
example, if strategies were not ordered by cost, it would be impossible to evaluate the pure cost 
and limited commitments models, each of which require me to draw conclusions about the 
relative intervention costs that third-parties choose to bear in successive interventions. 
Furthermore, the relative cost continuum dictates the appropriate quantitative method to use 
when evaluating the predictions derived from the theoretical models presented earlier. I return to 
this point below during the discussion of the dependent variable’s measurement and the 
quantitative method used in the analyses. 
 Second, the typology is more comprehensive than that found in any alternative datasets, 
both in terms of the conflict management strategies and the third-party actors included in the 
data. As demonstrated by table 3.1, Frazier and Dixon (2006) capture a wide range of third-party 
conflict management behavior – including verbal pleas, mediation, arbitration and adjudication, 
administrative activities, and peace operations. Furthermore, this dataset tracks the conflict 
management efforts of states, coalitions of states, and international organizations with respect to 
the full range of conflict management behaviors. Although alternative datasets often contain part 
of this scope (along both dimensions), none overlaps it in entirety. For example, Bercovitch’s 
International Conflict Management (ICM) Data includes detailed information on mediation 
                                                 
3 I outline the argument supporting this observation in Chapter 1. 
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(including conciliation, good offices, and fact-finding missions), arbitration, and adjudication 
efforts within international conflicts, but contains few third-party strategies beyond these 
(Bercovitch 2000; Bercovitch and Gartner 2006; Bercovitch and Houston 1996).4  
Similarly, the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project collects thorough information 
about mediation efforts within international crises (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000).5 The project 
also gathers less detailed information on a wider array of strategies used by international 
organizations (fact-finding, arbitration, good offices, military observation missions, or 
emergency military force). Despite the slightly wider scope contained within the ICB dataset, I 
note three limitations to using such data for examining trajectories. First, the ICB project restricts 
the information available on the broader array of conflict management strategies to international 
organizations. Yet these organizations are not the only actors that employ good offices, conduct 
arbitration, or even deploy peace operations. Libya, for example, deployed a military observation 
mission (a type of peace operation) to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in May 
1999, in the midst of the DRC’s conflict with Rwandan and Ugandan supported rebels. Although 
we might suspect organizations to use certain strategies (such as those under the peace operations 
category) more often than states or coalitions, there is therefore no reason a priori to ignore the 
possibility that each actor has access to the full range of conflict management strategies. The ICB 
project assumes the latter, thereby overlooking many interventions by states and coalitions that 
the Frazier and Dixon (2006) dataset captures. These interventions belong within trajectories. 
 Second, although the ICB project collects information on a broad range of conflict 
management strategies, those data remain less detailed than the Frazier and Dixon (2006) data. 
As an illustration, a review of the ICB codebook reveals that their data do not code dates of 
                                                 
4 This statement is based on a review of the ICM Codebook (see Bercovitch 2000). 
5 The International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data is available online at: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer/. 
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intervention. This makes it impossible to determine the chronological order of interventions from 
the ICB data, which is a critical step in the construction of trajectories (see below). Furthermore, 
when multiple actors intervene in a crisis (or employ multiple strategies), the project codes the 
corresponding variables as “multiple,” rather than with a specific actor or strategy. Without 
knowing the identity of the third-party and the strategy they used within each intervention, one 
cannot speak with certainty about how conflict management efforts evolve over the course of a 
conflict (that is, trajectories cannot be formed). To be fair, some of this information may be 
retained within the ICB crisis narratives, but a review of the narratives demonstrates that this is 
not always the case (for example, the intervention dates often do not appear in the publicly 
available narratives).  
Finally, international crises are based upon perceptions, making any expectations of 
third-party involvement in them less clear. An international crisis occurs when actors perceive a 
threat to their basic values, a finite timeframe for a response to that threat, and a heightened 
probability of a military encounter (Wilkenfeld and Brecher 2000). Because perceptions drive 
the formation and termination of crises, violence need not accompany them. Indeed, Wilkenfeld 
and Brecher (2000) note that crises and conflict are not identical concepts and that 25% of crises 
do not contain any violence. The challenge then is knowing whether third-parties can reasonably 
be expected to intervene in crises, especially if there is no clear conflict in which to intervene or 
the main issues are psychological (or perceptive).  
Because of this challenge, I focus on conflict management within militarized interstate 
disputes (MIDs) during the period 1946-2001, rather than crises. A MID occurs when one state 
threatens, displays, or uses force against another state in the international system (Ghosn, 
Palmer, and Bremer 2004; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). In the case of MIDs, disputants 
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cross a clear threshold of violence, and this threshold can easily be observed by potential third-
parties. Employing such a clear threshold provides a set of cases in which one can reasonably 
expect third-parties to intervene. Militarized threats and actions are generally well-publicized, 
making the presence of conflict widely known. Unlike in situations where states perceive a crisis 
in the absence of violence, third-parties know quite clearly when a MID occurs. Furthermore, the 
MID always provides third-parties with a conflict in which to intervene. The same cannot be said 
of crises, especially because conflict and crises do not always go together.6 
Frazier and Dixon (2006) collect conflict management data on interventions within MIDs 
during the period 1946-2000.7 Yet, despite this temporal span, their coverage of the period 1993-
2001 remained incomplete. Part of this project therefore involved (re)examining all MIDs that 
occurred between 1993-2001 for additional conflict management efforts. Towards this end, I 
reviewed world news sources to understand the main events within each MID. I then created a 
conflict narrative for each dispute based on those news sources.8 The narratives include 
information about the MID (for example, different military skirmishes or threats) as well as any 
interventions that occurred within it (that is, who intervened, what strategy they used, the dates 
                                                 
6 For a comparison of MIDs and crises, see Hewitt (2003). According to Hewitt, “most international crises qualify as 
militarized disputes, but most militarized disputes do not qualify as crises” (681). He reaches this conclusion 
because he can match most crises with a specific MID, while the majority of MIDs cannot similarly be paired with 
one crisis. This provides an additional argument in favor of using MIDs; studying MIDs will provide one with 
substantial insight into crises, but because of how the overlap occurs, the converse is not true. 
7 The end date of the period corresponds to the MID dataset, which currently contains disputes through 2001. Note 
that Frazier and Dixon (2006) also collect information on conflict management efforts that occur outside of MIDs. I 
exclude such interventions from consideration in this study. Restricting attention to MIDs creates a uniform conflict 
context within which interventions occur. This ensures that interventions within trajectories share similar conflict 
characteristics (the threat, display or use of force in the case of MIDs) and prevents me from comparing dissimilar 
contexts (MIDs vs. non-MIDs) with one another inappropriately. In other words, trajectories within and outside of 
MIDs may vary; I postpone this possibility for future research.  
8 The Correlates of War (COW) Project contains brief narratives for MIDs during the period 1993-2001 (Ghosn et 
al. 2004), but their narratives are limited in three ways. First, they do not provide a narrative for every dispute during 
this period. Second, the narratives that exist are sometimes vague. For example, many narratives simply note that a 
MID consisted of “a series of” clashes, border violations or skirmishes. I sought to fill in the details of those events. 
Third, the MID narratives contain no information on conflict management efforts, which is the main focus of this 
study (and the Frazier and Dixon 2006 dataset). The narratives created by this project are therefore consistent with 
those of COW, but are much more detailed than them. To construct my narratives, I do not rely on Ghosn et al. 
(2004) as a source unless I cannot find other information on the dispute that corroborates their existing narrative. 
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of intervention, whether the intervention achieved its purpose). An example of such a narrative 
appears in Figure 3.1 (a dispute in 2000 between Guyana and Suriname). Finally, I coded third-
party interventions that I found according to the scheme established by Frazier and Dixon 
(2006), ultimately adding these observations to their dataset (see Table 3.1 and the discussion of 
variables that appears later in this chapter). 
Tables 3.2-3.4 provide an overview of the Frazier and Dixon (2006) data for the 1993-
2001 period, along with the contribution offered to that data by my efforts. I detail the 
contributions along a number of fronts: by dispute, strategy, and third-party coverage. First, 
Table 3.2 describes the dispute coverage before and after the data collection process. Prior to this 
project, the Frazier and Dixon (2006) dataset contained intervention information on 18 MIDs that 
occurred between 1993-2001.9 This project added conflict management data on an additional 36 
MIDs to the dataset (additions column) and made changes to 11 of the 18 disputes already in the 
dataset (changes column). These changes involved adding interventions to the dispute, as well as 
updating some intervention dates and strategies that were clarified through reviewing additional 
news sources.  
Describing conflict management data by dispute can be slightly misleading, however. 
Because third-parties frequently intervene repeatedly in the same disputes, categorizing the data 
in such a fashion does not provide an indication of how many conflict management efforts occur 
within international disputes. Therefore, to understand the full scope of the data (and the 
contributions of this project), one must examine the data by interventions as well. Such an 
examination also uses a more appropriate level-of-analysis for describing the data because each 
observation within the Frazier and Dixon (2006) dataset consists of an intervention (rather than a 
dispute). As noted earlier, these interventions possess two characteristics – a third-party actor 
                                                 
9 The vast majority of MIDs experience no intervention. 
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who intervenes using one of many specific strategies (see Chapter 1). For these reasons, the 
tables that follow dissect the intervention-level data by the strategy used during the intervention 
and the actor that performs the intervention. 
 Table 3.3 depicts the break-down of conflict management strategies used by third-parties 
in each intervention during the period 1993-2001. The five categories (verbal, mediation, legal, 
administrative and peace operation) follow the Frazier and Dixon typology shown earlier (in 
Table 3.1).10 As illustrated in Table 3.3, the data that I collect during this project contributes 249 
new interventions to the dataset (an increase of 82% over the original dataset, which contains 
134 observations for this time period). Furthermore, these additions cover the full spectrum of 
conflict management strategies. The greatest additions clearly appear in the verbal (146 new 
interventions), and mediation (84 new observations) categories, but there are additions in the 
legal, administrative, and peace operations categories as well (4, 8, and 6 new interventions 
respectively). 
Table 3.4 takes a different tack; it categorizes the interventions during the 1993-2001 
period according to the type of third-party intervening in the dispute. As the table illustrates, the 
data gathered during the course of this project cover all third-party actors: states, coalitions, and 
intergovernmental organizations. States lead the majority of interventions added to the dataset 
(170 new interventions), but the new observations involving non-state third-parties are not 
negligible. In fact, the data derived from this project nearly double the interventions in the 
Frazier and Dixon (2006) dataset that are performed by coalitions (15 new observations) and 
organizations (63 new observations) during this time period.  
                                                 
10 Because I use these five broad categories throughout the empirical analysis that follows, I do not break the data 
down further. 
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Although there are a fair number of additions to the Frazier and Dixon (2006) dataset, 
these new data do not drastically change the characteristics of the original dataset. I reach this 
conclusion by comparing the amended data from the 1993-2001 period with the data collected by 
Frazier and Dixon for the 1946-1992 period. Table 3.5 shows intervention-level data by strategy 
and time period (1946-1992, 1993-2001, and the combined period of 1946-2001 shown earlier in 
Table 3.1). The percentages listed within each cell of the table are column percentages; they 
indicate the percentage of total observations for a given time period that fall within a specific 
strategy category. For example, third-parties use verbal strategies in 48.09% of interventions that 
occur between 1946-1992 and in 54.69% of interventions that occur between 1993-2001.  
The first two columns demonstrate that the strategy distribution remains relatively 
constant across the time periods with two slight exceptions. First, the number of verbal 
interventions increases in the 1993-2001 period. Such a change may result from expanding news 
coverage (for example, cable networks as opposed to newspapers) and technological advances 
(that increase the distribution of news) throughout the 1990s; as news coverage and its 
distribution expand, it potentially carries more public statements on behalf of world leaders that 
can be picked up by coders. Second, the frequency of peace operations falls somewhat after 
1992. This matches the empirical reality, as many peace operations in the post-cold war era 
address civil wars, rather than the interstate conflict examined in this study. Despite these 
exceptions, third-parties always rely most on verbal strategies, followed by mediation, peace 
operations, administrative, and legal strategies (in order of decreasing frequency of use). This 
pattern does not change as a result of the data contributed by this project. 
Besides looking at the distribution of strategies throughout the dataset, I also examine the 
prevalence of interventions performed by each of the three third-party actor types: states, 
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coalitions, and international organizations. Table 3.6 displays intervention-level data by third-
party actor type and time period. From 1946 to 1992, states conducted 39.28% of interventions, 
while coalitions only undertook 9.59% of all third-party interventions. International 
organizations led the most interventions during this time period (51.13%).  These values shift 
somewhat in the 1993-2001 period. The incident of state interventions increases when compared 
to the previous time period (to 57.81%), while that of coalitions and organizations drops (to 
6.25% and 35.94% respectively). These shifts may stem from two factors. First, many state 
interventions employ verbal strategies. To the extent that media expansion explains the rise in 
verbal interventions throughout the 1990s (see above), it may also help explain the shift toward 
greater state intervention. Second, intergovernmental organizations focused much of their 
attention upon civil wars during the 1990s (for example, see Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1995). 
Although the data demonstrate that these organizations clearly did not ignore interstate conflict 
after 1992, limited resources may have restricted the attention they could give to interstate 
conflicts during that period.11 
 
Constructing Trajectories Empirically 
 I argued earlier that the concept of a trajectory denotes a path of third-party intervention 
throughout the life of a dispute. The conflict management data described above provide the 
building blocks for trajectories; each trajectory contains two or more third-party interventions. 
The individual interventions that comprise a specific trajectory are related to one another in three 
ways, and these relationships determine the process by which I construct trajectories empirically. 
                                                 
11 Some may also argue that the end of the cold war permitted third-parties to intervene in disputes more freely. This 
argument, however, most often applies to organizations, rather than states (see Balas, Owsiak, and Diehl 2010; 
Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1995; Mingst and Karns 2000). Nonetheless, it is possible that the end of the cold war also 
provided states with greater autonomy with which to conduct interventions. 
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First, interventions within a trajectory all occur within the same dispute (by definition). This 
implies that the trajectory is a dispute-level concept, and it mandates the first step in the 
trajectory construction process: identifying all interventions within a given dispute. Second, the 
various interventions within a trajectory can be ordered chronologically. Doing so identifies the 
proper sequence in which interventions occur. Finally, I proposed in the previous chapter that a 
third-party’s selection of an intervention strategy depends on the most recent intervention 
strategy used in the trajectory. Third-parties consider characteristics of the previous intervention 
when deciding what to do next. Therefore, once I determine the chronological order of the 
interventions, I collect information (variables) about the previous intervention for each 
intervention that occurs within a trajectory.12 For example, for every intervention within a 
trajectory, I note the strategy used during the previous intervention within the trajectory and 
whether that previous intervention succeeded. I discuss the specifics of these variables below. 
 As an illustration of this process, I return to the dispute between Guyana and Suriname 
described in Figure 3.1. The narrative indicates that two third-party interventions occurred within 
this dispute.13 First, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) issued a verbal plea for the 
disputants to resume dialogue on 20 June 2000. Shortly thereafter (3-18 July 2000), CARICOM 
facilitated negotiations (that is, conducted good offices, which falls within the mediation 
category; see Table 3.1) in an effort to help the disputants reach a resolution to their conflict. 
These two interventions comprise the trajectory for the Guyana-Suriname dispute, and it is clear 
from the narrative that the verbal plea preceded the use of mediation. Furthermore, if successive 
interventions inform one another (as proposed by almost all of the hypotheses outlined in 
                                                 
12 Because the first intervention within a trajectory has no preceding intervention, the information mentioned here 
cannot be collected for interventions that begin a trajectory. 
13 Bilateral negotiations also occurred, but since these do not involve third-parties, they are not considered 
interventions. 
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Chapter 2), then the verbal intervention should in some way affect the subsequent selection of 
mediation as an intervention strategy. In other words, information from the verbal intervention 
may help predict the mediation that follows. 
Although the process of constructing trajectories appears straightforward, two factors 
complicate it. First, some observations during the 1946-1992 period do not contain precise 
intervention dates, and this prevented the creation of a trajectory in a handful of cases. For 
example, if two interventions occur in February of a specific year, but the day on which one or 
both of the interventions occur remains unknown, the proper sequence of interventions cannot be 
ascertained. Rather than assuming a trajectory shape in such cases, I do not include disputes 
affected by this issue in the analysis. This decision omits four disputes from consideration.14 
  Second, multiple third-parties occasionally intervene on the exact same day. In other 
words, interventions sometimes begin simultaneously. This can also obscure the construction of 
trajectories because the precise sequence of interventions cannot be determined in these cases. 
Note, however, that unlike in the previous cases (when the problem was a lack of precise 
information dates), the main issue in these cases involves simultaneity. Two possible solutions 
exist to rectify this dilemma. First, if the third-parties that intervene simultaneously use different 
intervention strategies, I construct multiple trajectories for the dispute – with intervention 
pathways that pass through each of the concurrent interventions. An illustration clarifies this 
process. Suppose, for example, that one third-party intervenes verbally in a dispute on a given 
day, while another third-party begins to mediate that dispute on the same day. Depending on 
which intervention precedes the other, the shape of the trajectory will differ. Because it is 
impossible to determine which of the two interventions occurs before the other, I opt instead to 
                                                 
14 The omitted disputes occur between Lebanon and Syria (1949), Ethiopia and Somalia (1963-4), Ethiopia and 
Sudan (1987), and Senegal and Mauritania (1989). Prior to removing these disputes from the analysis, I conducted 
additional research in an attempt to determine the exact intervention dates.  
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create two trajectories. The first trajectory includes the verbal intervention but not the mediation; 
the second includes the mediation but not the verbal plea.15  
Such a process preserves the integrity of the data; it correctly captures the fact that the 
trajectory passed through each intervention. Yet it also potentially inflates the number of 
transitions that occur within a dispute. As an example, there are 42 interventions that occur 
during a MID between the United States, United Kingdom, and Iraq over the enforcement of a 
United Nations sanctioned no-fly zone over Iraq (1997-2001). Because there are a few 
concurrently beginning interventions during this dispute, I follow the process outlined above and 
create multiple trajectories for this dispute (a total of 12 are needed to handle all of the 
concurrently beginning interventions). Each of these 12 trajectories differ from one another only 
when there are concurrently beginning interventions; the remainder of these trajectories are 
identical to one another. This causes many observations to be repeated in the dataset. In the 
example above, each intervention that does not have a concurrently beginning counterpart 
appears 12 times in the data, which thereby inflates (and biases) the true number of interventions. 
Three disputes in particular are drastically affected by this process: the Vietnam War; the 
Eritrea-Ethiopian War; and the dispute noted above between the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Iraq over the enforcement of a United Nations sanctioned no-fly zone (1997-
2001). These three disputes contain 33.5%, 6.1%, and 20.5% of the trajectory-level observations 
respectively.16 I address the potential bias caused by these disputes in two ways. First, I drop the 
outliers from certain models entirely. Second, I leave the disputes in the analysis, but focus only 
upon the first trajectory path constructed. Every dispute has at least one trajectory, so restricting 
analysis to only the first trajectory of every dispute ensures that I do not exclude any disputes. 
                                                 
15 In effect, I am modeling only one of the concurrently beginning interventions at a time. 
16 No other dispute comprises more than 3.2% of the trajectory-level observations. The vast majority of MIDs each 
account for less than 1% of the total observations. 
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Yet it also causes me to lose information about certain intervention paths, as many of the 
concurrently beginning interventions receive no consideration.  
Both of these methods for handling influential data yield similar conclusions (that is, the 
results are robust; see Chapter 4). Therefore, in the complex modeling presented in the next 
chapter, I generally opt to address influential observations by dropping the outliers from the 
analysis entirely. This allows me to balance my desire to retain information about as many 
trajectory paths as possible with my need to limit the bias that this causes. By allowing for 
multiple trajectories to exist, I retain the data on those interventions. Yet by removing the three 
outliers noted above, I also prevent multiple trajectories from inflating the data substantially. 
The second method for handling concurrently beginning interventions occurs when the 
intervening third-parties employ exactly the same intervention strategy. These cases are much 
easier; the precise order of the interventions need not be known because the shape of the 
trajectory remains unaffected by their ordering. As an illustration, suppose that two third-parties 
issue a verbal demand for a troop withdrawal on the same day. Regardless of which verbal plea 
comes first chronologically, the trajectory path remains the same; it will pass through a verbal 
intervention on this day. In these cases, I therefore credit each individual third-party with an 
intervention on the appropriate day as if they intervened together. Note, however, that this does 
not mean that I consider these to be instances of coalition interventions (see below for more on 
this point). I retain the information and characteristics of each intervening third-party. 
  
Variables and Methods 
 In the previous chapter, I proposed that third-party interventions within the same dispute 
were related to one another, and I advanced a number of mechanisms that might explain how this 
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occurs. Common to each of these mechanisms is that idea that the intervention strategy used in 
the previous intervention (and potentially its success) affects the strategy used in the current 
intervention (that is, the “next” intervention in the trajectory). This makes the relationship 
between the previous intervention (i-1) and the current (or next) intervention (i) tantamount to 
any analysis.17 
 The goal of the various hypotheses is then to predict the current intervention strategy 
used in the trajectory. This remains the dependent variable in all of the quantitative models 
presented in Chapter 4. I measure this variable using the Frazier and Dixon (2006) typology of 
strategies presented in Table 3.1. More specifically, I classify each intervention according to the 
broad category of intervention strategies to which it belongs. These categories (and their 
corresponding numerical coding values) include: verbal (1), mediation (2), legal (3), 
administrative (4), and peace operations (5) interventions (see Chapter 1 for a more detailed 
discussion of the precise strategies that fall within the various categories). 
  As noted earlier, the Frazier and Dixon (2006) typology arranges the various strategies 
along a continuum from relatively less costly to more costly strategies (with costs being 
interpreted with respect to the third-party using the strategy). The argument supporting this 
observation appears in Chapter 1. For the purposes of research design, two characteristics of the 
dependent variable result from this cost continuum. First, the dependent variable is ordered. 
Second (and related to the first characteristic), lower values of the dependent variable reflect 
relatively less costly strategies (see the coding listed above). Conversely, higher values 
correspond to relatively more costly strategies. 
                                                 
17 I will refer to the intervention at (i-1) as the “previous” intervention throughout the discussion in Chapters 3 and 4. 
In contrast, I label the intervention at (i) as the “current” or “next” intervention. Because of chronological ordering, 
the current or next intervention always follows the previous intervention.  
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Because the dependent variable is both ordered and categorical, I use a series of ordered 
probit regression models to evaluate the hypotheses outlined earlier (Greene 2008; Liao 1994). 
Despite the use of regression models, however, my main interest does not lie in the coefficients 
they produce, as is often the case with studies that use such models. This divergence occurs for 
two reasons. First, the coefficients of an ordered probit model cannot be interpreted directly (see 
Greene 2008:832-834 for a mathematical argument that yields this conclusion). Unlike in probit 
or logistic regressions (where one can see general positive or negative effects on a dependent, 
dichotomous variable), coefficients have no exact meaning when the dependent variable can take 
on more than two values.  
Second, the purpose of this study is to understand how a third-party’s choice of conflict 
management strategy (and therefore the shape of a trajectory) depends on the previous 
intervention in the trajectory. In other words, I need to know the likelihood with which (or the 
probability that) a third-party employs each of the five categories of strategies (verbal, 
mediation, legal, administrative, and peace operations) conditional upon the previous strategy 
used in the trajectory. Given that a verbal intervention just occurred (at i-1), how likely is the 
next intervening third-party (at i) to use another verbal strategy? How likely is the next 
intervening third-party to use mediation (at i)? What about their likelihood of resorting to a legal, 
administrative, or peace operations intervention (at i)? Do these answers change if the previous 
intervention (that is, at i-1) was not a verbal one (for example, mediation)? 
To address these questions, I therefore use the ordered probit results to generate 
probability distributions over outcomes.18 The “outcome” refers to the dependent variable – that 
is, the current conflict management strategy selected (i). The probability distribution over this 
outcome provides an answer to the general question: how likely is the next third-party (at i) to 
                                                 
18 I calculate all probabilities in Stata 9.0 using the Clarify software created by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000). 
117 
 
use each of the five categories of intervention strategies, given that the previous strategy (at i-1) 
used in the trajectory was x? I can then substitute each of the five strategy categories for x in the 
previous question to discover how third-party behavior changes according to the previous 
strategy used. In the end, this allows me to predict how likely third-parties are to follow any one 
conflict management strategy category (used at i-1) with any other (at i). 
An illustration of a distribution over outcomes helps clarify the concept and its 
importance to this study. One of the models presented in the next chapter (Model 1; Tables 4.4-
4.5) reveals that after a verbal intervention occurs (at i-1), third-parties use another verbal 
strategy next (at i) in the trajectory 77% of the time. In contrast, third-parties rely on mediation, 
legal, administrative, and peace operations strategies after a verbal intervention 19%, 1%, 1%, 
and 2% of the time respectively. These likelihoods define the distribution over outcomes (at i) 
that transpires after a verbal intervention (at i-1). Two characteristics are worth noting about this 
distribution. First, although the distribution above results after a verbal intervention (at i-1), 
similar (distinct) distributions define behavior after each of the other categories. For example, we 
could ask how likely third-parties are to use each of the five categories of strategies after a 
mediation instead of a verbal plea. Second, the distribution over outcomes depends on the 
ordered probit model. Changing the ordered probit model will therefore alter the corresponding 
distributions over outcomes. 
In statistical terminology, these distributions over outcomes imply the use of Markov 
transition models (Cinlar 1975; Gill 2006; for an application, see Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, 
Kristensen, and O’Halloran 2006). Markov models estimate the probability of moving (or 
transitioning) from any one category to any other, given that there are a finite number of 
categories. Epstein et al. (2006) provide a straightforward illustration of this technique. These 
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authors examine three types of government: democracy, autocracy and anocracy. By definition, 
all governments fall into one, and only one, of these three categories (in other words, the 
typology is exhaustive and the categories are mutually exclusive and finite). Epstein et al. then 
model the probability that a democracy transitions to either an autocracy or anocracy or remains 
a democracy in each year. Similar calculations examine the transitioning behavior of autocracies 
and anocracies. This ultimately tells the authors how likely government types are to persist or 
change in successive years as well as the factors associated with those governments’ transitions 
or persistence. 
The current study follows a similar pattern. The Frazier and Dixon (2006) typology 
classifies each diplomatic conflict management strategy into one, and only one, of five unique 
categories (see Table 3.1). Because there are no diplomatic intervention strategies that fall 
outside their categorization, the typology is exhaustive. The five categories of strategies are also 
mutually exclusive (that is, no strategy can be placed within more than one category) and finite 
(that is, there are only five categories). Armed with such a classification system, I then construct 
trajectories and use them to model the likelihood with which third-parties follow any given 
strategy (at i-1) with any other strategy (at i).  
In order to use the Markov modeling technique, conflict management trajectories must 
possess two characteristics (Gill 2006). First, trajectories must be aperiodic, meaning that they do 
not cycle in time (for example, seasonally or annually). There is no theoretical reason to believe 
that diplomatic interventions rise and fall regularly on a weekly, monthly, seasonal, or annual 
basis, so trajectories exhibit this characteristic. Second, trajectories must be irreducible; in other 
words, third-parties must have access to (and use) each of the five categories of strategies. If this 
is not the case, then the menu of strategies must be reduced for the analysis to proceed. For 
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example, if third-parties never used peace operations at all, it would be entirely impossible to 
follow any intervention with a peace operation. This would violate the irreducible characteristic, 
and one would need to “reduce” the classification system of strategies to exclude peace 
operations to continue with the analysis. Trajectories seem to possess this second characteristic 
as well. Third-parties can (and do) select from among any conflict management strategy in the 
typology regardless of what has been previously tried.  No strategy is entirely off-limits, as the 
menu of strategies remains constantly available to third-parties. 
As a result of these two characteristics, the Markov process underlying trajectories can be 
called ergotic (Gill 2006). This means that the distributions over outcomes (mentioned above) 
eventually stabilize (or converge toward an equilibrium) in each model. The practical 
implications of this cannot be overstated, for such a stable, unique distribution indicates that 
third-party intervention decisions do not change drastically throughout the course of a trajectory. 
It does not matter, for example, whether a third-party intervenes second in the trajectory or 
fifteenth or fiftieth. Because the models produce a stationary distribution over outcomes, the 
likelihood with which third-parties use each intervention strategy (at i) do not depend on the 
point at which intervention occurs within the trajectory. This permits me to speak of my 
conclusions in very general terms – without reference to specific points within a trajectory (for 
example, the third, fourth, or fifth intervention). 
 
Key Independent Variables 
 Because I am interested in how each intervention affects the one that follows, the main 
independent variables used in the analysis involve the lagged conflict management strategies. 
For each intervention in a trajectory, I note the strategy category used during the prior 
120 
 
intervention: verbal, mediation, legal, administrative, or peace operations.19 When measuring a 
series of mutually exclusive categories, researchers normally use dichotomous variables that 
capture one category at a time. For example, one variable would denote whether the previous 
intervention employed a verbal strategy, another would indicate whether the previous 
intervention resorted to mediation, and so on. Rather than follow this more standard approach, 
however, I take a slightly different tack.  
 Following the work of Epstein et al. (2006), I create a series of four dichotomous 
variables that differentiate between the five categories of conflict management strategies. The 
coding of these variables appears in Table 3.7. Unlike in the approach described above, each 
variable does not stand for a single category of strategies. Instead, the variable indicates whether 
the prior intervention used a strategy no more costly than a specified category of strategies. The 
variable labeled Y*1, for example, notes whether the prior strategy was no more costly than a 
verbal intervention; it is coded 1 only if the prior intervention involved a verbal strategy (because 
verbal strategies occupy the lowest point along the cost continuum; see Table 3.1). Similarly, the 
variable named Y*3 designates situations in which the prior strategy used in the trajectory was 
no more costly than a legal intervention; it is coded 1 if the prior intervention involved a verbal, 
mediation, or legal strategy. The reference category is peace operations, which occurs when all 
four of the constructed variables is equal to 0. 
 As an illustration of the coding process for these variables, I return to the Guyana and 
Suriname dispute described in Figure 3.1. Third-parties intervene twice in that dispute: first 
using a verbal intervention and subsequently through mediation. Because the first intervention 
involves a verbal plea, I therefore code all Y* variables 1 for this intervention (according to the 
                                                 
19 Obviously, this means that the first intervention in a trajectory contains no information on these variables, as there 
is no prior intervention in the trajectory to examine. 
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first column of Table 3.7). In contrast to the first intervention, third-parties mediate during the 
second intervention. According to Table 3.7 (second column), I code a value of 0 for Y*1 and a 
value of 1 for the remaining Y* variables for this intervention. Note that in this second 
intervention, Y*1 is coded 0 because mediation is more costly than a verbal plea, and Y*1 
denotes instances in which an intervention uses a strategy that is no more costly than a verbal 
strategy. 
 Although unconventional, this approach offers a key advantage over the traditional one: it 
allows me to verify the validity of the typology of conflict management strategies used in the 
analysis (Epstein et al. 2006). In particular, I can test whether third-parties distinguish between 
each of the five categories of strategies when making intervention decisions, and, if they do not, I 
can easily adjust the categorization scheme. For example, assume that third-parties behave as 
though mediation and legal strategies have similar costs when they make intervention decisions. 
This implies that mediation and legal strategies should be considered as one category along the 
cost continuum instead of two (they belong within the same “cost category” according to third-
party behavior). Using the Y* variables (as defined above), I can easily merge (or “collapse”; see 
Epstein et al. 2006) these two categories into a larger one. In short, if the five categories do not 
each meaningfully affect the selection of the next strategy in the trajectory, adjacent categories20 
along the cost continuum can be merged (or collapsed) until a larger, meaningful category exists. 
An illustration highlights this point. 
 There are relatively few legal interventions within the dataset (n=20; see Table 3.1). This 
makes it challenging to differentiate between legal strategies and those adjacent to it, as there is 
not much information available on the use of legal strategies to do so. Indeed, this fact is 
                                                 
20 Referring to the positioning along the relative cost continuum (see Table 1.1), adjacent categories are within one 
value of each other. So the verbal category (numbered 1) is adjacent to mediation (numbered 2). Mediation is 
adjacent to both the verbal category and the legal category (numbered 3). Etc. 
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supported by a closer examination of the Y* variables presented in Table 3.7. The Y*2 variable 
(Table 3.7) denotes whether a third-party used a strategy that was no more costly than mediation 
in the previous intervention (that is, a verbal or mediation strategy). Likewise, the Y*3 variable 
indicates whether a third-party used a strategy that was no more costly than a legal intervention 
in the previous intervention (that is, a legal, mediation, or verbal strategy). The difference in 
coding between these two variables is that Y*3 includes legal strategies, while Y*2 does not (see 
Table 3.7; when the previous intervention uses a legal strategy, Y*3 is coded 1 and Y*2 is coded 
0).  
Table 3.8 lists the correlation coefficients between each of the Y* variable combinations. 
As this table indicates, the correlation coefficient between Y*2 and Y*3 is extremely high 
(0.953). This reflects the paucity of legal interventions. Y*2 and Y*3 differ from one another 
only when a legal intervention occurs (see above). Yet there are so few legal interventions that 
the two variables cannot be differentiated from one another substantially.21 They therefore have a 
strong correlation, which suggests that only one of the two variables should probably be used in 
any analysis. If it is indeed the case that the Y*2 and Y*3 variables should not be used together 
in the same model (and the empirical modeling confirms such a position), then which variable 
should remain?  
 The variable construction process answers this question. The Y* variables are “nested” in 
a sense. Each Y* variable contains the information within the Y* variables numbered below it. 
For example, Y*3 denotes whether the previous intervention involved a strategy no more costly 
than a legal intervention (that is, verbal, mediation, or legal strategies); Y*2 indicates whether 
the prior intervention used a strategy no more costly than mediation (that is, verbal or mediation 
                                                 
21 There is no other substantive interpretation of this correlation coefficient. It is an artifact of the variable 
construction process. 
123 
 
strategies); and Y*1 captures instances in which the previous intervention used a strategy no 
more costly than a verbal plea (that is, a verbal strategy). Y*3 therefore clearly contains the 
information found within both Y*2 and Y*1, for it includes previous mediations and verbal 
pleas. Yet Y*3 is also slightly different than these other two variables; it includes information on 
cases where the prior intervention involved a legal strategy as well as when that intervention 
involved mediation or verbal strategies. Because Y*3 already contains information on cases 
where the previous intervention involved mediation, Y*2 offers nothing unique over Y*3. Thus, 
if we had to choose between the two variables, it makes sense to merge (or “collapse”) categories 
downward. In this case, that means omitting Y*2 from the models and allowing Y*3 to pick up 
prior interventions involving mediation.22  
 The omission of key independent variables does somewhat change the substantive 
interpretation of those that remain.23 The precise interpretation, however, depends on which 
variables stay in the final model. Returning to the example above, suppose that Y*1 and Y*3 
remain in the model, but we omit Y*2 and Y*4. As before, Y*1 captures third-party intervention 
decisions (at i) following an intervention (at  i-1) that used a strategy no more costly than a 
verbal strategy. Because there are no strategies less costly than verbal ones, I could instead say 
that Y*1 represents intervention behavior following a verbal intervention.24 Y*3 denotes third-
party intervention decisions (at i) following an intervention (at i-1) that used a strategy no more 
costly than a legal strategy (that is, a verbal, mediation, or legal strategy). With Y*2 omitted, 
                                                 
22 In this case, the Y*2 and Y*3 categories merged for a methodological reason: there are not enough legal 
interventions to allow a substantial distinction to be drawn between them. Above, I propose a substantive 
interpretation for merging the two categories – namely, that third-parties consider mediation and legal strategies to 
possess similar costs. Although these two arguments are not mutually exclusive, it is impossible to evaluate the 
substantive argument when the methodological one prevents both variables from being included in the same model. 
23 This prevents the use of variable names other than Y*. Although this discussion contains a great deal of 
information about these variables for the purposes of research design and replication, I move beyond them in the 
results section and focus instead upon their substantive implications. 
24 I use this more simplified interpretation going forward.  
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Y*3 differs from Y*1 in that it includes cases in which the prior intervention involved mediation 
or legal cases (the coding in Table 3.7 confirms this).25 Therefore, Y*3 actually signifies 
intervention behavior (at i) following a mediation or legal intervention (at i-1) when Y*1 remains 
in the model.  
Finally, omitting Y*4 causes it to merge with the reference category (similar to the 
process by which Y*2 and Y*3 merge above). The reference category generally covers third-
party intervention decisions not covered by the other Y* variables. Recall that Y*3 denotes 
instances in which the prior intervention used a strategy no more costly than a legal strategy. 
Therefore, when the model retains Y*3 (but not Y*4), the reference category denotes previous 
interventions in which the third-party employed strategies more costly than legal strategies (or 
everything along the cost continuum not covered by some Y* variable). Substantively, this 
means that third-parties in this reference category used either an administrative or peace 
operations intervention during the prior intervention (at i-1). 
 I recognize the complexity of these variables, so I offer a visual explanation of their 
interpretation as well. Figure 3.2 contains a theoretical distribution of interventions arranged 
along a cost continuum (as in Table 1.1).26 The Y* variables discussed above represent “cut 
points” across the distribution, and they are read somewhat analogously to how one reads z-
values across a probability density function. As noted above, Y*1 represents third-party 
intervention decisions (at i) following an intervention (at i-1) that uses a strategy no more costly 
than a verbal one. In Figure 3.2, this involves all interventions to the left of Y*1 (or just previous 
verbal interventions). Similarly, Y*3 denotes third-party decisions following an intervention that 
                                                 
25 Y*3 also contains observations in which the prior intervention involved a verbal strategy. Because Y*1 captures 
that information as well, we can force Y*1 to be 0 and let Y*3 capture the difference between it and Y*1. This 
difference occurs when the prior intervention used either mediation or a legal strategy. 
26 The exact form of the distribution does not matter for this explanation, although it must satisfy the conditions of a 
probability distribution function (see Stirzaker 1999 for more information on these conditions).  
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employs a strategy no more costly than a legal one. This includes all interventions to the left of 
Y*3 in the figure (that is, verbal, mediation, and legal strategies).  
Four things are worth noting about the depicted relationship between Y*1 and Y*3. First, 
Y*3 includes the information found within Y*1 (previous verbal interventions), since Y*1 is to 
the left of Y*3. This accords with the statement above that higher numbered Y* variables contain 
information from the Y* variables numbered below them. Second, Y*3 differs from Y*1 in the 
shaded area (that is, Y*3 includes previous mediation and legal interventions, while Y*1 does 
not). Finally, if we subtract Y*1 from Y*3, we get this shaded area. In other words, we can “turn 
off” Y*1 (or force it to 0) to better understand how intervention behavior differs after verbal 
interventions on the one hand and mediation and legal interventions on the other. Finally, if we 
need to collapse categories (because third-party decisions or methodological concerns compel us 
to do so), we should collapse categories to the left in the figure (that is, remove the lower 
numbered Y* variables and keep the higher valued ones). This ability to merge categories is the 
key advantage to using the Y* variables as defined above; it ensures that the analysis most 
closely matches how third-parties differentiate among the strategy categories’ relative costs. 
 There is one final thing to note from Figure 3.2. Merging categories (as was done with 
Y*2 and Y*3 above) does not exclude any intervention strategies from the analysis; we can still 
assess third-party behavior after both mediation and legal interventions, even though we 
removed Y*2. Yet it is not possible to differentiate between (the two) individual merged 
strategies, and the figure explains why. Y*3 can cover strategies no more costly than legal ones 
(that is, verbal, mediation, and legal strategies). It is possible to remove verbal strategies from 
the domain of Y*3 by “turning off” Y*1 (that is, forcing Y*1 to be 0). To distinguish further 
between mediation and legal strategies, we would need to similarly “turn off” the mediation 
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category as we did with the verbal one. Y*2 served this function, and its exclusion makes such a 
differentiation impossible. Therefore, once we merge two categories, we can describe 
intervention behavior following all of the strategies contained in the new, merged category as a 
group, but we cannot dissect intervention behavior that follows only one of the strategies in the 
merged category. Returning to the example, once we drop Y*2, we cannot ask how the 
likelihood with which a third-party employs each of the five strategy categories (at i) changes 
when the previous intervention (at i-1) involved mediation as opposed to a legal strategy.27  
 Because the interpretation of the Y* variables changes according to which Y* variables 
are used in a model, I retain the Y* variable labels while presenting and discussing the results in 
the next chapter (following Epstein et al. 2006). This decision, however, should not influence the 
discussion greatly. I am not primarily interested in the coefficients that result from the ordered 
probit models, as they cannot be interpreted directly. I therefore move rather quickly from the 
coefficients to the substantive likelihood with which third-parties use each intervention strategy 
(at i) given the previous intervention (at i-1). Although the Y* variables affect these likelihoods 
(that is, the distributions over outcomes), the variables themselves disappear from the discussion 
of them. 
 
Success 
 The learning model proposes that third-party intervention behavior (at i) changes as a 
result of the success of the strategy used in the previous intervention (at i-1). I measure short-
term28 success according to the standard set within the Frazier and Dixon (2006) dataset.29 A 
                                                 
27 We can, however, still differentiate between the merged category and other categories of intervention strategies. 
28 See Chapter 2 for the argument behind using short-term, as opposed to long-term, success. 
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strategy is considered successful if it accomplished its intended purpose (or primary goal) at the 
time it ended. For example, the purpose of an appeal for a troop withdrawal is to convince the 
disputants to remove their troops from a specific conflict zone. If the disputants remove their 
troops within two weeks of such an appeal, the intervention is coded as “successful.” 
Alternatively, the intervention is coded as “unsuccessful” if there is no clear evidence that a 
troop withdrawal occurred within the two weeks after such an appeal. Finally, because I am 
interested in how the success of the previous intervention (i-1) affects the selection of the current 
strategy (i), I lag this variable for each observation within a given trajectory. 
 It is also worth noting that I do not use this variable within the ordered probit models in a 
traditional fashion; that is, “success” does not appear as a variable in any of the regression 
models. Yet I do make use of it to produce modeling results. The learning model proposes that 
intervention behavior differs after successful and unsuccessful previous interventions. More 
specifically, it posits that third-parties repeat the use of previously successful strategies and avoid 
the use of strategies that previously failed. I therefore condition some of the regression models 
on the “success” or “failure” of the previous intervention (that is, I split the sample into 
interventions that follow previously successful interventions and those that follow previously 
failed interventions).  
 
Control Variables 
 I purposely limit the control variables under consideration for two reasons. First, scholars 
have recently called for a return to “simpler” models in order to understand better the 
relationships that they imply. Achen (2002), for example, argues that quantitative researchers 
                                                                                                                                                             
29 Frazier and Dixon (2006) code this variable for the 1946-1992 period. They do not, however, record this variable 
for any interventions they have after 1992. I therefore collect data on each intervention’s success within the 1993-
2001 period, according to the coding criteria set by the Frazier and Dixon codebook.  
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cannot know whether their statistical models accurately fit their data when they employ more 
than two or three independent variables (see also Achen 1982, 2005). This “rule of three” 
proposes that scholars spend less effort on generating comprehensive (or “garbage-can”) 
regression models and more effort on understanding the basic relationships within their data (for 
example, crosstabulations that sketch bivariate statistical relationships). Ray (2005) advances a 
similar argument. Although he stops short of restricting models to only three variables, Ray 
proposes that scholars start by building simple models before moving to more complex ones. The 
goal becomes understanding the relationship between the key variables of interest, rather than 
“controlling” for every conceivable factor.  
 Second, the influence of each control variable can vary according to the conflict 
management strategy used in the previous intervention. For example, an intergovernmental 
organization may be more likely than other actors to use mediation (at i) after a verbal 
intervention (at i-1). This preference may change, however, after a mediation; in such cases, 
organizations may be more likely than other actors to deploy a peace operation. Because of this 
possibility, I interact every control variable with each of the key independent variables noted 
above (that represent the previous strategy used in the trajectory). This adds five variables to the 
model for every one control variable included. Therefore, I must restrict the number of control 
variables included, lest they saturate the models and use too many degrees of freedom.30 
 Despite these arguments in favor of simpler models, I recognize that many will be 
skeptical of modeling that lacks sufficient controls. Therefore, after developing a series of 
parsimonious models, I run two series of models that include numerous control variables 
common to studies of international conflict and its management. The first series examines 
                                                 
30 Because I cluster the ordered probit on the MID, the degrees of freedom available are much smaller than the 
number of observations within the dataset. 
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differences in intervention behavior by type of third-party actor. In these models, I construct two 
dichotomous variables. The first denotes whether the intervening third-party in the current 
intervention is an intergovernmental organization (IGO), while the second indicates whether the 
intervening third-party in the current intervention is a coalition of states. Interventions by 
individual states remain the reference category in these models. 
  I identify state actors according to the Correlates of War Project’s state system 
membership list (Correlates of War Project 2008). Interventions by individual states occur when 
one of the state members of the system intervene within a dispute (using any of the intervention 
strategies identified earlier). In contrast, a coalition of states consists of more than one state 
member of the international system. For a coalition to receive credit for an intervention, there 
must be clear evidence that the state members worked together to intervene in the dispute as a 
cohesive unit, rather than as individuals. An empirical example illustrates this point more clearly.  
In 1942, Ecuador and Peru signed the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro, which was designed to 
resolve their territorial dispute with one another. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States 
guaranteed this agreement by providing assistance to demarcate the border as well as military 
observers to help keep the peace while the demarcation took place. Ecuador repudiated the 
agreement by 1950, and the neighboring states fought one another repeatedly in the decades that 
followed. During one of their more intense battles in 1995-1996 near the Canepa River, the four 
guarantor nations intervened together repeatedly in an effort to resolve the dispute.  This 
coalition not only mediated talks between the disputants frequently, but also deployed a peace 
operation to the region – the Mission of Military Observers Ecuador/Peru (MOMEP). In the end, 
it was the efforts of this coalition that ultimately produced a comprehensive peace accord in 
1999.  
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Throughout the Ecuadorian-Peruvian conflict, the coalition of guarantor states intervened 
as a unit; individual members did not intervene independently. That is, there was no Argentinean 
intervention or Chilean intervention that occurred independently of the coalition’s efforts. 
Rather, the four states acted in concert – either by sending representatives to work together on 
behalf of the coalition or by participating directly in a given intervention. For example, each 
guarantor state contributed troops to the peace operation and signed agreements that the coalition 
helped mediate. In short, the interventions were clearly performed cohesively and on behalf of 
the group. 
Finally, I rely upon the Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke (2004) definition to identify 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). According to these authors, an IGO is an organization 
formed by international treaty that has (more than two) states as members and displays some 
evidence of institutionalization (for example, a headquarters building or a permanent secretariat 
or staff). Interventions by an IGO occur when an organization acts through its permanent staff to 
manage a conflict (for example, when the head of the United Nations sends mediators to a 
conflict) or authorizes and coordinates a collective response on behalf of member states (for 
example, when the African Union deploys a peace operations). 
 The second series of models takes a closer look at the intervention behavior of state 
actors. Towards that end, I examine the influence of three characteristics of third-party states on 
intervention decisions. First, major states are involved in more conflict management efforts than 
their minor counterparts (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Frazier 2006; Owsiak and Frazier 
2009). Given this finding, and the fact that major states possess more resources with which to 
intervene, I entertain the possibility that major states intervene differently than minor states 
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within trajectories.31 A dichotomous variable indicates whether the third-party is considered a 
major state according to the Correlates of War (COW) State System Membership Data 
(Correlates of War Project 2008).32  
 Second, third-parties that are allied to at least one of the disputants may have a greater 
incentive to get more involved in managing their partner’s dispute than non-allied third-parties. 
Such an incentive may stem from an ally’s desire to restrain their partners, restore the strength of 
the alliance, or prevent themselves from getting dragged into a conflict. I rely on the Alliance 
Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset (Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell, and Long 2002) to 
create a dichotomous variable to denote whether the third-party was allied to at least one of the 
disputants at the time of the intervention. 
 Finally, contiguous third-parties may have a greater incentive to intervene than non-
contiguous third-parties (see Greig 2005). Neighboring states are more likely to be affected by a 
given conflict than those outside the immediate vicinity (see Gleditsch 2002). This results not 
just from the prospect of conflict spreading to neighbors, but also because the effects of conflicts 
(for example, refugees) often impact neighbors before non-neighbors. Using the COW Project’s 
Direct Contiguity Data (Stinnett, Tir, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman 2002), I create a 
dichotomous variable that captures whether the third-party shares an inland or river boundary 
(the closest level of contiguity in the COW dataset) with at least one of the disputants. 
                                                 
31 I also entertain the possibility that regional powers intervene differently than non-regional powers. This, however, 
does not change the results reported in Chapter 4 (results not shown). According to Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll 
(2010), regional powers (and their respective regions) include: the United States (North America); Brazil (South 
America); Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy (Europe); Nigeria (West Africa); South Africa 
(Southern Africa); Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel (Middle East); Russia (post-Soviet Union); India (South 
Asia); and China and Japan (East Asia). There are no regional powers within the Horn of or Central Africa. Using 
this list, alternative model specifications replace the major state variable with a dichotomous regional power 
variable. 
32 According to COW, major states (and the periods during which they held this status) during the temporal domain 
of this study include: the United States (1946-2001), the United Kingdom (1946-2001), France (1946-2001), 
Germany (1991-2001), the Soviet Union/Russia (1946-2001), China (1950-2001), and Japan (1991-2001). 
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 The two series of models (one on all third-party actors and one on states specifically) 
cannot be integrated. This stems from the measurement of the state-level variables noted above 
(major state status, alliance ties, and contiguity). It is unfitting to assign state-level characteristics 
to coalitions and organizations. I must therefore leave information on state-level characteristics 
out of interventions involving either coalitions or organizations. Although this decision is 
appropriate, 33 it causes interventions performed be coalitions or organizations to drop from any 
model containing the state-level characteristics. As a result of this, I elect to run two series of 
models. This allows me to explore differences among third-party actors in as great a level of 
detail as possible. 
 Despite creating two distinct series of models, there are two dispute-level control 
variables common to each series. First, third-party intervention behavior may differ when one of 
the disputing states is a major state. Either the third-party or the major state disputant can cause 
this difference. On the one hand, third-parties may believe that major state disputants can handle 
their own affairs or will do what they want regardless of any intervention efforts (for example, 
the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 despite the protest of the United Nations and other major 
states such as France). On the other hand, major state disputants may purposely restrict the 
involvement of third-parties, especially when the third-parties appear to contradict their wishes. 
For example, China regularly reiterates its desire for third-parties to respect its sovereignty and 
remain out of its affairs. Similarly, during much of the time period of this study, numerous major 
states in the international system did not recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ),34 making it impossible for the court to intervene in the 
                                                 
33 See King, Honaker, Joseph, and Scheve (2001). 
34 The United States withdrew its consent to the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction in 1986. It is not clear that Russia, 
France, or China ever granted consent. For more information, see the International Court of Justice website at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3. 
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conflicts of a major state without those states’ direct consent.35 Regardless of what causes the 
limitation, the above discussion suggests that third-party involvement may be restricted to more 
low-cost strategies (if intervention occurs) when one of the disputants is a major state. Using the 
same data and operationalization as earlier, I therefore construct a dichotomous variable to 
indicate whether or not at least one of the disputants is a major state.   
 Second, the presence of an enduring rivalry among the disputants may alter third-party 
behavior. Enduring rivalries are particularly contentious interstate relationships in which 
disputants see each other as enemies and the probability of militarized conflict remains 
consistently high (Diehl and Goertz 2000; Colaresi et al. 2007). Because enduring rivalries 
contain a disproportionate amount of militarized conflict and persist for decades, third-parties 
may approach these rivalries differently than they would conflict between non-rivals. This 
difference can yield two behavioral changes. First, rivals may attract a disproportionate amount 
of conflict management because they contain the most (and severest) conflict. Furthermore, 
third-parties may need to use more high-cost strategies within rivalries precisely because these 
are the “hard cases” (see Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Stedman 2003). Yet an argument can be 
made for limited third-party involvement as well. Rivalries often persist for decades, which 
suggests that any conflict management efforts are unlikely to produce a long-term, 
comprehensive solution to the rivals’ conflict. For example, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
(which generated many enduring rivalries between Israel and its neighbors) continues to elude a 
                                                 
35 Some may argue that disputants must consent to any diplomatic intervention, but this is not the case. Verbal 
interventions, for example, never demand disputants’ consent. Fact-finding missions (a form of mediation) do not 
require consent to gather information, although their work is often made easier by the cooperation of disputants. 
Even the legal interventions undertaken by the ICJ do not necessitate consent for the court to intervene in each 
particular case. For example, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) both recognize the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. This allowed the DRC to sue Uganda at the ICJ in 1999 for the latter’s 
involvement in the DRC’s civil conflict. Although Uganda did not consent to the DRC’s lawsuit (and, in fact, 
actively protested it), the court continued its proceedings, issued a judgment against Uganda in 2005, and required 
Uganda to make reparations to the DRC. 
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successful settlement despite the best efforts of numerous third-parties. For these reasons, one 
might expect third-parties to address conflicts between enduring rivals differently than non-
rivals. I therefore construct a dichotomous variable to designate whether disputing states are 
enduring rivals during the MID in which an intervention occurs. These data come from Klein, 
Goertz, and Diehl (2006), who define an enduring rivalry as a particularly contentious interstate 
relationship in which more than six disputes occur over a similar set of issues within a short 
period of time (see also Diehl and Goertz 2000).36  
 Finally, I consider two additional dispute-level control variables during the analysis. 
First, numerous studies find that territorial disputes differ substantially from non-territorial 
disputes. Not only do territorial disputes lead more often to war (Vasquez and Henehan 2001), 
but they also recur more frequently than disputes over non-territorial issues (Hensel 1996, 2001; 
Quackenbush 2010). Empirical studies hint that conflict management varies between territorial 
and non-territorial disputes as well (Frazier 2006; Greig 2001). Given that high cost strategies 
frequently address territorial disputes (for example, legal strategies in Latin America or peace 
operations in the Middle East), I therefore create a dichotomous variable to indicate whether the 
MID in which a third-party intervenes involves territorial issues –  based upon data from the 
COW Project’s MID data (Ghosn et al. 2004).   
 Second, the power (and capabilities) of disputants may affect third-parties’ willingness to 
intervene in a dispute. In particular, states that possess relatively equal capabilities are more 
likely to fight one another than those that do not (Bremer 1992; Vasquez 1993). Because disputes 
                                                 
36 The exact coding criteria found in Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) are not clear. For example, the authors note 
that the temporal proximity of the militarized disputes matters, but that there are also no concrete rules that outline 
how this is so. They therefore tell us that six disputes within a short period define an enduring rivalry, but we do not 
know precisely how short of a period this needs to be. Similar problems occur when coding rivalry termination. A 
rivalry ends after a certain period of time during which no additional militarized disputes occur, but there are no 
clear guidelines that identify how long this period of peace must be. 
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among relative equals involve greater uncertainty, third-parties may have a harder time 
managing these conflicts. Under conditions of great uncertainty, disputants may believe that they 
can achieve more from fighting than from non-violent conflict management mechanisms, 
ultimately limiting the costs that third-parties willingly incur to intervene. To confront this 
possibility, I construct a ratio of disputant capabilities using the COW National Military 
Capabilities’ Composite Index of Military Capabilities (CINC) score (Singer, Bremer, and 
Stuckey 1972). More specifically, I divide the weaker disputant’s capabilities by the strong 
state’s capabilities. The resulting ratio therefore ranges from 0 (complete inequality) to 1 
(complete equality). 
 
A (Brief) Digression on the Modeling Process 
The results presented in Chapter 4 are the product of an iterated modeling process. For 
each model presented, I first create a “fully saturated” model that contains all of the key 
independent variables, the appropriate control variables, and the interactions between the 
included controls and the key independent variables. From this comprehensive model, I then 
“test down” by removing variables affected by multicollinearity and insignificant interactions 
from the analysis (Epstein et al. 2006). This explains why the models presented later do not 
include every variable discussed above (or each higher order interaction term).  
Model 1 of Table 3.9 provides an illustration of this process. It includes only the key 
independent variables for all interventions during the period 1946-2001. I begin by initially 
including all key independent (Y*) variables in the model. Doing so yields a statistically 
significant coefficient on the Y*1 variable and insignificant coefficients on the remaining 
variables (Y*2, Y*3, and Y*4). Because Y*1 differentiates verbal strategies from the other 
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categories of strategies (see the coding in Table 3.7), I conclude that when a third-party 
previously used a verbal strategy in a trajectory (i-1), the third-party intervening next (at i) will 
employ each of the five categories of strategies with different likelihoods than if the previous 
intervention included a non-verbal, diplomatic intervention (that is, mediation, legal, 
administrative, or peace operations); in other words, third-party intervention decisions (at i) are 
unique when following a verbal intervention (as opposed to other intervention strategies).  
To ensure that third-party behavior is not similarly distinct after a previous intervention 
employs other categories of intervention strategies, I subsequently performed a Wald test on the 
Y*2, Y*3 and Y*4 variables. The Wald test considers the possibility that Y*2, Y*3, and Y*4 all 
equal 0 and therefore contribute nothing to the model. The results of this test suggest that the true 
value of the coefficients associated with all three of these variables may be zero (χ2 = 4.68, p < 
0.197). Yet the Y* variables are also highly correlated with one another, as noted earlier (see 
Table 3.8). In particular, the correlation coefficient between Y*2 and Y*3 is 0.953. Because of 
this, I remove the Y*2 variable from the model (to collapse the Y*3 category downward – see 
the earlier discussion under the “key independent variables” section). 
Re-running the model again produces insignificant coefficients on the Y*3 and Y*4 
variables. An additional Wald test then addresses the possibility that the true value of both of 
these two coefficients is zero; unlike previously, the test reveals that one of the coefficients may 
not be zero (χ2 = 4.55, p < 0.103).37 The Wald test, however, does not indicate which of the 
variables should remain in the model. I therefore run two models. The first contains Y*1 and 
Y*3, and this model yields statistically significant coefficients on both variables. The second 
model incorporates Y*1 and Y*4 and results in a statistically significant coefficient on only Y*1. 
Based on these results and general indicators of each model’s goodness of fit (for example, 
                                                 
37 The p-value here approaches the 0.10 threshold.  
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pseudo-R2 and log likelihood statistics), I conclude that the model containing Y*3 is best. This 
leaves a model containing only Y*1 and Y*3. 
Omitting Y*2 and Y*4 leaves three categories into which prior interventions can fall (see 
Figure 3.2).38 The first contains information on intervention decisions (at i) after verbal 
interventions (at i-1). The second (through “turning off” the Y*1 variable) describes intervention 
decisions after either a mediation or legal intervention. Finally, the third category (reference 
category) portrays intervention decisions that follow either an administrative or peace operations 
intervention (by “turning off” the Y*1 and Y*3 variables). In Figure 3.2, these are depicted by 
the unshaded area on the left, the shaded area in the middle, and the unshaded area on the right 
respectively. I specify the exact process by which categories merge (and the interpretation of 
these merged categories) above during the discussion of the Y* variables. 
I follow a similar, iterative process to construct each of the models that I present 
throughout the next chapter, although I do not detail the construction of each model as I have 
here. There is, however, one additional thing to note about this process. Using controls generates 
interaction terms between the controls and Y* variables. When the modeling process suggests 
that a control variable (or related interactions) does not statistically significantly affect the 
selection of a conflict management strategy (at i), as with the capability ratio between disputants, 
I occasionally remove the control from the model entirely to save space within the results tables. 
This allows me to distill a more parsimonious model and accounts for the fact that none of the 
models contains the full set of controls mentioned earlier. 
 
                                                 
38 The discussion associated with Figure 3.2 describes the end result of Model 1 exactly. Y*3 merged with Y*2, and 
Y*4 merged with the reference category. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 3.1: Sample Conflict Narrative – Guyana and Suriname, June-August 2000 
Guyana and Suriname disputed the exact placement of their maritime boundary, as well as a concession 
awarded by Guyana to the Canadian oil company CGX Energy Inc. in 1998.  The dispute became militarized in 
2000. On 2 June 2000, Suriname protested the fact that Guyana granted CGX permission to drill for oil in the 
disputed maritime area.  On 3 June, the Suriname air force spotted CGX preparing an oil rig in the disputed 
waters. Suriname’s navy then forced CGX to move the rig outside the territorial waters that it claimed. The two 
parties began bilateral talks on 6-7 June 2000 to address the matter. Despite progress being made in the talks, 
Guyana deployed military troops to the disputed Corentyne River on 8 June. The parties met again 13-14 June 
2000 and 18 June 2000. These talks broke down before agreement could be reached. Shortly thereafter, the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) issued a plea for the parties to resume a dialogue (20 June 2000). 
CARICOM subsequently facilitated talks between the parties from 3-5 July 2000 and 14-18 July 2000 (the latter 
were hosted and facilitated by Jamaica, acting on behalf of CARICOM). The last talks failed when the parties 
were unable to agree on the distribution of resources within the disputed maritime zone. Suriname then changed 
governments at the beginning of August 2000, and Guyana waited to resume dialogue until the new 
administration took office.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Interpretation of the Y* Variables 
 
Verbal Mediation Peace 
Operations 
Legal Administrative 
Less 
Costly 
Strategies 
More 
Costly 
Strategies 
Y*1 
Y*3 
Reference Category 
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Table 3.1: Third-Party Conflict Management Intervention Strategies and Their Relative Usage, 1946-2001 
Cost Category Specific Conflict Management 
Strategy 
Dependent 
Variable 
Value 
Relative Usage 
Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
Verbal 
Interventions 
Ceasefire appeal or demand 1 571 
(50.31%) Negotiations appeal or demand 
Troop withdrawal appeal or demand 
Offer to facilitate negotiations 
Offer to mediate negotiations 
Mediation 
Interventions 
Inquiry/fact-finding 2 435 
(38.33%) Good offices 
Mediation 
Conciliation 
Legal 
Interventions 
Arbitration 3 20 
(1.76%) Judicial settlement 
War crimes tribunal 
Administrative 
Interventions 
Temporary administration 4 47 
(4.14%) Humanitarian assistance 
Plebiscite/election 
supervision/monitoring 
Boundary delimitation/demarcation 
Disarmament verification/inspection 
Repatriation assistance 
Peace 
Operations 
Military observation 5 62 
(5.46%) Preventive peacekeeping 
Interpositionary peacekeeping 
Humanitarian protection 
Demobilization 
monitoring/verification 
Mine-clearing/sweeping 
Notes: The organization of strategies comes from Frazier and Dixon (2006). 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Conflict Management Data – Dispute Coverage, 1993-2001 
 
 Frazier and 
Dixon (2006) 
Owsiak (2011) 
Changes 
Owsiak (2011) 
Addition 
Total 
MIDs Containing Conflict 
Management 
 
18 
 
11 
 
36 
 
54 
 
140 
 
 
Table 3.3: Conflict Management Data – Strategy Coverage, 1993-2001 
 
 
Strategy 
Frazier and Dixon 
(2006) 
Owsiak (2011) 
Addition 
 
Total 
Verbal 64 146 210 
Mediation 59 84 143 
Legal 1 4 5 
Administrative 4 8 12 
Peace Operations 8 6 14 
 
Total 
 
136 
 
248 
 
384 
 
 
Table 3.4: Conflict Management Data – Third-Party Coverage, 1993-2001 
 
 
Actor Type 
Frazier and 
Dixon (2006) 
Owsiak (2011) 
Addition 
 
Total 
State 52 170 222 
Coalition 9 15 24 
Intergovernmental Organization 75 63 138 
 
Total 
 
136 
 
248 
 
384 
 
 
Table 3.5: Conflict Management Data – Strategy Coverage, 1946-2001 
 
 
Strategy 
1946-1992 
(Column Percent) 
1993-2001 
(Column Percent) 
1946-2001 
(Column Percent) 
Verbal 361 
(48.09%) 
210 
(54.69%) 
571 
(50.31%) 
Mediation 292 
(38.88%) 
143 
(37.24%) 
435 
(38.33%) 
Legal 15 
(2.00%) 
5 
(1.30%) 
20 
(1.76%) 
Administrative 35 
(4.65%) 
12 
(3.13%) 
47 
(4.14%) 
Peace Operations 48 
(6.39%) 
14 
(3.64%) 
62 
(5.46%) 
 
Total 
 
751 
 
384 
 
1,135 
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Table 3.6: Conflict Management Data – Third-Party Coverage, 1946-2001 
 
 
Actor Type 
1946-1992 
(Column Percent) 
1993-2001 
(Column Percent) 
1946-2001 
(Column Percent) 
State 295 
(39.28%) 
222 
(57.81%) 
517 
(45.55%) 
Coalition 72 
(9.59%) 
24 
(6.25%) 
96 
(8.46%) 
Intergovernmental Organization 384 
(51.13%) 
138 
(35.94%) 
522 
(45.99%) 
 
Total 
  
751 
 
384 
 
1,135 
 
Table 3.7: Coding of Y* Variables 
 
 
 
Variable 
Previous Strategy Used in the Trajectory (at i-1) 
 
Verbal 
 
Mediation 
 
Legal 
 
Administrative 
Peace 
Operations 
Y*1 1 0 0 0 0 
Y*2 1 1 0 0 0 
Y*3 1 1 1 0 0 
Y*4 1 1 1 1 0 
 
 
Table 3.8: Correlation Coefficients among Y* Variables 
 
 Y*1 Y*2 Y*3 Y*4 
Y*1 1.000 - - - 
Y*2 0.386 1.000 - - 
Y*3 0.368 0.953 1.000 - 
Y*4 0.277 0.717 0.753 1.000 
 
142 
 
Table 3.9: Ordered Probit Regression of Conflict Management Intervention  
Strategy Selection, 1946-2001 
 
 Model 1 
  
Time 
Period 
1946-2001 
  
Data All 
  
Variables  
Y*1 -0.723*** 
(0.206) 
Y*2 - 
Y*3 -0.383** 
(0.184) 
Y*4 - 
  
Parameters  
Cut 1 -0.332 
Cut 2 0.746 
Cut 3 0.803 
Cut 4 1.035 
  
Model 
Information 
 
Obs. 2,432 
χ2 14.66*** 
Pseudo R2 0.057 
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p <0.01; robust standard errors 
reported in parentheses; observations clustered on the Militarized 
Interstate Dispute (MID). 
 
   
143 
 
Chapter 4 
Conflict Management Trajectories, 1946-2001 
 
The previous chapter established the construction of trajectories, the measurement of 
variables, and the background behind the quantitative methods that will be used in this study. 
The purpose of this chapter is to use the foundation laid by the previous chapter to empirically 
test the competing hypotheses about interventions derived from the theoretical models presented 
earlier. The central goal of this analysis is to determine which of the theoretical models best 
predicts the intervention behavior of third-parties during the period 1946-2001. Towards that 
end, I first describe third-party behavior within trajectories. I then present a series of general 
statistical models to test the competing arguments advanced by the theoretical models, after 
which I vary third-party characteristics to ensure the robustness of the conclusions that I reach. In 
the end, I find strong support for the limited commitments model (and to a lesser extent, the pure 
cost model), while dispelling the validity of the learning and random model’s predictions. 
 
Trajectory Length and Content 
 There are three characteristics that differentiate trajectories from one another: their 
length, their content, and their shape. I begin the analysis with a general description of third-
party intervention within militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), which addresses the first two 
characteristics. Statistics on trajectory length appear in Table 4.1. Each row of the table lists the 
number of disputes that experience at least a given level of intervention, as well as the 
probability of any one MID receiving such a level of intervention.   
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Of the 1,524 MIDs that occur during the period 1946-2001, only 15.62% experience 
diplomatic intervention of some kind (that is, at least one diplomatic intervention).1 The 
remaining 84.34% of MIDs do not receive any third-party attention. At first glance, this number 
seems particularly low. Yet many MIDs are relatively short, which may explain the low 
incidence of intervention within these disputes. A number of fishing disputes, for example, last 
only one day, making the window for a potential intervention very narrow.2 This interpretation is 
further supported by the MID data, which indicates that the median length of a MID during the 
period 1946-2001 is between 13-25 days.3 When disputes do not persist for a long period of time, 
third-parties do not have an opportunity to contribute to the management of the disputes, even if 
they want to do so.4 Regardless of the exact reason, however, it is clear that the vast majority of 
MIDs do not experience the involvement of third-party conflict managers. 
The current study, however, is not concerned with any interventions, but rather conflict 
management trajectories in particular. Although 238 disputes receive at least one intervention, 
only 128 MIDs experience at least two interventions. This cut-off separates conflict management 
trajectories (comprised of at least two diplomatic interventions) from individual, isolated 
diplomatic interventions. As Table 4.1 highlights, these figures indicate that a trajectory develops 
within only 8.40% of all MIDs during the period 1946-2001. Furthermore, trajectories emerge in 
                                                 
1 The likelihood of intervention does vary slightly between the 1946-1992 and 1993-2001 periods (15.00% and 
17.17% respectively). 
2 An example of a fishing dispute occurred between Thailand and Myanmar on 12 January 1999. On this date, a 
Myanmar patrol vessel chased three Thai fishing boats. The Thai boats issued a distress call, and the Thai navy 
responded. Upon arriving in the vicinity of the Myanmar patrol boat, the Thai naval vessel chased and shot at the 
Myanmar boat, damaging it in the process. Thailand claims that the incident occurred within its territorial waters and 
that the Myanmar vessel could not be identified. Myanmar claims that the incident occurred within its waters and 
therefore protested Thailand’s actions. Similar incidents occur throughout the world and generally involve two (or 
more) states fighting over the appropriate maritime boundary between them. In some cases, states also seize the 
fishing vessels of another state after it allegedly violates their territorial waters. 
3 I calculate this using the median of the minimum and maximum duration variables within the MID 3.1 dataset for 
all disputes that occur during the 1946-2001 period (Ghosn et al. 2004). 
4 Note that this does not mean that disputants are resolving their short disputes. Over 60% of MIDs end in a 
stalemate (Ghosn et al. 2004). 
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approximately half of all conflicts that attract third-party involvement (8.40% of disputes receive 
at least two interventions, and 15.62% of all disputes receive at least one intervention; 
8.40/15.62=53.78%).5 These figures demonstrate two characteristics of trajectories. First, 
trajectories are not common events. They occur in less than 10% of all disputes. Second, when 
third-parties do get involved in a MID, a trajectory is just as likely to occur as a single, isolated 
intervention.6  
Moving farther down Table 4.1 provides a more detailed description of the length of 
trajectories. Only 90 disputes experience at least three interventions. Because 128 MIDs received 
at least two interventions, roughly 30% of trajectories (n=38) end before the third intervention. 
Another 20% end before the fourth intervention (n=28), and an additional 15% of trajectories 
terminate before the sixth intervention. These figures suggest that trajectories are generally not 
very long. Although there are some outliers (for example, two trajectories contain more than 40 
interventions, and another possesses over 50 interventions), two-thirds of all trajectories contain 
five interventions or less, and the median trajectory ends before the fourth intervention. Third-
parties therefore do occasionally intervene repeatedly within MIDs, but their level of 
intervention remains limited. 
These statistics provide prima facie evidence in favor of the rational actor assumption. At 
some point (which may vary according to the specific third-party), the costs of intervention 
exceed the benefits, making intervention an undesirable policy. In other words, third-parties are 
                                                 
5 The prevalence of trajectories also varies slightly between the 1946-1992 and the 1993-2001 periods (7.42% and 
11.44% of all MIDs within these two periods experience trajectories respectively). 
6 It is reasonable to ask how these isolated interventions differ from those found within trajectories. Although a 
thorough examination of this question lies beyond the scope of the current study, two distinguishing characteristics 
are worth noting. First, isolated interventions are more likely to involve mediation; 60% of isolated interventions 
involve third-party mediations, while only 39% of interventions within trajectories contain mediation efforts. 
Second, isolated interventions contain slightly higher success rates. Approximately 63% of isolated interventions are 
successful in the short-term, as opposed to about 46% of interventions within trajectories. This makes sense, since 
success during an initial intervention should be one factor that prevents a trajectory from forming. 
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not altruistic – interested in conflict management merely for the sake of making the world more 
peaceful. Were they altruistic instead of rational, we might not expect the length of trajectories 
(and the associated probability of a MID receiving a certain level of intervention) to decline so 
rapidly unless third-parties successfully bring disputes to an end quickly. Unfortunately, both 
previous research and this project find that interventions succeed only 30-45% of the time. It is 
therefore more likely that third-parties behave rationally by electing to eschew intervention once 
it is no longer a sound policy.  
The second characteristic of trajectories is their content. The previous chapter began 
explaining this content by outlining the frequency with which third-parties use each of the 
strategies when intervening. In particular, Tables 3.5 and 3.6 identified 1,135 diplomatic 
interventions within the period 1946-2001. In the first column of Table 4.2, I reproduce the 
strategy distribution presented earlier for all observations that occur specifically within 
trajectories. During the 128 disputes in which trajectories occur, third-parties intervene on 2,639 
separate occasions. From these figures (and Table 4.2), it becomes immediately apparent that the 
trajectory construction process inflates the number of observations (from 1,135 to 2,639; see 
Tables 3.5 and 4.2 respectively).7 Because this inflation results (in part) from a handful of 
outlying disputes, the second column of Table 4.2 regenerates the strategy distribution without 
these outliers.8 This reduces the number of interventions within trajectories to 1,047, although 
even this figure retains some inflation. These 1,047 diplomatic interventions comprise the 128 
trajectories that I analyze throughout the remainder of this study. 
Despite the potential inflation of observations that results from creating trajectories, I 
note that the distribution presented in the second column of Table 4.2 closely mirrors that 
                                                 
7 See also the previous chapter, which explains the trajectory construction process. 
8 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of how I handle outlying trajectories/disputes. 
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presented earlier (Table 3.5).9 Third-parties use verbal strategies more frequently than any other 
strategy – in roughly 47% of their interventions. They mediate in 39% of their interventions, 
deploy peace operations in 8% of their interventions, and resort to administrative and legal 
strategies in 3% and 2% of their interventions respectively. Thus, in order from most frequently 
to least frequently used strategy, third-parties rely on: verbal pleas, mediation, peace operations, 
administration interventions, and legal strategies. This ordering does not change by time period 
(1946-1992 vs. 1993-2001; see Table 3.5) or when the outliers are factored back into the data 
(see the first column of Table 4.2).  
Such an ordering undercuts some of the predictions of the pure cost model. In particular, 
this model proposed that third-parties would use relatively more costly strategies less often than 
they would use relatively less costly strategies (Hypothesis 1b). This does not seem to be 
consistently true. Third-parties do use the least costly strategy (verbal pleas) most often, and they 
rely on the second least costly strategy (mediation) regularly after that. Beyond this point, 
however, the ordering preference contradicts the predictions of the cost model. The third most 
frequently used strategy is peace operations, which is also the most costly strategy available. This 
means that although there are other less costly options available (for example, legal or 
administrative strategies), third-parties turn instead to more costly alternatives. Hypothesis 1b 
therefore receives weak support. 
One can also find a glimmer of support for the limited commitments model within the 
strategy distribution. The likelihood with which third-parties use verbal pleas or mediation vastly 
exceeds the likelihood with which they use either legal, administrative, or peace operations 
strategies. This suggests that there is a precipice along the cost continuum of strategies (see 
Table 1.1) that lies just past mediation. In other words, third-parties are very willing to intervene 
                                                 
9 The percentages across corresponding cells of the tables differ by at most 0-3%. 
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verbally or through mediation, but when the costs of using a strategy exceed those that 
accompany mediation, their willingness decreases drastically. The preference of third-parties is 
clearly to rely on strategies that cost no more than mediation does. 
Of course, various types of third-parties do not behave identically within trajectories. 
Therefore, in order to understand better how intervention decisions differ by third-party type 
(that is, state, coalitions, or intergovernmental organizations), Table 4.3 presents a series of 
statistics that describe the first and most costly strategy used by each actor type within each 
trajectory.10 The numeric values that appear in the table correspond to the categories of conflict 
management strategies described earlier (see Table 3.1; 1=verbal, 2=mediation, 3=legal, 
4=administrative, 5=peace operations). Lower values signify less costly strategies, while higher 
values indicate more costly strategies. 
Two conclusions emerge from reviewing Table 4.3. First, coalitions and IGOs employ 
more costly strategies than individual states. This behavior occurs primarily within the first 
intervention that each actor type undertakes (as predicted by Hypothesis 1c). For example, states 
generally resort to verbal strategies first in a trajectory (median/mode=1). In contrast, coalitions 
and IGOs employ slightly more costly strategies on their first interventions. More specifically, 
they seem to resort to mediation first, rather than verbal strategies. This provides strong support 
to Hypothesis 1c and, therefore, the logic behind the cost model. When states can disperse costs 
across more actors, they seem to authorize (or allow) more costly (initial) interventions. 
Second, the precipice noted above reappears, and it seems to exist for each actor type (in 
support of Hypothesis 1g). Looking at the highest level of third-party involvement within 
                                                 
10 For each third-party type, I consider the first and most costly intervention strategy that they use in each trajectory, 
regardless of the point in the trajectory at which those interventions occurred. For example, suppose that states 
intervened three times in a dispute using verbal strategies before an IGO deployed a peace operation. The first verbal 
intervention becomes the first intervention of states within the trajectory, while the peace operation becomes the first 
intervention of the IGO. Coalitions would not be credited with intervention at all within this hypothetical trajectory. 
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trajectories, states regularly restrict themselves to interventions that are no more costly than 
mediation (median/mode=2).11 Coalitions and IGOs do likewise (median/mode=2).12 These data 
suggest that the threshold advanced by the limited commitments model does not exist for states 
alone. Although coalitions and IGOs sometimes receive authorization (or at least, not resistance) 
to undertake more costly interventions (as evidenced by their slightly higher averages for the 
most costly strategy they use within each trajectory – 2.62 and 2.69 respectively), most of their 
involvement uses strategies no more costly than mediation. These findings lend strong support to 
the limited commitments model (particularly Hypothesis 1g). 
After viewing Table 4.2, it seems reasonable to ask one additional question: do third-
parties ever start their involvement in a trajectory with the most costly strategy that they will use 
during the course of that trajectory (that is, does the strategy used in the first intervention ever 
match the most costly strategy used within a trajectory). This behavior actually occurs quite 
often. During their first intervention within a trajectory, states use the most costly strategy that 
they will employ during that trajectory 54% of the time. For coalitions and IGOs, this rises to 
76% and 62% respectively.13 This suggests two things. First, third-parties may not escalate their 
involvement over the course of a trajectory – at least not once the trajectory is disaggregated by 
third-party type (state, coalition, or IGO). Such a finding provides some evidence that contradicts 
the pure cost model, particularly its prediction that third-parties escalate their involvement from 
the use of relatively less costly strategies to relative more costly strategies (Hypothesis 1a).14 
                                                 
11 The average of 1.96 suggests a large number of verbal interventions that bring the average below 2. 
12 Averages greater than 2 suggest that coalitions and IGOs do occasionally undertake more costly interventions than 
mediation. 
13 This behavior has increased somewhat after 1992. Beginning in 1993, States, coalitions, and IGOs begin their 
involvement in a trajectory with the most costly strategy that they will use in the trajectory 66%, 56%, and 89% of 
the time respectively.  
14 Note, however, that there is a subtle distinction here. Behavior across third-party types may indicate an escalation 
toward more costly strategies over the course of a trajectory, even while behavior within third-party types finds no 
such behavior. For example, suppose a trajectory consists of a state that used a verbal plea, followed by a coalition 
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Second, interested parties (disputants or other potential third-parties) should watch the first 
intervention made by third-parties, especially those conducted by coalitions and IGOs. In most 
cases, once we know the first move by these third-parties, we also know the extent of the 
intervention costs that they are willing to bear during the entire dispute. For example, if a 
coalition’s first intervention within a trajectory uses mediation, the coalition will only move to a 
more costly strategy than mediation 25% of the time. Thus, the first move by coalitions and 
IGOs within a trajectory signals the limits of these actors’ intervention efforts to the world 
community. 
The analysis presented so far considers interventions to be distinct events. Yet numerous 
hypotheses speak to overlapping and simultaneous interventions. Overlapping interventions 
occur when a third-party starts an intervention while another is ongoing. Simultaneous 
interventions are a subset of overlapping interventions in which the same third-party begins an 
intervention while it has another ongoing. What can be said of the prevalence and characteristics 
of such interventions within trajectories? The data suggest three noteworthy findings.15 
First, simultaneous interventions lie almost entirely within the domain of 
intergovernmental organizations. There are 176 instances of simultaneous interventions. Of 
these, 97% are undertaken by IGOs (n=170). States perform the remaining 3% (n=6). Together, 
these statistics present mixed support for the pure cost model (Hypothesis 1d). IGOs are clearly 
more likely than coalitions or states to carry out simultaneous interventions; coalitions, however, 
are not more likely than states to conduct simultaneous interventions. In fact, coalitions never 
intervene again while they have an intervention underway. It therefore seems that coalitions (and 
                                                                                                                                                             
mediation, and then an IGO-led peace operation. Across all actor types, third-parties moved from less costly to more 
costly strategies during the trajectory (verbal > mediation > peace operations). Yet each disaggregated third-party 
type did not escalate their involvement. States used only verbal pleas and no more. Similarly, the coalition relied on 
only mediation, while the IGO used only a peace operation. 
15 I exclude outlying disputes from the statistics presented on overlapping and simultaneous interventions. 
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to a slightly lesser extent, states) execute one intervention at a time. In contrast, when state actors 
can disperse intervention costs widely by acting through an IGO, they frequently authorize 
multiple interventions at a time.  
A clear illustration of an organization performing simultaneous interventions occurs 
during a dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in 1957 over the border town of Mocoron, 
Honduras. As the disputants fought over the town, the Organization of American States (OAS) 
intervened three times (Frazier and Dixon 2006). It initially established a commission of inquiry 
to investigate the dispute. While the commission collected facts (and before it officially issued its 
report), the OAS deployed a military observation force to the disputed area. Finally, with the 
military observation team in the field, the OAS created a conciliation commission to mediate an 
agreement between the disputants. In each of the latter two interventions, the OAS already had 
an ongoing intervention in the field – either collecting the facts pertaining to the dispute or 
keeping the peace – and it began another intervention anyway. These interventions more than 
likely complemented one another.16 Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the organization 
conducted concurrent interventions, while coalitions and states (including OAS members) did 
not individually intervene at all.  
Second, although states and coalitions avoid simultaneous interventions, they do perform 
overlapping ones.17 Of the 443 instances of overlapping interventions found within trajectories, 
states, coalitions, and IGOs conduct 38% (n=168), 3% (n=12), and 59% (n=263) respectively. 
Contrary to the prediction of the limited cost model (Hypothesis 1h), third-parties do not seem 
particularly unlikely to use overlapping interventions. In fact, overlapping interventions (as a 
                                                 
16 Detailed case analysis would need to confirm this with certainty. 
17 Because simultaneous interventions are a subset of overlapping interventions (in which the same third-party 
intervenes concurrently), the overlapping intervention data therefore include the simultaneous interventions noted 
above. I examine overlapping interventions without simultaneous ones below. 
   
152 
 
whole) comprise 42% of the interventions contained within trajectories.18 This suggests that 
third-parties do not regularly wait for one intervention to end before beginning another. It also 
provides support against a learning model (Hypothesis 2b). If third-parties are not waiting for 
one intervention to end before beginning another, they cannot be accounting for the success of 
the previously started intervention when making decisions about the next intervention.  
Indeed, cases of overlapping interventions demonstrate that the learning model’s 
prediction lacks empirical validity. For example, during a dispute in 1998 between the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and its neighbors (Rwanda and Uganda, who the DRC 
claimed supported rebels seeking to overthrown the DRC government), the South African 
Development Community (SADC) dispatched a fact-finding mission to the conflict zone. The 
day after the SADC intervention began, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) also sent a 
fact-finding team to the area (thus, beginning an overlapping intervention). The two teams 
simultaneously gathered information for almost two weeks before issuing their reports (within a 
week of each other). As this case highlights, the OAU could not have learned from the SADC 
intervention. Not only had the SADC intervention begun only the day before the OAU one, but 
the SADC fact-finding mission would not issue its report until after the OAU team submitted its 
report. Simply put, third-parties that intervene before the success of the previously started 
intervention is known (as the OAU did) cannot be learning in the manner proposed by the 
learning model. It is impossible for third-parties to account for the success or failure of the 
previous interventions when that outcome is unknown at the time the next intervention decision 
is made. 
                                                 
18 I derive this value from the 443 instances of overlapping interventions within the 1.047 total interventions that 
occur within trajectories (see Table 4.2). 
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Finally, it is possible to be slightly more specific about when overlapping interventions 
occur. The vast majority of these (76%) occur during an ongoing IGO-led intervention (as 
occurred, for example, in the Nicaraguan-Honduras or DRC disputes above). In other words, 
once an IGO intervenes (and while it is still actively involved in intervention), other third-parties 
follow immediately in their wake – before the IGO has an opportunity to complete their 
intervention. This is true for all types of third-party actors, although the relationship is strongest 
for IGO interventions. When IGOs begin an overlapping intervention, 86% occur during an 
ongoing IGO-led intervention. In contrast, overlapping interventions conducted by states and 
coalitions occur during an ongoing IGO-led intervention 64% and 50% of the time respectively. 
These findings provide empirical support to the pure cost model’s predictions (particularly 
Hypothesis 1e). States do perform overlapping interventions and when they do, these 
interventions occur more often during an ongoing IGO-led intervention than not. 19  
A dispute between Syria and Turkey in 1998 illustrates this tendency. As Syria and 
Turkey began amassing troops at their mutual border in October 1998, the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) and Egypt each tried simultaneously to mediate. During these 
overlapping mediation attempts, three states (China, Oman, and Iraq) separately issued verbal 
pleas for the disputants to agree to a cease-fire. In other words, four states intervened at the same 
time (overlapping) as an organization (the OIC) using more than one strategy. Of course, states 
                                                 
19 One might ask whether the interventions that overlap (that is, occur during) an IGO-led intervention complement 
the IGO’s efforts. Two difficulties complicate the answer to such a question. First, to answer whether interventions 
complement one another requires the use of detailed case studies, which are beyond the scope of the current project. 
It might be possible, however, to obtain a preliminary answer to the question by asking whether an IGO’s members 
intervene during an intervention that it leads. Yet this is complicated by the high intervention rate of the United 
Nations, whose membership includes the vast majority of states in the international system. Despite this limitation, I 
note that IGO members intervene alongside an IGO in some cases, particularly with some regional organizations 
(for example, the Arab League). I return to this question in Chapter 6 – during the discussion of a future research 
agenda involving trajectories. 
   
154 
 
can intervene during state-led or coalition-led interventions instead, but they intervene more 
frequently while an IGO is working to manage a conflict – as they did during this dispute. 
Although these findings support the pure cost model’s prediction, it is worth addressing 
one additional point. Recall that simultaneous interventions are a subset of overlapping ones – a 
special case in which the same third-party performs an overlapping intervention. What happens 
to the findings on overlapping interventions once the simultaneous interventions (subset) are 
removed from consideration? After excluding these simultaneous interventions, 60% of the 
remaining overlapping interventions are performed by states, 4% by coalitions, and 36% by 
organizations. In other words, IGOs tend to intervene simultaneously (that is, the same 
organization undertakes more than one intervention at a time; see the Honduras-Nicaragua 
dispute above), while states resort to overlapping (but not simultaneous) interventions (see the 
Syria-Turkey dispute above). Furthermore, of the overlapping interventions that occur 
specifically during an IGO-led one (and still excluding simultaneous interventions), 62% are 
conducted by states, 3% by coalitions, and 35% by organizations. The composition of third-party 
actor types (states, coalitions, and organizations) does not change markedly depending on 
whether or not the overlapping intervention occurs during an IGO-led one. Finally, I note that of 
the overlapping interventions conducted by third-party states (n=162), nearly 64% occur during 
an IGO-led intervention (n=104), as opposed to either a coalition-led (6%; n=9) or a state-led 
one (30%; n=49). That is, when a state performs an overlapping intervention, that intervention is 
twice as likely to appear during an IGO-led intervention than a state-led one. It therefore appears 
that the pure cost model’s prediction (Hypothesis 1e) receives consistent, strong support; states 
conduct overlapping interventions, and they are more likely to do so while an IGO is already 
trying to manage the conflict. 
   
155 
 
 
Trajectory Shape: General Results 
The previous section handles two of the three characteristics that distinguish trajectories 
from one another: length and content. I now move beyond these traits (and descriptive statistics) 
to consider the third differentiating characteristic: shape. The theoretical models outlined earlier 
each predict a unique (competing) trajectory shape. It is therefore this analysis that proves 
pivotal in an assessment of these models’ relative merit.  
I begin the analysis by considering simple ordered probit regression models that contain 
no control variables. The simplest models available for this study include only the series of key 
(Y*) independent variables; these variables distinguish among the previous conflict management 
strategy (categories) used in the trajectory (at i-1; see Table 3.1 for more information on these 
variables’ coding). As noted earlier, I use these variables to predict the conflict management 
strategy selected for the current intervention (at i). In essence, these models consider how the 
previous intervention strategy used in the trajectory (at i-1) affects the selection of the next 
conflict management strategy (at intervention i).20 The results from these models describe how 
likely a third-party is to select each of the five intervention strategy categories during the current 
intervention (at i), given the strategy used previously in the trajectory (at i-1).  
Table 4.4 presents the results from a number of simple ordered probit models. These 
models vary along two dimensions (listed in rows across the top of the table). First, I modify the 
temporal scope across models to check for differences between cold war (1946-1989) and post-
cold war (1990-2001) intervention patterns. Although it is not common for scholars to test for 
                                                 
20 As noted earlier, the “previous intervention” (i-1) moves one intervention back in the trajectory. The “current” or 
“next” intervention (at i) always immediately follows the previous one (that is, there is no other intervention 
between the previous and current one).  
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variation in conflict management behavior across these two time periods,21 one can make a 
theoretical argument for doing so. After the cold war ended, a spirit of optimism permeated the 
international system. States increasingly authorized the United Nations (UN) to intervene in a 
variety of conflicts (see, for example, Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1995; Mingst and Karns 2000). At the 
same time, the exponential growth in the number of regional organizations continued (Pevehouse 
et al. 2004). These regional organizations not only increased in number, but became gradually 
more involved in conflict management as well (see Diehl and Lepgold 2003; Powers 2005). It is 
therefore feasible that intervention behavior changed after the fall of the Berlin Wall, especially 
in so far as international organizations are concerned. 
Second, as noted earlier, the data are affected by three outlying disputes: the Vietnam 
War; the Eritrea-Ethiopian War; and a dispute between the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and Iraq over the enforcement of a United Nations sanctioned no-fly zone (1997-2001). I address 
the potential bias caused by these disputes in two ways. First, I drop the outliers from the 
analysis entirely (Models 2-4 in Table 4.4; labeled “without outliers”). Second, I leave the 
disputes in the analysis, but focus only upon the first trajectory path constructed (Models 5-7 in 
Table 4.4; labeled “first trajectory”). Because every dispute has at least one trajectory, this latter 
method ensures that I do not exclude any disputes. Yet it also causes me to lose information 
about certain intervention paths, as only the first of many potential paths receives consideration. 
The results are robust to the two methods for handling outliers. Thus, going forward, I only 
present results from models that exclude the outliers.22 
                                                 
21 For an exception, see Fortna (2004), who finds slight differences in United Nations peacekeeping behavior and 
effectiveness across the two periods. In particular, her analysis reveals that UN peacekeeping creates longer lasting 
periods of peace in the post-cold war era. 
22 I outline the rationale for this decision in the previous chapter. 
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Model 1 of Table 4.4 includes all data within the entire temporal domain of the study 
(1946-2001). According to the results produced by this model, third-parties do select current 
intervention strategies (at i) based (at least, in part) on the previous strategy used in the trajectory 
(at i-1). After a verbal intervention (at i-1) for example, third-parties select each of the five 
categories of strategies (at i) differently than they do after interventions consisting of mediation, 
legal, administrative, or peace operations strategies.23 Similarly, third-parties select each of the 
five categories of strategies (at i) differently after either a mediation or legal intervention (at i-1) 
than they do after inventions involving verbal, administrative, or peace operations strategies. 
Finally, third parties seem to select each of the five categories of strategies (at i) differently after 
either an administrative or peace operations intervention (at i-1) than they do after a verbal, 
mediation, or legal intervention. These results indicate that third-parties base intervention 
decisions on the strategy used in the previous intervention. Yet they do not say exactly how these 
intervention decisions are affected. How likely is the third-party to use each of the five categories 
of strategies (at i) after a verbal intervention (at i-1)? How does this change when the prior 
intervention involves a mediation or legal strategy? 
Table 4.5 addresses such questions directly. It presents the probability distributions 
underlying Model 1 (Table 4.4).24 Each row represents the previous strategy (category) used in 
the trajectory (at i-1), while each column corresponds to the current strategy (category) selected 
by a third-party (at i). The table therefore describes how likely a third-party is to select each of 
the five categories of strategies for use in the current intervention (at i), given the use of a 
                                                 
23 This is all that the coefficients from the ordered probit model indicate (Greene 2008; Long 1997). I cannot 
(generally) say anything about which strategies third-parties are likely to use without additional analysis. I conduct 
such an analysis below. Because ordered probit model coefficients reveal such limited information, I generally 
dispense with their discussion throughout the remainder of the chapter and focus instead on the more substantive 
findings. The full ordered probit results, however, still appear in the tables contained in this chapter for those 
interested in them. 
24 I generate all probabilities using the Clarify software in Stata 9.0 (see King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). 
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specific strategy in the previous intervention (at i-1). For example, the probability that a third-
party will follow a verbal strategy (the previous strategy; row 1) with another verbal strategy (the 
current strategy; column 1) is 0.773. Note that there is still some chance that third-parties will 
follow a verbal strategy with a non-verbal one (1.000-0.773 = 0.227), and the first row makes 
predictions about the use of such non-verbal strategies in detail. More specifically, if a third-
party previously used a verbal strategy in the trajectory (at i-1), a third-party will subsequently 
use either mediation, legal, administrative, or peace operations strategies next in the trajectory (at 
i) 19.3%, 0.4%, 1.3%, and 1.7% of the time respectively (moving left to right across row 1 of the 
table; the row sums to 1.000 or 100%).25 The other rows of the table can be read similarly. Each 
row therefore provides a probability distribution over outcomes (that is, the likelihood with 
which third-parties select each of the five categories of strategies for the current intervention), 
and these distributions depend (or are conditional) upon the strategy previously used in the 
trajectory. In the aggregate, the entire table displays a probability transition matrix, which 
describes the likelihood that any one intervention strategy (category) follows any other. 
Of course, the probabilities contained in Table 4.5 are merely estimates and therefore 
contain some uncertainty. To provide more information about this uncertainty, the table also 
includes the 95% confidence interval bounds in parentheses below each point estimate. I note 
above, for example, that the probability with which a third-party will follow a verbal strategy (at 
i-1) with another verbal strategy (at i) is 0.773. For this particular (point) estimate, there is a 95% 
chance that the true probability with which a third-party follows a verbal intervention with 
                                                 
25 The rows of a probability transition matrix will sum to 1.000 (Cinlar 1975; Gill 2006). This, however, does not 
mean that third-parties must always intervene. Rather, the rows indicate that when a third-party decides to intervene 
diplomatically in an interstate dispute, they will select a strategy from one of the five categories outlined earlier – 
verbal, mediation, legal, administrative, or peace operations (that is, there are no other diplomatic intervention 
strategies outside of Table 1.1 from which to choose). The likelihood of an intervention at specific point in the 
trajectory is a separate matter; I outline these probabilities in Table 4.1. 
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another verbal intervention lies somewhere between 0.627 and 0.888 (see the range listed in 
parentheses below the 0.773 estimate in Table 4.4).  
I rely on these confidence intervals throughout the chapter to supply information about 
whether differences between various estimates are statistically significant (or “meaningfully 
different” from one another). When confidence intervals overlap, the corresponding estimates 
cannot be distinguished empirically from one another; they are therefore not meaningfully 
distinct from each other. For example, after a verbal intervention (at i-1), the model predicts that 
there is a 1.3% chance that the next third-party uses an administrative strategy and a 1.7% chance 
of a third-party deploying a peace operation (at i). The confidence intervals for these two 
estimates overlap one another, which suggests that the two values could be identical. That is, 
after a verbal intervention, third-parties are just as likely to select an administrative strategy as 
they are to select a peace operation. In contrast, if two confidence intervals to not overlap, then a 
distinction can be made between the estimates; such estimates meaningfully differ from one 
another. For example, after a verbal intervention (at i), a third-party is less likely to use mediation 
next (at i-1) than they are to issue another verbal plea. This statement follows from both the 
estimates (which are 77% and 19% respectively for verbal pleas and mediation) as well as the 
fact that the confidence intervals associated with these estimates do not overlap.   
Returning to Table 4.5, four conclusions stand out. 26 First, verbal strategies demonstrate 
cyclical tendencies. After a third-party uses a verbal strategy, there is a 77% chance that the next 
third-party to act in the trajectory will also use a verbal strategy. It seems that once third-parties 
decide to remain relatively aloof, they consistently remain there. A dispute between China and 
                                                 
26 In addition to the conclusions that follow, astute observers will notice that rows 2-3 of Table 4.5 are identical to 
one another, as are rows 4-5. This occurs because the variables differentiating different categories of prior 
intervention strategies merged. I outline the process by which this occurs and the interpretation of such categories in 
Chapter 3. For this discussion, I simply note that the repetition occurs on purpose as a result of the modeling 
process. 
   
160 
 
the Philippines illustrates this point. In January 1995, China detained a number of Philippine 
fishing boats and allegedly established a military base on Mischief Reef – a reef within the 
Spratly Islands over which both disputants claim sovereignty. As the dispute ebbed and flowed 
during the months that followed, the Philippines regularly deployed military forces to the 
disputed area. Each time such a deployment occurred, a third-party (the United States, Japan, 
Indonesia, or Malaysia) issued a verbal plea for the disputants to pursue negotiations instead of 
militarized conflict. Despite these repeated calls for negotiations to occur, no third-party became 
more actively involved in managing the dispute. As intervention within this dispute 
demonstrates, pleas for peace do not necessarily precede active involvement on its behalf.27 
Second, the cyclical tendency decreases as third-parties escalate their involvement. If a 
third-party previously used a mediation or legal strategy instead of a verbal strategy (at i-1), the 
likelihood that the next third-party to act in the trajectory (at i) will try a verbal strategy falls 
from 0.773 to 0.523. If the previous intervention used an administrative or peace operations 
strategy, this probability drops further to 0.374 (a statistically significant decrease over the 
original 0.773). For example, during a dispute between the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Rwanda, and Uganda in 1999, Libya deployed a military observation team to monitor a cease-
fire it brokered. During the next intervention in the trajectory, South Africa mediated between 
the disputants as opposed to issuing a verbal plea. Such a pattern is not unique to this dispute, 
and its rationale more than likely involves one of two plausible scenarios. Either third-parties are 
already productively handling the conflict (thereby obviating the need to plead for negotiations 
or peace, as in the dispute involving the DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda) or potential third-parties 
believe that some other actor has a higher stake in the conflict than they do (for example, the 
                                                 
27 These pleas may establish new or re-enforce existing norms. I reserve an investigation of this possibility for future 
research. 
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third-party that most recently performed the more costly intervention). In both cases, we would 
expect the use of verbal pleas to decrease after more costly interventions. Whether the optimistic 
or pessimistic interpretation possesses greater credence requires more detailed case analysis. 
Third, a precipice exists between the mediation and legal categories (see the differences 
between columns 2-3). This precipice first appeared during the descriptive discussion of 
trajectories, but it is much more pronounced here. The model predicts that third-parties will use a 
verbal or mediation strategy 77-97% of the time (depending on the previous intervention in the 
trajectory). After a verbal intervention, for example, third-parties almost never use a strategy 
more costly than mediation next in the trajectory. In contrast, after a strategy that is more costly 
that a verbal plea (at i-1), they will employ strategies more costly than mediation (at i) in only 3-
23% of all cases (again, depending on the intervention at i-1). This not only suggests that third-
parties generally do not wish to incur high intervention costs, but also that they prefer to limit 
their involvement to either verbal or mediation strategies. There is therefore a clear upper 
boundary to the costs (and strategies) third-parties seem willing to employ. 
There is no shortage of cases in which this threshold appears. For example, during a 
dispute between Russia and Georgia throughout 1996, the United Nations, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, and the United States each intervened (sometimes more than once). Yet 
their interventions involved only a mix of verbal pleas and mediation tactics. These third-parties 
did not try more costly interventions strategies, even though the dispute persisted for over seven 
months. Similar behavior occurs during disputes between Guyana and Suriname (2000), Guinea 
and Liberia (2000-2001), Turkey and Syria (1998), Eritrea and Yemen (1995-1996), and China 
and the Philippines (1999). Although this list is not exhaustive, it does demonstrate that the 
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tendency of third-parties to limit themselves to intervention strategies no more costly than 
mediation is both common and pervasive.  
Finally, peace operations tend to follow one another. This conclusion might seem obvious 
to those that study civil war; third-parties regularly deploy numerous peace operations to states 
ravaged by civil conflict (for example, Ethiopia, Haiti, Angola, or the former Yugoslavia each 
received more than one peace operation). Yet the willingness to send multiple missions occurs 
within interstate conflicts as well. In fact, Table 4.5 demonstrates that once third-parties commit 
to using relatively more costly strategies, they remain more likely to do so in the future. After an 
administrative or peace operation, the next intervening third-party is consistently more likely to 
use mediation, legal, administrative, or peace operations than if the previous intervention 
involved a less costly strategy (either mediation/legal or verbal strategies; comparing the fifth 
row of the table to the first and third rows). Combined with the first finding (on the cyclical 
trends in using verbal strategies), these results imply that the key obstacle to intervention 
involves securing the commitment of any third-party. Once someone clears that hurdle, others 
are more likely to remain heavily involved in the future. 
 
Evaluating the Cost Model (and its Variant) 
Table 4.5 also provides general evidence with which to evaluate three of the hypotheses 
contained within the cost model (and its variant – the limited commitments model). I begin with 
the pure cost model. Its first hypothesis (Hypothesis 1a) proposes that third-parties will escalate 
their involvement in successive interventions. In practical terms, this implies that third-parties 
should use a strategy in the current intervention (at i) that is at least as costly as the last one used 
in the trajectory (at i-1). If third-parties instead use a less costly strategy in a successive 
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intervention (that is, third-parties de-escalate their involvement), such evidence would undermine 
both the logic behind and the predictions of the pure cost model. 
Table 4.5 provides mixed support for this prediction. Third-parties are likely to follow a 
verbal intervention with another verbal intervention 78% of the time. Because there is no less 
costly strategy than a verbal strategy available to third-parties, this finding (and the entire first 
row) is therefore consistent with the model’s prediction. In contrast, the other rows of Table 4.2 
demonstrate the limitations of the empirical support for this hypothesis. Third-parties are most 
likely to follow a mediation or legal intervention with a verbal one (52% of the time).28 
Similarly, after an administrative or peace operations intervention, third-parties turn most 
frequently to verbal (pr = 0.374) or mediation (pr = 0.396) strategies.  
This suggests that third-parties are more likely to reduce their intervention costs in 
successive interventions than they are to escalate (or even maintain) them. Hypothesis 1a 
therefore receives evidence that both supports and contradicts it. Yet the bulk of the evidence 
generally runs counter to the hypothesis. The only evidence that clearly supports it comes in the 
first row of the table, when third-parties have no other option than to employ a strategy that is at 
least as costly as the previous one. Once third-parties have an option to use less costly strategies, 
they do so more often than not (see the latter four rows of Table 4.5).  
A dispute between China and the United States in 2001 highlights this tendency. In April 
2001, a US reconnaissance aircraft collided in mid-air with a Chinese fighter, causing the 
Chinese plane to crash. The US plane executed an emergency landing in China, at which point 
Chinese officials held both the plane and its crew. Japan became involved in the dispute first and 
dispatched a fact-finding mission (a mediation strategy) to investigate the particulars of the 
                                                 
28 I use pr as an abbreviation for probability. This is distinct from p, which I use to refer to p-values associated with 
regression coefficients. 
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collision. This investigation ended quickly, however, and it is not clear that it provided any 
meaningful information to the disputants. In the days that followed, Taiwan and Pakistan each 
issued verbal pleas to encourage the disputants to settle the matter through negotiations rather 
than violence. No third-parties got more actively involved in the management of the dispute, 
which was eventually settled through bilateral negotiations.  
The trajectory in this dispute consisted of a mediation strategy followed by two verbal 
pleas. Furthermore, these interventions were not instrumental in managing the dispute. Yet this is 
not what stands out most about this case. Rather, it is noteworthy that third-parties chose not to 
be instrumental. After the Japanese intervention (mediation strategy), third-parties could have 
maintained or escalated their involvement. They elected instead to de-escalate their involvement 
(from mediation to verbal pleas), a decision that occurs frequently within trajectories. This 
violates one of the main predictions of the pure cost model (Hypothesis 1a).  
In addition to predicting that third-party involvement escalates (that is, uses more costly 
strategies) over the course of a trajectory, the pure cost model proposes that third-parties will use 
relatively more costly strategies less frequently than they use low cost strategies (Hypothesis 1b). 
The empirical evidence confirms this prediction, although it clearly depends on the strategy used 
in the previous intervention. For example, after a verbal intervention, third-parties are less likely 
to use mediation than another verbal strategy (19.3% versus 77.3% respectively; row 1 of Table 
4.5). In this case, third-parties are clearly using more costly strategies (mediation) less frequently 
than the low-cost alternatives (verbal pleas). Yet the frequency with which third-parties employ 
more costly interventions does not decrease consistently across the table. Returning to decisions 
after a verbal intervention occurs (the first row of the table), third-parties use legal strategies less 
frequently than mediation (0.4% versus 19.3% respectively).  Beyond that, the likelihood with 
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which third-parties use more costly strategies increases slightly (or at least does not significantly 
decrease). Third-parties intervening after a verbal intervention use administrative and peace 
operations strategies more frequently than they use legal strategies (1.3% and 1.7% compared to 
0.4%). Unfortunately, the analysis indicates that the latter three estimates may all be similar in 
value (that is, their confidence intervals overlap). Despite this, we can conclude that third-parties 
are not less likely to use administrative or peace operations after a verbal intervention than they 
are to use a legal strategy. The evidence therefore contradicts the pure cost model’s prediction.29 
Clearer evidence of the hypothesis’ shortcomings can be ascertained from other values in 
the table. For example, after a mediation or legal intervention (rows 2 and 3 of Table 4.5), third-
parties are more likely to employ administrative or peace operations strategies than they are to 
use a legal strategy (pr = 0.039, pr = 0.080, and pr = 0.012 respectively). The difference between 
the use of peace operations and legal strategies in this case (pr = 0.080 and 0.012 respectively) is 
statistically significant; third-parties are therefore statistically more likely to use peace 
operations strategies than legal strategies. A similar effect occurs when third-parties previously 
used either administrative or peace operations strategies (see the final row of Table 4.5). Each of 
these findings provides evidence that is inconsistent with Hypothesis 1b and, therefore, the pure 
cost model. 
Finally, even among the strategies used most frequently by third-parties (that is, verbal 
and mediation strategies), there is not always a clear difference between the use of relatively 
more and less costly strategies. For example, after an administrative or peace operations 
intervention, third-parties select a verbal strategy in the next intervention 37% of the time, while 
                                                 
29 The desire to avoid legal interventions may result from the lack of control that it leaves disputants. Once 
committed to binding arbitration or adjudication, disputants generally cannot control the outcome of the process. 
They therefore may prefer to acquiesce to the use of mediation, administrative, or peace operations strategies, since 
they retain some control over the outcomes produced by such interventions. 
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they employ mediation in such cases 40% of the time (row 4 and 5 of Table 4.2). Not only are 
these values similar to one another, but their confidence intervals also clearly overlap. This 
implies that third-parties are just as likely to employ a verbal strategy as they are to use 
mediation (at i) when the previous intervention (at i-1) involved an administrative or peace 
operations strategy. In other words, third-parties do not distinguish between the less costly verbal 
pleas and the more costly mediations when choosing how to intervene after an administrative or 
peace operation. 
The strongest evidence against Hypothesis 1b, however, comes from comparing the 
verbal and peace operations columns, particularly in the final rows of Table 4.5. The analysis 
reveals that the likelihood with which third-parties follow an administrative or peace operation 
strategy (at i-1) with a verbal (pr = 0.374) or peace operations (pr = 0.155) strategy (at i) could 
be identical (their confidence intervals overlap). This suggests that, in some cases, third-parties 
do not distinguish between the least and most costly strategies available to them. In other words, 
even at the extremes (when a cost comparison should be easiest to make), third-parties do not 
always use relatively more costly strategies less frequently than the lower cost alternatives.  
In the aggregate, the results used to evaluate Hypothesis 1b indicate that third-parties do 
not fail to differentiate between relatively more and less costly strategies at only one point along 
the cost spectrum. Rather, a comparison of adjacent30 categories at both ends of the spectrum, as 
well as a comparison of the most and least costly categories, reveals that third-parties do not 
regularly use more costly strategies less often than low cost strategies. The pure cost model’s 
                                                 
30 Adjacent categories are within one number of each other along the dependant variable scale. Thus, for example, 
the verbal category (numbered 1) is adjacent to the mediation category (numbered 2). Mediation is adjacent to both 
the verbal category and the legal category (numbered 3), and so on. It would be easiest for third-parties to fail to 
differentiate between the costs of adjacent categories, since they are (by definition) closest to one another in cost. 
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prediction is therefore largely inaccurate. Although third-parties may factor costs into their 
decision-making calculus, they do not do so in the manner predicted by this model. 
Although the pure cost model receives limited empirical support, the limited 
commitments model fares better. This model argues that third-party involvement only escalates 
up to a point (or threshold), and it predicts that this threshold occurs just beyond the mediation 
category (Hypothesis 1f). In other words, third-parties should regularly intervene verbally within 
or mediate disputes, but they should resort infrequently to strategies that are more costly than 
mediation. This appears to generally be true.31 After a verbal intervention (at i-1), for example, 
third-parties generally mediate or, less frequently, intervene verbally (at i) next in the dispute (pr 
= 0.773 and pr = 0.193 respectively; see the first row of Table 4.5). The likelihood of using more 
costly strategies than mediation after a verbal intervention (legal, administrative, or peace 
operations) falls dramatically (to 0.4%, 1.3%, and 1.7% respectively). The difference between 
the former two categories and the latter three categories is statistically significant. The same 
general behavior occurs if the third-party previously used any other intervention strategy (the 
exception lies in the inability to distinguish between verbal and peace operations strategies after 
an administrative or peace operations intervention; see above and rows four and five of Table 
4.2). This suggests that a clear precipice exists between the use of verbal and mediation 
strategies on the one hand and those strategies that entail greater costs than mediation on the 
other. Third-parties have a limit to the intervention costs they are willing to bear. 
 
                                                 
31 Earlier, I listed a number of empirical cases that are consistent with this model, including a dispute between 
Guinea and Liberia (2000-2001), Guyana and Suriname (2000), Turkey and Syria (1998), Eritrea and Yemen (1995-
1996) and China and the Philippines (1999). 
   
168 
 
Evaluating the Random Model 
In contrast to the cost model, the random model claims that there is no discernible pattern 
within the intervention behavior of third-parties (Hypothesis 3). Support for such a prediction 
could be found in one of two ways. First, third-parties may be equally likely to employ any 
strategy (at i), regardless of the previous strategy used in the trajectory.32 As the discussion 
above indicates, however, this is not the case. After a verbal intervention, for example, third-
parties are less likely to employ legal, administrative, or peace operations strategies (see Model 
1; Table 4.4). Second, any potential patterns may not match the predictions made by the other 
models; in other words, third-parties may condition their subsequent intervention decisions on 
previous interventions, but it might not be possible to explain these findings in a theoretically 
coherent manner. This does not seem to the case either. The findings noted above generally 
match the expectations of the limited commitments (and to a lesser extent, pure cost) model. 
The data contained in Table 4.5 thoroughly undermine the random model. By both 
finding statistical patterns within the data and explaining those patterns theoretically, I conclude 
quite confidently that the random model does not explain third-party intervention behavior 
within trajectories. The models presented throughout the remainder of this chapter further 
confirm this conclusion. 
 
A Note on Robustness 
In order to ensure the robustness of the general results presented thus far, I run a series of 
additional models that vary the time period (cold war and post-cold war) as well as how I handle 
outliers (dropping the three outlier disputes versus examining only the first trajectory within each 
                                                 
32 In statistical terms, the confidence intervals might all overlap, which would suggest that third-parties do not 
condition their subsequent decisions on the previous intervention. 
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dispute). These models appear in Table 4.4 (Models 2-7). Model 2 examines third-party 
intervention behavior across the entire temporal domain of the study (1946-2001) after dropping 
the outlier disputes (the Vietnam War; The Eritrea-Ethiopian War; and a dispute during the 
period 1998-2001 between Iraq, the United States, and the United Kingdom regarding the 
enforcement of a United Nations sanctioned no-fly zone over Iraq). Models 3 and 4 then break 
the second model into the cold war (1946-1989) and post-cold war periods (1990-2001) 
respectively. Finally, Models 5-7 mirror Models 2-4, but handle outlying disputes differently 
during each of the three time periods. The former models (5-7) focus on just the first trajectory 
within a dispute, while the latter (2-4) drop the outliers entirely. 
Tables 4.6-4.8 present the probability distributions underlying Models 2-4 respectively.33 
In order to determine whether meaningful differences exist across different models, I compare 
each cell within Tables 4.6-4.8 to its corresponding cell in Table 4.5. 34 For example, after a 
verbal intervention, Table 4.5 reveals that the likelihood with which third-parties use another 
verbal intervention is 0.773 (the first row, first column of the table). The 95% confidence interval 
associated with this estimate is 0.627-0.888. Once outliers are removed from the analysis, Table 
4.6 reports that this probability falls to 0.597, and the confidence interval associated with this 
new estimate adjusts to 0.503-0.689. Because these two intervals overlap, it is plausible that the 
values within the two cells are really identical to one another (in other words, they cannot be 
distinguished from each other statistically). The comparison therefore indicates that the general 
results hold. Similar comparisons can be made for each cell of Table 4.6-4.8. In almost every 
                                                 
33 I do not display the probability distributions underlying Models 5-7. Despite this, I examine these distributions 
and construct a comparison similar to the one described below. 
34 In statistical terms, I check corresponding cells to see if the confidence intervals overlap. If these intervals 
overlap, then the corresponding cells could be identical in value. In contrast, if the intervals do not overlap, this 
suggests a meaningful variation across models. Note that as the number of observations in a given model fall, the 
confidence intervals attached to the probability estimates widen. This makes sense statistically, since fewer 
observations leads to greater uncertainty in predictions. Yet it also makes it harder for any differentiation to be 
found. 
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case, the comparison reveals that the results of the general model remain consistent across time 
periods and for different methods of handling outliers.35  
The robustness checks yield three general conclusions. First, the outliers cause no 
discernible effect on the analysis. These outliers may generate additional trajectory data, but that 
data does not alter the conclusions reached.36 Second, intervention behavior within militarized 
interstate disputes does not change substantially after the cold war ends. For example, when 
Tunisia blockaded the French naval base at Bizerte (Tunisia) in July 1961, third-parties first 
issued a series of verbal warnings and then began mediating.37 A similar pattern of third-party 
intervention occurred within both a dispute between Guyana and Suriname in 2000 regarding the 
exact location of their maritime boundary38 and a dispute between China and the Philippines over 
the Spratly Islands in 1999.39 As these examples illustrate, trajectories did not change abruptly 
when the cold war ended. To be sure, intervention behavior may have changed with respect to 
civil conflicts, but the affect on intervention within interstate conflicts remained marginal at best. 
Such a finding may explain why testing for differences between intervention behavior across 
these two time periods is not commonly done. 
                                                 
35 The one exception occurs in the probability of a third-party using a peace operation after a verbal intervention (the 
first row, fifth column of the tables). In the cold war period (Table 4.7), this probability is 0.065 (confidence 
interval: 0.021-0.148). The probability decreases to 0.011 in the post-cold war period (confidence interval: 0.005-
0.020; Table 4.8). In both cases, however, the confidence intervals overlap that contained in the similar, overall 
model (see Table 4.7; pr = 0.038, confidence interval: 0.013-0.082). This finding matches the empirical evidence. 
After 1989, universal and regional organizations more frequently deployed peace operations to intrastate (civil) 
conflicts than to interstate conflict (see Balas, Owsiak, and Diehl 2010).  
36 Despite this, the outlying disputes generate a large amount of data. I therefore exclude these outliers from the 
models presented in the remainder of the chapter. Note that handling the outliers differently does not change the 
conclusions. I ultimately exclude the outliers based on the argument presented in Chapter 3. 
37 The United Nations Security Council first issued a cease-fire demand. In the month that followed, the United 
States, United Kingdom, and the UN each called for peaceful negotiations to resolve the dispute. Finally, the ICJ 
sent a fact-finding mission to the conflict zone (a form of mediation). The fact finding mission helped lead to a 
bilateral agreement between France and Tunisia. 
38 In this case, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM, an IGO) issued the verbal plea and tried to mediate the 
dispute. The mediation failed to bring the disputants to agreement. 
39 The United States offered to mediate and issued a plea for negotiations. The Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) subsequently conducted good offices (a form of mediation), which helped the parties produce a 
“code of conduct” for the Spratly Island area. 
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Finally, although the general results do not seem to be affected by alternative modeling, I 
also ensure that the conclusions I reach about the pure cost, limited commitment, and random 
models remain intact. With this goal in mind, I revisit each of the conclusions presented above to 
ensure that they hold across each modeling specification. I find that the conclusions about third-
party intervention behavior remain consistent, regardless of the model. This is true of both the 
overall conclusions as well as those specific to each model’s prediction.   
 
Evaluating the Learning Model 
 Assessing the accuracy of the learning model’s theoretical predictions requires slight 
variations on the models presented above. In particular, one must know how third-parties behave 
within trajectories after successful and unsuccessful interventions. Table 4.9 presents models that 
address both situations. Model 8 considers third-party intervention decisions after a previously 
successful intervention, while Model 9 examines these decisions after a previously unsuccessful 
intervention. Both models include the entire temporal domain of the study (1946-2001) and 
exclude the three outlying disputes noted above. Tables 4.10 and 4.11 then contain the details of 
third-party intervention decisions that are associated with Model 8 and 9 respectively. Because 
my main interest lies in these intervention decisions, I turn now to the latter two tables. 
The main prediction of the learning model (Hypothesis 2a) contains two related 
propositions: that third-parties should repeat the use of strategies that were most recently 
successful and avoid the use of strategies that were most recently unsuccessful. Table 4.10 
addresses the first prediction; it provides the likelihood with which third-parties will follow a 
given strategy (at i-1) with any other (at i) given that the previous intervention was successful. 
For the learning model to be accurate, the largest probabilities in this table should occur in the 
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cells where third-parties repeat the same strategy in successive interventions.40 This does not 
appear to occur consistently, however.  
The first cell of Table 4.10 (first row, first column) reveals that the chance of a third-
party following a successful verbal intervention with another verbal plea is 48.1%.  Although this 
value seems high, third-parties are just as likely to follow a previously successful verbal 
intervention with mediation (pr = 0.376, with a confidence interval that overlaps that of the first 
cell). In other words, if a previous verbal intervention succeeded in achieving its goal, 
subsequent third-parties were equally likely to try a verbal strategy again as they were to switch 
to mediation. The same happens after a previously successful mediation (see row 2 of Table 4.7). 
When a prior mediation (at i-1) succeeded, third-parties were just as likely to try mediation again 
as they were to switch to a verbal strategy. Therefore, at the low cost end of the spectrum, it 
appears that third-parties are equally likely to resort to verbal or mediation strategies, regardless 
of the success of the last intervention. This evidence contradicts the prediction of the learning 
model. Third-parties may use a previously successful strategy frequently, but they are just as 
likely to try something else. 
As an illustration of this finding, consider a dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria in 
1996. During February 1996, the disputants’ troops clashed on the Bakassi Peninsula (a 
contested area of land along the Cameroon/Nigeria border). In response to this military skirmish, 
the Organization for African Unity (OAU) appealed for peaceful negotiations.41 President 
Eyadema of Togo then mediated a cease-fire agreement a few weeks later. When that agreement 
failed to avoid further military battles, the United Nations reverted to appeals for peaceful 
negotiations. In other words, although mediation recently proved a successful tool for managing 
                                                 
40 In Table 4.10, all previous interventions (at i-1) were successful. 
41 Other third-party verbal pleas preceded this one. I omit them here to keep the example simpler. Including them 
does not alter the point being made. 
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the dispute, third-parties opted not to use it when further conflict management efforts were 
needed.42 They chose instead to use strategies less costly than mediation. 
The evidence strengthens further against the learning model when one considers prior 
interventions involving strategies more costly than mediation. Following a previously successful 
administrative intervention (the fourth row of Table 4.10), third-parties are more likely to turn to 
verbal pleas (24.1% of the time) mediation (41.9% of the time) and peace operations (27.2% of 
the time) than to another administrative intervention (4.0% of the time).43 Similarly, after a 
successful peace operation (the fifth row of Table 4.10), third-parties turn more frequently to 
mediation (pr = 0.406) than another peace operation (pr = 0.167). These findings supply 
consistent evidence that third-parties are not repeating the use of previously successful strategies. 
This failure to repeat successful strategies in successive interventions occurs across the full 
spectrum of strategies, thereby supplying convincing evidence that undercuts the predictions of 
the learning model. 
This, however, comprises only one part of the learning model’s main prediction. What 
about third-party behavior after unsuccessful interventions? Do third-parties avoid the use of 
unsuccessful strategies in successive interventions? Table 4.11 attempts to answer this question; 
it displays third-party intervention decisions (at i) when the previous intervention (at i-1) did not 
succeed. In order for the evidence to support the learning model, the smallest probabilities in 
Table 4.11 should occur in the cells where third-parties repeat the same strategy in successive 
interventions.44 Were this to happen, it would indicate that third-parties were moving 
                                                 
42 Third-parties did eventually return to mediation, but the point is that third-parties are not repeating successful 
strategies (at i-1) in successive interventions (at i). 
43 Third-parties are equally likely to employ verbal pleas, mediation, and peace operations in these cases (the 
confidence intervals of the estimates overlap). 
44 This is because all prior interventions were unsuccessful in this table. Third-parties should therefore avoid the use 
of the same strategy in successive interventions. 
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significantly away from the use of strategies that most recently failed. Once again, the evidence 
does not generally support the hypothesis’ prediction. 
Across the entire spectrum of strategies, Table 4.11 reveals that third parties frequently 
reuse strategies that recently failed to productively manage a conflict. For example, after a verbal 
intervention failed to achieve its purpose (that is, to stop the fighting, encourage negotiations, or 
produce a troop withdrawal), the model predicts that third-parties will use another verbal strategy 
in the next intervention 65.1% of the time. This estimate is statistically significantly higher than 
the estimates associated with the use of any other strategy that might immediately follow a failed 
verbal intervention (row one of Table 4.11). Such a finding demonstrates that third-parties are 
more likely to repeat verbal strategies when they fail than to alter their intervention behavior.  
This cyclical tendency of verbal interventions appeared earlier (see the discussion of the 
cost model), but Tables 4.10 and 4.11 provide greater insight about it. After a verbal 
intervention, third-parties generally intervene again verbally in the dispute. This behavior 
appears regardless of the success of the previous intervention. Yet the cycling behavior seems 
slightly stronger after an unsuccessful verbal intervention than after a successful one (compare 
the first cells of Table 4.10 and 4.11).45 In other words, when verbal pleas fail to stop the 
fighting, secure a troop withdrawal, or encourage negotiations, third-parties generally ask again. 
They are unwilling to increase their involvement in managing the dispute until a verbal plea can 
somewhat tame the conflict (for example, by stopping the violence). For example, when the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) intervened in a dispute between Guyana and Suriname in 
2000, they issued a verbal plea for negotiations before mediating the dispute a few weeks later. 
                                                 
45 The confidence intervals of the first cells of Tables 4.10 and 4.11 overlap, which suggests that they might be 
identical. Notice, however, that after a successful verbal intervention, a third-party is just as likely to try a verbal 
plea as they are to mediate (see above). After a failed verbal strategy, a third-party is more likely to try another plea 
than any other strategy. This suggests that the cyclical tendency is stronger after a failed verbal intervention. 
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More than likely, such behavior occurs because third-parties are waiting for a signal that more 
costly interventions might succeed. Verbal pleas offer a low-cost way to receive such a signal 
from the disputants. If the violence stops, a troop withdrawal occurs, or the parties begin (even 
bilateral) negotiations as a result of a verbal intervention, third-parties may believe that there is 
an increased opportunity for effective conflict management (Zartman 2000). Returning to the 
Guyana-Suriname dispute, the disputants did not escalate their violence (that is, either fight or 
increase their demonstration of force) after CARICOM’s plea, which may have indicated to the 
organization that the disputants were ready for mediation.46 
Cycling is not unique to verbal interventions, however. A similar phenomenon occurs 
after a failed mediation. Third-parties return to mediation immediately after a failed mediation 
50.2% of the time. To be fair, they are equally likely to turn to verbal strategies as they are to 
return to mediation (pr = 0.373; the confidence intervals overlap). Yet even if this is true, it still 
suggests that third-parties are not specifically avoiding the use of the failed mediation strategy. 
In fact, third-parties are more likely to follow a failed mediation with another mediation than 
they are to use either legal, administrative, or peace operations strategies in the next intervention. 
During a dispute between Uganda and Sudan in 1996-1997, for example, Iran tried to mediate 
repeatedly (and successively), even though its efforts did not yield meaningful results. Quite 
simply, when a mediation fails, third-parties often try again.  
Finally, intervention behavior that follows a failed administrative or peace operations 
intervention supplies weak evidence of learning (as defined previously). Immediately after one 
of these two strategies fail (rows four and five of Table 4.11), third-parties select another 
administrative (pr = 0.187 and pr = 0.095 in rows four and five respectively) or peace operation 
                                                 
46 The parties had been escalating their show of force just prior to CARICOM’s plea. Thus, there was a clear change 
of behavior after the plea. This is not to say that the plea caused the behavioral change, only that CARICOM could 
interpret the behavioral change as a signal given the timing of its intervention. 
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(pr = 0.318 and pr = 0.069 respectively) frequently. Yet neither of these strategies is their 
consistently preferred behavior; instead, third-parties are either (statistically significantly) more 
likely to use mediation than any other strategy (as after a failed administrative intervention) or 
just as likely to mediate as to repeat the previously failed strategy (as after a failed peace 
operation). This evidence supports the claims advanced in the learning model, as third-parties 
significantly alter their behavior after a failed administrative or peace operation intervention. Yet 
their use of the previous failed strategy is not entirely negligible (it may be as much as 32%), 
they may be equally likely to use the failed and an alternative strategy (as after a failed peace 
operation) and the switch to mediation can be better explained by a competing model (the limited 
commitments model).  
If the evidence contained in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 does not provide strong, consistent 
support for the learning model, what does it reveal about the relative merits of the other 
competing theoretical models? Looking across these two tables, a number of patterns are 
conspicuous. First, the findings clearly support the limited commitments model (Hypothesis 1f). 
A stark precipice exists once again between the use of verbal and mediation strategies on the one 
hand and the use of legal, administrative, and peace operations strategies on the other.47 In fact, 
the likelihood with which third-parties employ mediation remains statistically significantly 
higher than the use of other strategies across many rows of the tables. One can therefore safely 
conclude that third-parties return to mediation often. According to the limited commitments 
model, third-parties do this because mediation offers them a nice balance between getting 
meaningfully involved in a dispute’s resolution and limiting the costs associated with their 
involvement. Thus, third-parties pay less attention to the success and failure of the previous 
intervention than they do to balancing their competing interests.  
                                                 
47 The precipice becomes less clear after a failed administrative intervention. See Table 4.11. 
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Second, more costly strategies are not always employed less frequently than the lower 
cost strategies. The easiest way to reach this conclusion involves comparing the first (least 
costly) and fifth (most costly) columns of each table. For example, in Table 4.10, third-parties 
follow a successful mediation with a verbal intervention 32% of the time; in contrast, they turn to 
peace operations 20% of the time in such situations. Despite these different estimates, the results 
also suggest that third-parties are equally likely to use a verbal strategy as they are to deploy a 
peace operation following a successful mediation (the confidence intervals overlap). Similar 
findings obtain after successful legal, administrative, and peace operations (the third-fifth rows 
of Table 4.10), as well as after failed administrative and peace operations (the fourth and fifth 
rows of Table 4.11). These findings therefore provide the clearest evidence against two 
predictions of the pure cost model: that third-parties escalate their involvement over the course of 
a trajectory (Hypothesis 1a) and that relatively less costly strategies are used more frequently 
than higher cost alternatives (Hypothesis 1b).  
Finally, Tables 4.10 and 4.11 demonstrate that the random model wrongly predicts third-
party behavior (that is, the data undermine Hypothesis 3). The previous two points mention 
specific patterns found within the data. Furthermore, although evidence in favor of the learning 
model is not substantial, it does receive some weak empirical support. Each of these conclusions 
suggests that third-party intervention behavior is not entirely random. Statistical patterns do exist 
within the data, and these patterns seem consistent with at least one of the theoretical 
explanations – particularly the limited commitments model.    
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Variation across Third-Party Actor Types 
After examining the general results, I next construct a series of models that attempt to 
examine how the general results change (if at all) as a result of third-party characteristics. I begin 
with the models containing all three types of third-party actors, which appear in Table 4.12. Each 
model contained in the table covers the entire time period of the study (1946-2001) and excludes 
the three outlier disputes. Model 10 presents results regardless of the success obtained in the 
previous intervention, while Models 11 and 12 consider third-party behavior after previously 
successful and unsuccessful interventions respectfully. The reference category with respect to 
third-party actor type is state interventions. 
At first glance, these models do not appear impressive, as many coefficients fail to 
achieve statistical significance. The reported coefficients are once again misleading, however. As 
noted earlier, the coefficients of the ordered probit model cannot be interpreted directly (Greene 
2008). Furthermore, the interaction terms require one to consider linear combinations of 
coefficients, rather than the direct coefficients reported in the model’s output (see also Epstein et 
al 2006).48 Once one considers such linear combinations, the coefficients are significant in many 
cases.  For example, IGO intervention behavior differs from states after a verbal intervention.49 
Similar effects can be found for other linear combinations of variables throughout the table. 
Because of this, I stress that any conclusions about third-party intervention decisions cannot be 
drawn from Table 4.12 directly. Rather, such conclusions require an examination of the 
                                                 
48 This occurs because of the way that the Y* variables are coded (see Chapter 3). An example will illustrate this 
point. In Model 10, all of the coefficients associated with IGO intervention (direct and interactive) are statistically 
insignificant. After a verbal intervention, however, all Y* variables are coded 1 (that is, Y*1=Y*3=Y*4=1). 
Therefore, to ascertain IGO intervention behavior after a verbal intervention, one must sum all of the IGO 
coefficients (IGO+IGO*Y*1+IGO*Y*3+IGO*Y*4) and test the significance of the summed coefficient. In this 
case, the summed coefficient is 0.0904, and it is statistically significant (standard error=0.201; p<0.000).  
49 This is the only information that can be gleaned from the coefficients. More precise descriptions of third-party 
behavior require additional analysis. I conduct such an analysis below. 
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likelihood with which third-parties use each of the strategies, conditional on the prior 
intervention.  
With this in mind, Table 4.13 provides the detailed information about third-party 
behavior that underlies Model 10 (Table 4.12). To recover these probabilities, I set all 
coefficients at their modal values. Thus, the probabilities refer to a conflict that does not contain 
a major state disputant or involve an enduring rivalry between disputants.50 These dispute-level 
characteristics remain constant in Tables 4.13-4.15. This allows me to uncover changes in 
intervention behavior that result from the identity of the third-party, rather than from changes in 
dispute characteristics. Table 4.13 provides information on third-party states, while Tables 4.14 
and 4.15 supply statistics about third-party coalition and IGO behavior respectively. 
Upon reviewing and comparing Tables 4.13-4.15, four conclusions stand out. First, the 
differences between third-party actors are minimal once a trajectory begins. Third-party states 
are more likely than coalitions and IGOs to use verbal strategies after a verbal intervention (see 
below for more on this); they are also less likely to turn to peace operations at that time. After 
more costly interventions, however, the distinction between unilateral and multilateral 
interventions weakens and eventually dissipates. For example, after a mediation or legal strategy, 
states are more likely than coalitions to intervene verbally in a dispute and less likely than 
coalitions to employ a peace operation (see the second and third rows of each table). Yet a 
similar difference does not exist statistically between states and IGOs after a mediation or legal 
intervention. There is then no statistically significant difference between the behavior of third-
                                                 
50 Additional control variables used in the modeling include whether or not the dispute was over territory and the 
relative capabilities of the disputants. These did not change the results. Therefore, to conserve degrees of freedom in 
the models, as well as to save space in the tables, I do not report models containing these variables in Tables 4.12 
and 4.16.  
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party states, coalitions, or IGOs following an administrative or peace operations strategy. Each 
turns most frequently to either a verbal plea or mediation.  
Second, as noted above, states more often resort to verbal strategies successively than do 
organizations or coalitions. For example, during a dispute between China and the Philippines in 
1995 over the Spratly Islands in 1995, a handful of states (the United States, Malaysia, Japan, 
and Indonesia) issued successive verbal pleas for negotiations. The same pattern emerged during 
a dispute between the same parties in 1999 – with one exception. In this latter dispute, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (an organization) mediated after the United States 
requested the parties to pursue diplomatic conflict management mechanisms, but ASEAN itself 
did not issue verbal pleas.    
The results presented in Tables 4.13-4.15 suggest that third-party states’ recurring 
reliance on verbal pleas is not unique to the China-Philippines dispute. More broadly, after a 
verbal intervention occurs, states will resort to verbal strategies again 70% of the time (the first 
row, first column of Table 4.10). In similar situations, coalitions and IGOs employ verbal 
strategies 39% and 35% of the time respectively (see the first row, first column of Tables 4.11 
and 4.12 respectively). The difference between state behavior on the one hand and coalition and 
IGO behavior on the other is statistically significant, and it suggests that the cyclical tendency of 
verbal interventions noted earlier derives primarily from the behavior of third-party states. Such 
a finding also supports the logic of the pure cost and limited commitments models. Since verbal 
interventions cost the least and states bear the full costs of their unilateral interventions, they 
employ verbal strategies repeatedly and reserve more costly interventions for the multilateral 
banner. 
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Third, the likelihood of a coalition or organization performing a peace operation does not 
generally depend significantly on the prior intervention strategy used.51 This implies that third-
party organizations and coalitions may not always deploy a peace operation immediately upon 
the coattails of a mediated, arbitrated, or adjudicated agreement.52 Yet a review of the descriptive 
statistics also reveals that they do not try to deploy peace operations as early as possible in a 
trajectory either. In fact, it is quite rare for a peace operation to begin a trajectory (n = 4).53 I 
therefore suspect that this finding has to do with the length of time required for a third-party to 
authorize and organize a peace operation. While the authorization and deployment process 
unfolds, other interventions appear between mediated agreements and the peace operations, 
making it seem as though peace operations do not follow them. Thus, it might be true that peace 
operations deploy in response to mediated agreements, but these deployments do not come next 
in the trajectory. 
As an illustration of this possibility, I return to the dispute between the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) and its neighbors (Uganda and Rwanda). The disputing states 
signed the Lusaka Accords in July 1999. These accords envisioned a joint military commission 
(JMC), which was to be supported financially and logistically by the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU), Zambia, and South Africa. Before the JMC began meeting in October 1999, 
however, the DRC filed suit against Uganda in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Thus, the 
ICJ intervention interrupts the agreement that produced the JMC (the Lusaka accords) and the 
intervention of the JMC within the trajectory. Because it takes time to create and deploy a peace 
                                                 
51 The one exception to this occurs after an administrative intervention. Coalitions are more likely to use a peace 
operation in such scenarios than after any other intervention strategy. 
52 A peace operation usually requires a cease-fire to precede its deployment. This cease-fire may result from either 
bilateral negotiations or third-party intervention. Such a question deserves attention in the future. For now, I simply 
note that peace operations do not immediately follow a mediation or legal strategy (that is, in the next intervention 
after the mediation or legal one). 
53 Only the United Nations deploys a peace operation at the beginning of a trajectory.  
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operation, other interventions may prevent the peace operation from immediately following the 
agreement that produced it.54 
Finally, the conclusions reached earlier about the competing hypotheses hold within these 
models as well. Third parties do not escalate their involvement over the life of a trajectory. They 
instead frequently employ less costly strategies after higher cost ones (see the lower rows of 
Tables 4.13-4.15). Third-parties are also not always less likely to use higher cost strategies than 
lower cost strategies. For example, third-party IGOs are equally likely to use a peace operation 
(the most costly strategy) as they are to use a verbal strategy (the least costly strategy) after a 
mediation, legal, administrative, or peace operations intervention (see the lowest four rows of 
Table 4.15). In other words, in most cases, IGOs resort as often to cheaper interventions as they 
do to more costly ones. This may occur because it is easier for the IGO to achieve consensus on 
the deployment of an impartial peace operation than on a resolution that might display biased 
language. Regardless of the reason for the findings, however, they suggest once again that the 
pure cost model’s predictions are largely inaccurate (see Hypothesis 1a and 1b). 
The findings also support the earlier conclusions on the limited commitments model. It 
seems again that a clear precipice exists between verbal and mediation strategies on the one hand 
and legal, administrative, and peace operations on the other (Hypothesis 1f). Generally, third-
parties prefer to resort to verbal or mediation strategies, as opposed to the more costly strategies. 
This preference is often (though not always) statistically significant and remains robust to 
changes in the identity of the third-party (thereby supporting Hypothesis 1g). For example, IGOs 
are statistically more likely to follow a mediation, legal, or peace operations intervention with 
                                                 
54 A similar situation happened with the United Nations (UN) in this dispute. The UN created a peace operation 
(MONUC) for the DRC in November 1999, but did not authorize the deployment of that operation until February 
2000. Before the deployment was authorized, Zambia presided over a regional summit that addressed the conflict in 
the DRC (a form of mediation). Thus, Zambia’s intervention appeared between when the UN signaled its desire to 
intervene and when it actually did so.   
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mediation. This allows them to remain actively involved in the management of the dispute 
(which requires them to undertake more than a verbal intervention) while also limiting the costs 
of their involvement. States behave similarly after all but administrative interventions (Table 
4.10). The findings are less clear with respect to coalitions, primarily because there are less data 
points involving this type of third-party (and therefore, the confidence intervals around the 
estimates widen substantially). Despite this limitation, however, the results underscore the 
tendency of third-parties to return regularly to verbal interventions and mediation, as well as 
their hesitancy to move to more costly strategies.  
Finally, although the limited commitment model receives additional empirical support, 
the learning model does not. Models 11 and 12 of Table 4.12 present third-party behavior after 
successful and unsuccessful interventions respectively. Reviewing the probability transition 
matrices associated with these models (not shown), I discover that the failure to learn noted 
above does not depend on any one type of third-party actor. Neither states, coalitions, nor 
organizations significantly repeat recently successful strategies or significantly avoid recently 
unsuccessful ones. Instead, they often return to verbal and mediation strategies (as noted above). 
This undercuts the logic of the learning model (Hypothesis 2a), while also providing additional 
evidence in favor of the limited commitments model. 
 
Variation across Third-Party States 
 The analysis presented above assumes that state actors all behave similarly. Yet there are 
a number of reasons to suspect that differences in state intervention behavior depend upon 
certain state characteristics. For example, major states might intervene differently than minor 
states, as might those states either allied or contiguous to at least one of the disputants. I 
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therefore consider this possibility in Models 13-15 (Table 4.16). These models include only the 
current interventions (that is, at i) performed by states. As before, the models in Table 4.16 
encompass the entire temporal domain of the study (1946-2001) and exclude the three outlying 
disputes. 
Tables 4.17-4.20 provide the detailed information about third-party behavior that 
underlies Model 13 (Table 4.16). To recover these probabilities, I set all coefficients at their 
modal values. Thus, the probabilities refer to a conflict that does not contain a major state 
disputant or involve an enduring rivalry between disputants. I then vary the characteristics of the 
third-party state across Tables 4.17-4.20. Table 4.17 contains the modal third-party state – one 
that is a minor state and neither allied nor contiguous to the disputants. Table 4.18 then considers 
major states, while Tables 4.19 and 4.20 examine the behavior of states that are allied or 
contiguous to the disputants respectively. 
After reviewing and comparing these tables, I find only one instance in which a state-
level characteristic altered intervention behavior. Following an administrative intervention, third-
party states allied to at least one disputant are significantly less likely to mediate (pr = 0.341) 
than their non-allied counterparts (pr = 0.643). In every other situation, third-party states behave 
similarly in trajectories, regardless of their individual characteristics. This may result from 
selection into the trajectory. For example, if major states are more likely than minor states to 
intervene in the first place (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Frazier 2006), perhaps they are the 
only states involved in trajectories. Yet this seems unlikely, as I find many instances in which 
minor states intervene, particularly in the Middle East and Africa (for example, Libya). In the 
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end, these results suggest that once a trajectory begins, intervention decisions do not vary 
significantly according to state-level characteristics.55  
Although the findings contained throughout Tables 4.17-4.20 do not uncover variation 
within the behavior of third-party states, they do reaffirm the conclusions reaches earlier. First, 
the pure cost model receives weak support. States generally prefer to use less costly strategies, 
but their involvement does not escalate throughout the trajectory (contrary to Hypothesis 1a). For 
example, after an administrative or peace operations intervention, states employ mediation (for 
minor states, pr = 0.643) more often than any other strategy, and this difference is statistically 
significant. Because low cost strategies regularly follow high cost ones (as when mediation 
follows an administrative intervention), third-parties do not seem to escalate their involvement 
over the course of a dispute (from low cost to high cost strategies). 
Second, states do not always rely on relatively less costly strategies more often than the 
high cost alternatives (as predicted by the pure cost model, Hypothesis 1b). As before, the 
clearest evidence against this hypothesis emerges when third-parties fail to distinguish between 
the least and most costly strategies. Tables 4.17-4.20 indicate that such failures occur often. After 
an administrative or peace operation, for example, minor states are equally likely to employ a 
peace operation as they are to verbally intervene in the dispute (see the fourth and fifth row of 
Table 4.17; the confidence intervals within the verbal and peace operations columns overlap one 
another). Major states, allies, and contiguous third-parties exhibit similar behavior. Thus, even 
when it is easiest for third-parties to distinguish between the relative costs of strategies (that is, 
                                                 
55 States do not intervene in disputes using legal strategies during this time period. Despite this fact, legal strategies 
are available to third-party states, and they have employed them frequently throughout history (see Chapter 2). It 
seems, however, that they rely on the International Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and similar 
institutions for legal interventions in the post-World War II era. I hasten to note that this empirical pattern does not 
affect my analysis. More specifically, since the mediation and legal categories collapse in the models, the Markov 
chain remains ergotic (Gill 2006). 
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when they are choosing between the least and most costly strategies), third-parties do not always 
employ more costly strategies less often than their lower cost counterparts.  
Third, the evidence contained in Tables 4.17-4.20 generally supports the limited 
commitments model (Hypothesis 1g). States regularly turn to verbal and mediation strategies 
more often than higher cost strategies, regardless of the previous strategy used. For example, 
minor states are always more likely to use mediation than legal, administrative, or peace 
operations strategies (Table 4.17); these same states are also more likely to use verbal strategies 
than legal, administrative, and peace operations in many cases. The findings become less clear 
for other third-party states (Tables 4.18-4.20). The state actors found within these latter tables 
habitually employ verbal and mediation strategies at high rates, but the estimates cannot always 
be distinguished from the higher cost strategies (particularly peace operations). Despite this, I 
note that variation in state level characteristics did not significantly alter the data presented in 
Table 4.17, which suggests that similar findings to those contained within this table may prevail 
within Tables 4.18-4.20 as well.56  
Finally, the learning model again received no empirical support (Models 14-15; 
probability transition matrices not shown). States are not more likely to repeat recently 
successful strategies than to try something different in the next intervention. They are also not 
more likely to change strategies when one recently fails than they are to repeat the failed strategy 
(Hypothesis 2). It therefore seems that states do not learn in the way predicted by the learning 
model presented in Chapter 2. I return to this point in the concluding chapter. 
 
                                                 
56 I compared corresponding cells of Tables 4.18-4.20 with Table 4.17 to discern whether state-level characteristics 
change state intervention behavior. The confidence intervals of corresponding cells almost always overlap, which 
suggests that the estimates across the tables may be identical. 
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Summary 
As a result of this analysis, what have we learned about third-party intervention behavior 
and the relative merits of the competing theoretical models that seek to explain it? Table 4.21 
summarizes the findings for each prediction made in Chapter 2. As the table demonstrates, the 
results contained in this chapter provide evidence most consistent with the limited commitments 
model (and, to a lesser extent, the pure cost model). Across the general models (and each of their 
variants), a precipice continually emerges, and it is robust to changes in third-party 
characteristics. Third-parties use verbal and mediation strategies more frequently than more 
costly alternatives, and these tendencies are often statistically significant. Such results suggest 
that third-parties pay attention to costs, but will not escalate their involvement linearly or 
indefinitely. Faced with limited resources and competing interests, third-parties must instead 
determine a boundary beyond which they are unwilling to invest further in the productive 
management of a conflict. This boundary appears between the mediation and legal strategies; 
generally speaking, third-parties hesitate to incur greater costs than those associated with 
mediation.  
In contrast to the limited commitments model, the pure cost model did not fare well. I 
find that third-parties do not regularly escalate their involvement in disputes from the use of 
relatively less costly strategies to more costly ones. Furthermore, third-parties do not even use 
less costly strategies more frequently than the higher cost alternatives. This suggests that third-
parties factor more than a simple cost comparison into their intervention decision calculus. The 
limited commitments model hints at what else third-parties might consider. It proposes that third-
parties balance their interest in meaningful intervention with a desire to restrain costs. Thus, in 
practical terms, it is not that third-parties make simple cost comparisons between any two 
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strategies at their disposal, but that they care about comparing the costs between strategies no 
more costly than mediation and those that exceed the costs of mediation.  
Despite these shortcomings, the pure cost model did receive some empirical support. It 
accurately forecasts that organizations and coalitions will begin their involvement in trajectories 
with a more costly strategy than states. It also correctly predicts that simultaneous interventions 
almost always results from multilateral action. Finally, the cost model proposes that states will 
attempt overlapping interventions, particularly during an IGO-led ongoing intervention. Each of 
these suggests that the cost model has some merit, even if some of its central predictions remain 
unsupported. I therefore attempt to reconcile these results with the limited commitments model 
in the conclusion of this work. 
 Finally, the empirical evidence consistently undermines two other competing theoretical 
models: the learning model and the random model. With respect to the former, third-parties do 
not regularly pay attention to the success of a previous intervention when deciding what to do 
next in a trajectory. They do not retain strategies that recently succeeded or replace strategies that 
recently failed with any statistical regularity. Furthermore, third-parties often do not wait for an 
intervention to end before beginning a new one. This provides the strongest evidence against the 
learning model. It is not merely that third-parties fail to learn from the previous intervention 
when deciding what to do next, but that they often chose not to have an opportunity to learn 
because they intervene before the success of the prior intervention can be known. To be fair, the 
conflicts in which this occurs may demand additional intervention before a prior intervention 
ends. This, however, does not change the fact that learning does not occur as the model predicts. 
In addition to undercutting the learning model’s predictions, the results provide a clear 
indication that the random model is inaccurate. Evidence of random behavior can emerge either 
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when there are no statistical patterns within the data (that is, third-parties never distinguish 
between the use of strategies) or when those results that do appear cannot be explained by 
theoretical expectations. Neither is true here. Each of the models suggests that there are statistical 
patterns behind third-party interventions within trajectories, thereby negating the claim that 
intervention strategies are entirely interchangeable in the eyes of third-parties. Furthermore, 
these statistical patterns find explanation (and therefore, meaning) in the limited commitments 
and pure cost models. It seems that there is “a method to the madness” of intervention within 
trajectories. 
The aggregation of the results contained in Table 4.21 suggests that intervention need not 
be thought about entirely in terms of the identity of the third-party. Unfortunately, such thinking 
has been a common theme in the conflict management literature, and has led to questions about 
which states are most likely to mediate, where United Nations peacekeepers go, and so on. My 
analysis indicates, however, that third-parties do not make drastically different intervention 
decisions according to their own identity. Rather, intervention (and therefore, conflict 
management) can be thought of a process that applies similarly to all types of third-parties. If 
nothing else, such a finding should encourage conflict management scholars to think about how 
all third-parties work together to manage a conflict, instead of how specific types of third-parties 
behave independently of the others. 
The remainder of this work details the practical implications of my findings. In the next 
chapter, I explore how the models presented earlier can inform policy decisions about 
intervention. I also demonstrate that the theoretical arguments contained in Chapter 2 exist in 
practice, even if they receive limited empirical support in a large-n analysis. For example, 
although the learning model received no support in the above models, there is evidence that 
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actors do learn within specific disputes. It is therefore wrong to reject the learning model in its 
entirety; although it may not be most prevalent across all disputes and actors, it can explain some 
intervention behavior. I therefore provide empirical examples consistent with each theoretical 
model, regardless of the support it received in this chapter. Finally, in the concluding chapter, I 
synthesize the theoretical and policy contributions and answer a series of questions related to 
their importance. For example, why does it matter if there’s a threshold to third-party 
involvement? Does this threshold imply more than that third-parties are simply reluctant to 
deploy troops? With these larger questions in mind, I now turn to the more practical side of 
trajectories. 
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Tables 
Table 4.1: Third-Party Conflict Management within Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1946-2001 
 
Number of 
Interventions 
Number of Disputes Experiencing at 
Least This Level of Intervention 
Probability of Reaching at Least 
This Level of Intervention  
0 1,286 0.8438 
1 (or more) 238 0.1562 
2 (or more) 128 0.0840 
3 (or more) 90 0.0591 
4 (or more) 62 0.0407 
5 (or more) 53 0.0348 
6 (or more) 43 0.0282 
7 (or more) 30 0.0197 
8 (or more) 26 0.0171 
9 (or more) 23 0.0151 
10 (or more) 16 0.0105 
11 (or more) 14 0.0092 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Strategy Use within Trajectories, 1946-2001 
 
 All Trajectory-Level 
Observations 
(Column Percent) 
Excluding Outlying 
Disputes 
(Column Percent) 
Verbal 1,779 
(67.41%) 
497 
(47.47%) 
Mediation 678 
(25.69%) 
412 
(39.35%) 
Legal 20 
(0.76%) 
20 
(1.91%) 
Administrative 55 
(2.08%) 
31 
(2.96%) 
Peace Operations 107 
(4.06%) 
87 
(8.31%) 
   
Total 2,639 1,047 
 
 
 
Table 4.3: Conflict Management Behavior by Third-Party Type 
 
Intervening 
Party 
 
State 
 
Coalition 
 
IGO 
Intervention First Highest First Highest First Highest 
       
Average 1.43 1.94 1.97 2.62 1.83 2.69 
Median 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Mode 1 2 2 2 1 2 
Notes: Numbers correspond to category values on the dependent variable, where 1=verbal, 2=mediation, 3=legal,  
4=administrative, and 5=peace operations.
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Table 4.4: Ordered Probit Regression of Conflict Management Intervention Strategy Selection, 1946-2001 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
        
Time 
Period 
1946-2001 1946-2001 1946-1989 1990-2001 1946-2001 1946-1989 1990-2001 
        
Data All Without 
outliers 
Without 
outliers 
Without 
outliers 
First 
trajectory 
First 
trajectory 
First 
trajectory 
        
Previous 
Strategy 
Used 
       
Y*1 -0.723*** 
(0.206) 
-0.639*** 
(0.227) 
-0.368 
(0.300) 
-1.041*** 
(0.224) 
-0.934*** 
(0.135) 
-0.793*** 
(0.203) 
-1.087*** 
(0.165) 
Y*2 - - - -0.788*** 
(0.271) 
- - - 
Y*3 -0.383** 
(0.184) 
-0.541*** 
(0.209) 
-0.356 
(0.308) 
- - - - 
Y*4 - 0.505* 
(0.261) 
0.242 
(0.379) 
0.827* 
(0.421) 
- - - 
        
Parameters        
Cut 1 -0.332 -0.433 -0.395 -0.530 -0.610 -0.368 -0.548 
Cut 2 0.746 0.084 0.805 0.893 0.709 0.892 0.830 
Cut 3 0.803 0.928 0.908 0.975 0.781 0.983 0.884 
Cut 4 1.035 1.135 1.068 1.283 1.023 1.128 1.238 
        
Model 
Information 
       
Obs. 2,432 872 504 368 678 343 335 
χ2 14.66*** 22.35*** 4.69 43.93*** 49.09*** 15.20*** 43.20*** 
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.042 0.016 0.107 0.074 0.054 0.097 
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p <0.01; robust standard errors reported in parentheses; observations clustered on 
the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID). 
 
 
Table 4.5: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 1 (from Table 4.4) 
 
 Current Strategy Used 
 
Verbal 
 
Mediation 
 
Legal 
 
Administrative 
Peace 
Operations 
 
Previous 
Strategy 
Used 
Verbal 0.773 
(0.627-0.888) 
0.193 
(0.093-0.312) 
0.004 
(0.000-0.009) 
0.013 
(0.003-0.028) 
0.017 
(0.008-0.031) 
Mediation 0.523 
(0.379-0.680) 
0.346 
(0.246-0.441) 
0.012 
(0.001-0.025) 
0.039 
(0.013-0.068) 
0.080 
(0.037-0.137) 
Legal 0.523 
(0.379-0.680) 
0.346 
(0.246-0.441) 
0.012 
(0.001-0.025) 
0.039 
(0.013-0.068) 
0.080 
(0.037-0.137) 
Administrative 0.374 
(0.248-0.512) 
0.396 
(0.326-0.467) 
0.017 
(0.001-0.035) 
0.058 
(0.022-0.097) 
0.155 
(0.065-0.273) 
Peace 
Operations 
0.374 
(0.248-0.512) 
0.396 
(0.326-0.467) 
0.017 
(0.001-0.035) 
0.058 
(0.022-0.097) 
0.155 
(0.065-0.273) 
Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses. 
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Table 4.6: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 2 (from Table 4.4) 
 
 Current Strategy Used 
 
Verbal 
 
Mediation 
 
Legal 
 
Administrative 
Peace 
Operations 
 
Previous 
Strategy 
Used 
Verbal 0.597 
(0.503-0.689) 
0.335 
(0.267-0.408) 
0.011 
(0.002-0.022) 
0.019 
(0.008-0.034) 
0.038 
(0.013-0.082) 
Mediation 0.348 
(0.244-0.457) 
0.458 
(0.377-0.542) 
0.025 
(0.003-0.048) 
0.047 
(0.017-0.080) 
0.122 
(0.090-0.159) 
Legal 0.348 
(0.244-0.457) 
0.458 
(0.377-0.542) 
0.025 
(0.003-0.048) 
0.047 
(0.017-0.080) 
0.122 
(0.090-0.159) 
Administrative 0.179 
(0.083-0.300) 
0.445 
(0.351-0.527) 
0.035 
(0.005-0.066) 
0.071 
(0.026-0.121) 
0.270 
(0.152-0.422) 
Peace 
Operations 
0.335 
(0.164-0.529) 
0.454 
(0.352-0.540) 
0.027 
(0.002-0.056) 
0.050 
(0.015-0.093) 
0.135 
(0.067-0.229) 
Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 4.7: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 3 (from Table 4.4) 
 
 Current Strategy Used 
 
Verbal 
 
Mediation 
 
Legal 
 
Administrative 
Peace 
Operations 
 
Previous 
Strategy 
Used 
Verbal 0.537 
(0.427-0.642) 
0.361 
(0.293-0.428) 
0.016 
(-0.003-0.032) 
0.021 
(0.003-0.044) 
0.065 
(0.021-0.148) 
Mediation 0.390 
(0.245-0.537) 
0.426 
(0.331-0.513) 
0.027 
(-0.003-0.064) 
0.036 
(0.003-0.076) 
0.121 
(0.082-0.166) 
Legal 0.390 
(0.245-0.537) 
0.426 
(0.331-0.513) 
0.027 
(-0.003-0.064) 
0.036 
(0.003-0.076) 
0.121 
(0.082-0.166) 
Administrative 0.271 
(0.111-0.470) 
0.433 
(0.349-0.511) 
0.034 
(-0.003-0.080) 
0.048 
(0.005-0.096) 
0.213 
(0.087-0.397) 
Peace 
Operations 
0.349 
(0.165-0.572) 
0.429 
(0.323-0.512) 
0.031 
(-0.002-0.078) 
0.041 
(0.004-0.087) 
0.149 
(0.071-0.259) 
Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 4.8: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 4 (from Table 4.4) 
 
 Current Strategy Used 
 
Verbal 
 
Mediation 
 
Legal 
 
Administrative 
Peace 
Operations 
 
Previous 
Strategy 
Used 
Verbal 0.680 
(0.550-0.794) 
0.290 
(0.175-0.420) 
0.005 
(-0.001-0.015) 
0.013 
(0.002-0.028) 
0.011 
(0.005-0.020) 
Mediation 0.283 
(0.179-0.396) 
0.516 
(0.385-0.639) 
0.021 
(-0.005-0.043) 
0.067 
(0.014-0.133) 
0.112 
(0.054-0.200) 
Legal 0.283 
(0.179-0.396) 
0.516 
(0.385-0.639) 
0.021 
(-0.005-0.043) 
0.067 
(0.014-0.133) 
0.112 
(0.054-0.200) 
Administrative 0.095 
(0.026-0.209) 
0.431 
(0.267-0.581) 
0.031 
(-0.006-0.071) 
0.112 
(0.022-0.207) 
0.331 
(0.160-0.544) 
Peace 
Operations 
0.323 
(0.061-0.692) 
0.467 
(0.267-0.617) 
0.020 
(-0.003-0.052) 
0.063 
(0.006-0.159) 
0.127 
(0.009-0.397) 
Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses. 
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Table 4.9: Ordered Probit Regression of Conflict Management Intervention Strategy Selection, 1946-2001 
(Outliers Excluded; Variation on Model 2) 
 
 Model 8 Model 9 
   
Restrictions After successful 
intervention 
After unsuccessful 
intervention 
   
Previous Strategy 
Used 
  
Y*1 -0.428 
(0.319) 
-0.718*** 
(0.179) 
Y*3 -0.241 
(0.237) 
0.350*** 
(0.350) 
Y*4 0.366 
(0.315) 
1.034** 
(0.457) 
   
Parameters   
Cut 1 -0.349 -0.616 
Cut 2 0.794 0.869 
Cut 3 0.869 1.016 
Cut 4 0.990 1.531 
   
Model Information   
Obs. 393 479 
χ2 8.45** 54.57*** 
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.065 
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p <0.01; robust standard errors reported in parentheses; observations clustered on 
the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID). 
 
 
 
Table 4.10: Probability Transition Matrix after Successful Intervention (Model 8, Table 4.9) 
 
 Current Strategy Used 
 
Verbal 
 
Mediation 
 
Legal 
 
Administrative 
Peace 
Operations 
 
Previous 
Strategy 
Used 
Verbal 0.481 
(0.357-0.602) 
0.376 
(0.300-0.452) 
0.016 
(-0.007-0.042) 
0.021 
(0.008-0.038) 
0.106 
(0.037-0.220) 
Mediation 0.321 
(0.188-0.476) 
0.423 
(0.325-0.514) 
0.025 
(-0.007-0.065) 
0.035 
(0.008-0.065) 
0.196 
(0.134-0.274) 
Legal 0.321 
(0.188-0.476) 
0.423 
(0.325-0.514) 
0.025 
(-0.007-0.065) 
0.035 
(0.008-0.065) 
0.196 
(0.134-0.274) 
Administrative 0.241 
(0.132-0.382) 
0.419 
(0.329-0.513) 
0.027 
(-0.010-0.068) 
0.040 
(0.011-0.073) 
0.272 
(0.164-0.410) 
Peace 
Operations 
0.372 
(0.159-0.614) 
0.406 
(0.279-0.510) 
0.023 
(-0.006-0.066) 
0.031 
(0.007-0.065) 
0.167 
(0.068-0.305) 
Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses. 
   
195 
 
Table 4.11: Probability Transition Matrix after Unsuccessful Intervention (Model 9, Table 4.9) 
 
 Current Strategy Used 
 
Verbal 
 
Mediation 
 
Legal 
 
Administrative 
Peace 
Operations 
 
Previous 
Strategy 
Used 
Verbal 0.651 
(0.553-0.746) 
0.317 
(0.233-0.403) 
0.009 
(0.001-0.020) 
0.016 
(0.005-0.032) 
0.007 
(0.002-0.017) 
Mediation 0.373 
(0.279-0.475) 
0.502 
(0.421-0.576) 
0.026 
(0.005-0.048) 
0.061 
(0.019-0.108) 
0.037 
(0.016-0.071) 
Legal 0.373 
(0.279-0.475) 
0.502 
(0.421-0.576) 
0.026 
(0.005-0.048) 
0.061 
(0.019-0.108) 
0.037 
(0.016-0.071) 
Administrative 0.059 
(0.010-0.166) 
0.380 
(0.209-0.519) 
0.055 
(0.008-0.102) 
0.187 
(0.063-0.302) 
0.318 
(0.133-0.554) 
Peace 
Operations 
0.279 
(0.113-0.470) 
0.520 
(0.429-0.595) 
0.036 
(0.005-0.076) 
0.095 
(0.018-0.204) 
0.069 
(0.018-0.160) 
Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses. 
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Table 4.12: Ordered Probit Regression of Conflict Management Intervention Strategy Selection, All Third-
Party Actors, 1946-2001 (Outliers Excluded) 
 
 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
    
Restrictions None After successful 
intervention 
After unsuccessful 
intervention 
    
Variables    
Y*1 -0.621*** 
(0.233) 
-0.508* 
(0.250) 
-0.525 
0.323) 
Y*3 -1.234** 
(0.582) 
-0.477 
(0.362) 
-0.956 
(0.855) 
Y*4 1.000** 
(0.470) 
- - 
IGO 0.337 
(0.382) 
-0.147 
(0.280) 
0.121 
(0.535) 
IGO*(Y*1) 0.323 
(0.295) 
0.402 
(0.285) 
0.095 
(0.356) 
IGO*(Y*3) 0.571 
(0.541) 
0.598 
(0.369) 
0.660 
(0.714) 
IGO*(Y*4) -0.327 
(0.589) 
- - 
Coalition 1.468** 
(0.605) 
1.276*** 
(0.454) 
1.651*** 
(0.607) 
Coalition*(Y*1) -0.674* 
(0.390) 
-0.294 
(0.617) 
-1.037 
(0.649) 
Coalition*(Y*3) 0.016 
(0.749) 
- - 
Disputing Major State -1.099 
(0.710) 
-0.902 
(0.604) 
-1.383 
(1.038) 
Disputing Major State*(Y*1) 0.242 
(0.374) 
0.763* 
(0.453) 
-0.463 
(0.339) 
Disputing Major State*(Y*3) 0.704 
(0.640) 
0.090 
(0.454) 
1.623 
(1.117) 
Disputing Major State*(Y*4) 0.064 
(0.737) 
- - 
Enduring Rivalry Disputants 0.283 
(0.427) 
0.273 
(0.470) 
0.271 
(0.549) 
Enduring Rivalry Disputants*(Y*1) -0.403 
(0.306) 
-0.510 
(0.350) 
-0.292 
(0.348) 
Enduring Rivalry Disputants*(Y*3) 0.164 
(0.644) 
-0.227 
(0.454) 
-0.415 
(0.617) 
Enduring Rivalry Disputants*(Y*4) -0.455 
(0.562) 
- - 
    
Model Information    
Obs. 872 393 479 
χ2 204.20*** 49.38*** 90.91*** 
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.083 0.131 
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p <0.01; robust standard errors reported in parentheses; observations clustered on 
the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID); to save space, parameterized cut points are not reported in this table. 
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Table 4.13: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 10 (from Table 4.12; Third-Party State) 
 
 Current Strategy Used 
 
Verbal 
 
Mediation 
 
Legal 
 
Administrative 
Peace 
Operations 
 
Previous 
Strategy 
Used 
Verbal 0.699 
(0.576-0.814) 
0.272 
(0.171-0.380) 
0.006 
(0.000-0.014) 
0.009 
(0.003-0.019) 
0.013 
(0.004-0.028) 
Mediation 0.466 
(0.307-0.639) 
0.434 
(0.311-0.538) 
0.016 
(0.002-0.033) 
0.028 
(0.011-0.054) 
0.056 
(0.017-0.123) 
Legal 0.466 
(0.307-0.639) 
0.434 
(0.311-0.538) 
0.016 
(0.002-0.033) 
0.028 
(0.011-0.054) 
0.056 
(0.017-0.123) 
Administrative 0.114 
(0.010-0.359) 
0.401 
(0.155-0.547) 
0.037 
(0.003-0.074) 
0.079 
(0.026-0.139) 
0.369 
(0.076-0.748) 
Peace 
Operations 
0.376 
(0.157-0.631) 
0.461 
(0.335-0.540) 
0.022 
(0.002-0.054) 
0.041 
(0.009-0.095) 
0.100 
(0.014-0.276) 
Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 4.14: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 10 (from Table 4.12; Third-Party Coalition) 
 
 Current Strategy Used 
 
Verbal 
 
Mediation 
 
Legal 
 
Administrative 
Peace 
Operations 
 
Previous 
Strategy 
Used 
Verbal 0.388 
(0.202-0.570) 
0.469 
(0.363-0.557) 
0.023 
(0.001-0.054) 
0.039 
(0.013-0.072) 
0.082 
(0.027-0.183) 
Mediation 0.074 
(0.008-0.255) 
0.352 
(0.133-0.531) 
0.037 
(0.003-0.071) 
0.084 
(0.030-0.141) 
0.453 
(0.147-0.772) 
Legal 0.074 
(0.008-0.255) 
0.352 
(0.133-0.531) 
0.037 
(0.003-0.071) 
0.084 
(0.030-0.141) 
0.453 
(0.147-0.772) 
Administrative 0.014 
(0.000-0.110) 
0.122 
(0.001-0.477) 
0.019 
(0.000-0.058) 
0.051 
(0.001-0.136) 
0.794 
(0.269-0.998) 
Peace 
Operations 
0.071 
(0.001-0.344) 
0.304 
(0.035-0.550) 
0.033 
(0.002-0.071) 
0.073 
(0.011-0.134) 
0.519 
(0.072-0.942) 
Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 4.15: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 10 (from Table 4.12; Third-Party IGO) 
 
 Current Strategy Used 
 
Verbal 
 
Mediation 
 
Legal 
 
Administrative 
Peace 
Operations 
 
Previous 
Strategy 
Used 
Verbal 0.354 
(0.234-0.482) 
0.486 
(0.414-0.555) 
0.023 
(0.002-0.048) 
0.042 
(0.016-0.075) 
0.094 
(0.036-0.180) 
Mediation 0.252 
(0.157-0.366) 
0.509 
(0.445-0.569) 
0.030 
(0.003-0.059) 
0.060 
(0.020-0.107) 
0.149 
(0.089-0.222) 
Legal 0.252 
(0.157-0.366) 
0.509 
(0.445-0.569) 
0.030 
(0.003-0.059) 
0.060 
(0.020-0.107) 
0.149 
(0.089-0.222) 
Administrative 0.123 
(0.004-0.442) 
0.385 
(0.103-0.547) 
0.035 
(0.002-0.072) 
0.075 
(0.018-0.136) 
0.382 
(0.051-0.811) 
Peace 
Operations 
0.268 
(0.075-0.540) 
0.483 
(0.356-0.560) 
0.060 
(0.002-0.068) 
0.058 
(0.013-0.119) 
0.161 
(0.035-0.395) 
Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses. 
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Table 4.16: Ordered Probit Regression of Conflict Management Intervention Strategy Selection, State Actors, 
1946-2001 (Outliers Excluded) 
 
 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
    
Restrictions None After successful 
intervention 
After unsuccessful 
intervention 
    
Variables    
Y*1 -0.801** 
(0.351) 
-1.380** 
(0.633) 
-0.346 
(0.337) 
Y*3 -0.538 
(0.409) 
-0.164 
(0.413) 
- 
Third-party Major State 0.570** 
(0.263) 
0.677 
(0.424) 
0.521* 
(0.292) 
Third-party Major State*(Y*1) 0.360 
(0.466) 
0.732 
(0.762) 
-0.205 
(0.461) 
Third-party Major State*(Y*3) -0.516 
(0.363) 
-0.899* 
(0.525) 
- 
Third-party Alliance -1.233* 
(0.679) 
0.275 
(0.631) 
0.237 
(0.341) 
Third-party Alliance*(Y*1) 0.273 
(0.399) 
1.255** 
(0.562) 
0.135 
(0.410) 
Third-party Alliance*(Y*3) 1.370* 
(0.767) 
-0.986 
(0.884) 
- 
Third-party Contiguous 0.477 
(0.343) 
-0.770 
(0.520) 
0.184 
(0.371) 
Third-party Contiguous*(Y*1) 0.185 
(0.385) 
0.103 
(0.724) 
-0.071 
(0.521) 
Third-party Contiguous*(Y*3) -0.370 
(0.481) 
0.995 
(0.740) 
- 
Disputing Major State -0.604 
(0.653) 
0.310 
(0.495) 
-0.441 
(0.364) 
Disputing Major State*(Y*1) -0.388 
(0.599) 
-0.282 
(0.793) 
-0.495 
(0.545) 
Disputing Major State*(Y*3) 0.007 
(0.786 
-1.189 
(0.708) 
- 
Enduring Rivalry Disputants 0.141 
(0.545) 
-0.654 
(0.484) 
-0.265 
(0.365) 
Enduring Rivalry Disputants*(Y*1) -0.201 
(0.407) 
0.216 
(0.625) 
-0.653 
(0.457) 
Enduring Rivalry Disputants*(Y*3) -0.673 
(0.674) 
0.138 
(0.508) 
- 
    
Model Information    
Obs. 370 123 247 
χ2 219.53*** 84.09*** 76.39*** 
Pseudo R2 0.167 0.166 0.165 
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p <0.01; robust standard errors reported in parentheses; observations clustered on 
the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID); to save space, parameterized cut points are not reported in this table. 
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Table 4.17: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 13  
(from Table 4.16; Minor, Non-Allied, Non-Contiguous State) 
 
 Current Strategy Used 
 
Verbal 
 
Mediation 
 
Legal 
 
Administrative 
Peace 
Operations 
 
Previous 
Strategy 
Used 
Verbal 0.668 
(0.496-0.814) 
0.321 
(0.176-0.491) 
0.000 0.007 
(-0.000-0.022) 
0.004 
(0.01-0.012) 
Mediation 0.365 
(0.168-0.615) 
0.565 
(0.363-0.727) 
0.000 0.034 
(-0.003-0.101) 
0.036 
(0.003-0.120) 
Legal 0.365 
(0.168-0.615) 
0.565 
(0.363-0.727) 
0.000 0.034 
(-0.003-0.101) 
0.036 
(0.003-0.120) 
Administrative 0.191 
(0.094-0.325) 
0.643 
(0.483-0.758) 
0.000 0.067 
(-0.005-0.162) 
0.099 
(0.012-0.288) 
Peace 
Operations 
0.191 
(0.094-0.325) 
0.643 
(0.483-0.758) 
0.000 0.067 
(-0.005-0.162) 
0.099 
(0.012-0.288) 
Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 4.18: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 13 (from Table 4.16; Major State Variation) 
 
 Current Strategy Used 
 
Verbal 
 
Mediation 
 
Legal 
 
Administrative 
Peace 
Operations 
 
Previous 
Strategy 
Used 
Verbal 0.513 
(0.345-0.668) 
0.457 
(0.314-0.613) 
0.000 0.018 
(-0.001-0.058) 
0.013 
(0.002-0.038) 
Mediation 0.349 
(0.181-0.557) 
0.579 
(0.397-0.734) 
0.000 0.036 
(-0.003-0.102) 
0.037 
(0.004-0.119) 
Legal 0.349 
(0.181-0.557) 
0.579 
(0.397-0.734) 
0.000 0.036 
(-0.003-0.102) 
0.037 
(0.004-0.119) 
Administrative 0.088 
(0.014-0.263) 
0.573 
(0.276-0.768) 
0.000 0.106 
(-0.009-0.238) 
0.233 
(0.023-0.616) 
Peace 
Operations 
0.088 
(0.014-0.263) 
0.573 
(0.276-0.768) 
0.000 0.106 
(-0.009-0.238) 
0.233 
(0.023-0.616) 
Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 4.19: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 13 (from Table 4.16; Alliance Variation) 
 
 Current Strategy Used 
 
Verbal 
 
Mediation 
 
Legal 
 
Administrative 
Peace 
Operations 
 
Previous 
Strategy 
Used 
Verbal 0.521 
(0.305-0.731) 
0.446 
(0.261-0.625) 
0.000 0.019 
(-0.001-0.073) 
0.014 
(0.001-0.049) 
Mediation 0.327 
(0.099-0.629) 
0.584 
(0.345-0.755) 
0.000 0.040 
(-0.003-0.106) 
0.049 
(0.003-0.175) 
Legal 0.327 
(0.099-0.629) 
0.584 
(0.345-0.755) 
0.000 0.040 
(-0.003-0.106) 
0.049 
(0.003-0.175) 
Administrative 0.608 
(0.125-0.975) 
0.341 
(0.025-0.328) 
0.000 0.019 
(-0.001-0.119) 
0.032 
(0.000-0.228) 
Peace 
Operations 
0.608 
(0.125-0.975) 
0.341 
(0.025-0.328) 
0.000 0.019 
(-0.001-0.119) 
0.032 
(0.000-0.228) 
Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses. 
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Table 4.20: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 13 (from Table 4.16; Alliance Variation) 
 
 Current Strategy Used 
 
Verbal 
 
Mediation 
 
Legal 
 
Administrative 
Peace 
Operations 
 
Previous 
Strategy 
Used 
Verbal 0.556 
(0.412-0.699) 
0.422 
(0.280-0.562) 
0.000 0.012 
(-0.001-0.033) 
0.009 
(0.001-0.026) 
Mediation 0.327 
(0.098-0.627) 
0.581 
(0.344-0.748) 
0.000 0.045 
(-0.002-0.148) 
0.047 
(0.004-0.160) 
Legal 0.327 
(0.098-0.627) 
0.581 
(0.344-0.748) 
0.000 0.045 
(-0.002-0.148) 
0.047 
(0.004-0.160) 
Administrative 0.098 
(0.023-0.255) 
0.598 
(0.334-0.771) 
0.000 0.103 
(-0.008-0.236) 
0.201 
(0.023-0.517) 
Peace 
Operations 
0.098 
(0.023-0.255) 
0.598 
(0.334-0.771) 
0.000 0.103 
(-0.008-0.236) 
0.201 
(0.023-0.517) 
Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses. 
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Table 4.21: A Summary of Proposed Hypotheses and Empirical Results 
 
Model Model Variant Number Hypothesis Empirical Support 
Cost Pure 1a Over the course of a conflict, third-party 
interventions will escalate from the use of 
relatively low-cost strategies to relatively 
high-cost strategies. 
Weak 
1b Relatively high-cost strategies will be used 
less frequently than relatively low-cost 
strategies. 
Weak 
1c IGOs and coalitions will begin their 
interventions with relatively more costly 
intervention strategies than individual 
states. 
Strong 
1d IGOs are more likely than coalitions or 
individual states to perform multiple 
interventions simultaneously. Similarly, 
coalitions are more likely than individual 
states to perform multiple interventions 
simultaneously.  
Strong 
(Prediction is 
inaccurate about 
coalitions.) 
1e States are more likely to attempt an 
overlapping intervention during an IGO or 
coalition-led intervention than a state-led 
one. 
Strong 
(Prediction does 
not include 
overlapping 
interventions 
performed by 
coalitions or 
IGOs.) 
Limited 
Commitments 
1f Third-parties are highly unlikely to use 
intervention strategies more costly than 
mediation. 
Strong 
1g IGOs and coalitions are highly unlikely to 
use intervention strategies more costly than 
mediation. 
Strong 
1h Third-parties are unlikely to initiate 
simultaneous or overlapping interventions, 
regardless of the actor involved or the 
strategy used. 
None 
Learning (N/A) 2a Third-parties repeat strategies that were 
most recently successful and avoid 
strategies that were most recently 
unsuccessful. 
Very Weak 
2b Third-parties are unlikely to initiate 
simultaneous or overlapping interventions, 
regardless of the actor involved or the 
strategy used. 
None 
Random (N/A) 3 There is no discernible pattern in the 
(successive) interventions of third-parties. 
None 
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Chapter 5 
The Practical Side of Trajectories 
 
 Trajectories are theoretical constructs, but they are rooted in the empirical world. It is 
therefore important to extend the discussion of competing theoretical models (Chapter 2) and 
their evaluation (Chapter 4) to the realm of policy-makers. How can trajectories inform those 
who practice conflict management within international disputes? When a militarized dispute 
occurs between states, what can potential third-parties expect from those that might get involved 
in the management of that dispute? Finally, are there specific cases that illustrate the various 
theoretical models proposed earlier? 
I devote the current chapter to these three broad questions. To answer them, I pursue two 
different lines of inquiry. First, I simulate a trajectory based on the results of the previous 
chapter. This simulation offers policy-makers a number of insights into how third-party behavior 
evolves over the course of an interstate dispute. Second, I provide an illustration (that is, an 
empirical example) of each of the theoretical trajectory models outlined in Chapter 2. Through 
this exercise, I demonstrate how each of the trajectories might look in practice. I also highlight a 
series of factors that might help identify the disputes to which each model applies.  
 
Forecasting Intervention Behavior 
 One of the best ways that this project can be of use to decision-makers involves its 
forecasting potential. Towards that end, I simulate a trajectory from the results presented in the 
previous chapter. This trajectory begins with an initial intervention by some third-party. Table 
5.1 describes what form that initial intervention will most likely take; the table displays the 
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strategy distribution for initial interventions during the period 1946-2001 across the five broad 
categories discussed earlier – verbal pleas, mediation, legal, administrative, and peace 
operations. These initial interventions include the first intervention within each trajectory, as well 
as the isolated interventions that do not develop into trajectories.1  
According to Table 5.1, approximately 50% of all initial interventions involve mediation. 
Third-parties clearly prefer to begin their interventions within militarized disputes by mediating; 
they employ this strategy more often than any other when beginning to manage a dispute. Second 
to mediation, third-parties are most likely to intervene verbally during an initial intervention 
(41.45%). Such verbal pleas for a cease-fire, troop withdrawal, or negotiations are not only 
common, but they may also be a way for third-parties to test the waters for the possibility of 
greater intervention. If disputants stop the violence, proceed to the negotiating table, or withdraw 
forces in response to a verbal intervention, third-parties have reason to believe that disputants are 
prepared for a peaceful settlement and, therefore, that more costly (and active)2 conflict 
management strategies will effectively manage the dispute. In this way, the disputant response to 
verbal pleas can signal third-parties that the time is right for greater intervention, thereby 
explaining the prevalence of verbal intervention during the initial interventions of third-parties 
(see also Zartman 2000). Finally, the use of verbal pleas and mediation dwarf the use of the other 
more costly, alternative strategies. For example, the likelihood that third-parties will use either 
legal, administrative or peace operations strategies in an initial intervention is 3.42%, 1.71%, and 
                                                 
1 I include isolated interventions in this distribution because it is unknown whether they will develop into trajectories 
at the time of the initial intervention. Each initial intervention has approximately a 50/50 chance of developing into a 
trajectory (see the previous chapter).  
2 “Active” here refers to the involvement of the third-party. Verbal pleas only require a third-party to issue a 
statement. Every other strategy (which also happen to be more costly than verbal interventions) demands that third-
parties become directly involved in the management of the dispute or its effects (for example, refugee flows). 
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3.42% respectively. Each of these likelihoods is substantially lower than the probability that 
third-parties will turn to either mediation or verbal pleas. 
  Using this strategy distribution as a starting point (and the general results from the 
previous chapter), I construct a simulated trajectory, which appears in Table 5.2.3 Each row 
represents a specific intervention within the trajectory, while the columns display the likelihood 
with which third-parties will use each of the intervention strategies during that given 
intervention. The distribution of strategies from Table 5.1 begins the trajectory, and it appears 
across the first row of the table (which describes intervention behavior within the first, or initial, 
intervention).4 Moving row by row down the table, one can see how the likelihood with which a 
third-party selects from among the various strategies changes over the course of the trajectory. 
 The data contained in Table 5.2 produce three general conclusions. First, as a trajectory 
unfolds, the likelihood of third-parties being actively involved in the management of a dispute 
declines. Instead of intervening in ways that would actually assist the disputants in managing 
their conflict or its consequences (for example, through mediation, legal, administrative, or peace 
operations), third-parties are increasingly likely to intervene verbally as a trajectory develops. 
More specifically, third-parties intervene verbally in 41% of initial interventions (the first row of 
Table 5.2). By the second intervention, the likelihood of a verbal intervention rises sharply to 
62% (the second row) and continues climbing slowly until it reaches 68% by the fifth 
                                                 
3 In methodological terms, I multiply the original distribution of values (Table 5.1) by the likelihood with which 
third-parties use each of the five strategies (at i) given the previous intervention strategy (at i-1). In other words, I 
use matrix multiplication to multiply Table 5.1 (transposed to create a 1x5 matrix) by Table 4.4 (general results 
table). I then multiply the resulting matrix (a 1x5 matrix containing a distribution of strategies) by Table 4.4 again 
and repeat the process. Table 5.2 reports the results produced by the first nine multiplications. Because trajectories 
are ergotic, Table 4.4 describes intervention behavior at all points within a trajectory (see Gill 2006). Therefore, I 
use Table 4.4 throughout the entire multiplication process. On matrix multiplication, see Leon (2006). 
4 The rows of Table 5.2 sum to 1. As before, this does not indicate that third-parties must intervene at each point in 
the trajectory. Rather, it signifies that if third-parties choose to intervene, they will use one of the five diplomatic 
strategies listed in Table 5.2 (that is, there are no alternative, diplomatic strategies from which to choose). The 
likelihood of intervention at each point in the trajectory appears in Table 4.1. All intervention behavior in Table 5.2 
is therefore conditional upon the probabilities of intervention listed in Table 4.1.  
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intervention. This suggests either that third-parties have short attention spans for active 
intervention over time or that many potential third-parties eventually “give up” (or at least, do 
not “try harder”). Either scenario seems plausible. As new events demand the attention of world 
leaders, an ongoing conflict can easily shift to the back burner. Furthermore, as a conflict 
persists, third-parties may simply not want to invest the resources necessary for effective conflict 
management. A verbal intervention presents them with an opportunity to advocate for peace 
when they do not want to work actively to achieve it.  
 Of course, as the likelihood of verbal interventions rises, the probability of more costly 
strategies must fall. Such a decline happens for all non-verbal intervention strategies over the life 
of the trajectory. For example, third-parties mediate in 50% of their initial interventions. By the 
second intervention, the likelihood of mediation falls sharply to 29%. It eventually settles around 
25% by the fourth intervention. Such a finding contains two noteworthy implications. First, it 
suggests that as a dispute persists (and numerous interventions occur), there is about a one in 
four chance (at each intervention) that third-parties will help the disputants to forge an agreement 
in the pursuit of peace. Although additional case study analysis would be needed to uncover the 
rationale for why third-parties scale back their involvement in conflict management during a 
trajectory, it is again plausible that third-parties either believe that mediation will not work (that 
is, they choose to “give up” on active conflict management strategies) or must shift their 
attention to other world events.5 Second, this finding implies that the greatest chance for a 
                                                 
5 It may also be possible that early mediation efforts succeed, thereby ending a series of trajectories and leaving the 
difficult cases behind (which third-parties are then more hesitant to mediate). Such an argument is consistent with 
the other two presented here. If third-parties are hesitant to mediate, this amounts to “giving up” on active strategies 
or “not wanting to try harder” in the remaining disputes Furthermore, evaluating this argument lies beyond the scope 
of this study. Because I focus upon short-term success (that is, whether the intervention achieved its purpose at the 
time that it ended), it is possible for mediation to succeed and for the trajectory to continue (see also Beardsley 2008; 
Greig 2001). For example, during a dispute between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbors 
(Rwanda and Uganda), third-parties regularly mediated cease-fire and troop withdrawal agreements. Although 
mediation succeeded numerous times in this case, the trajectory persisted. To determine whether mediation 
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mediation occurs as early in the trajectory as possible. Note, however, that this does not mean 
that the greatest likelihood of mediation exists early in the dispute. Rather, when third-parties 
intervene (regardless of when in the dispute they do so), mediation is most likely to occur 
initially. Then, as more third-parties intervene, the likelihood of mediation drops to about half of 
what it was at the outset of the trajectory.6 Therefore, if disputants need time to “soften up” (to 
borrow a phrase from Greig and Diehl 2006) before signing an agreement, third-parties may be 
less willing to intervene when the disputants are ready for it. 
 Third-party usage of legal, administrative, and peace operations strategies within the 
simulated trajectory follow a similar pattern to mediation. By the fifth intervention, the chance of 
third-parties using each of these strategies falls to about 33-66% of their initial values. Despite 
this similarity, however, administrative and peace operations strategies display an additional, 
unique behavior. The likelihood with which third-parties use each of these latter two strategies 
hits its peak during the second intervention (rather than the first). That is, third-parties have only 
a 3% chance of deploying a peace operation in the initial intervention. The likelihood of a peace 
operation then rises to 6% in the second intervention before slowly declining until it stabilizes 
around 4%. Although 6% is still a small substantive value, note that the chance of a third-party 
deploying a peace operation climbs 100% from the first to the second intervention and then falls 
33% from the second to the third intervention. These are large changes in behavior, even though 
the likelihood of a peace operation remains substantively low.  
These findings make sense empirically. Peace operations rarely deploy at the outset of a 
trajectory.7 Instead, they (and similarly, administrative interventions) often require a mediated 
                                                                                                                                                             
produced a successful outcome that decisively ended a dispute (and the trajectory), one would need to examine the 
long-term outcomes of mediation instead. I leave this for future research. 
6 The likelihood of mediation falls from 50% to about 25% during the course of the simulated trajectory. 
7 There are only four cases in which a peace operation begins a trajectory. All are performed by the United Nations. 
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agreement to precede it at some point in the trajectory, since parties frequently consent to a peace 
operation within these agreements.8 The earliest we should see peace operations would therefore 
be during the second intervention within a trajectory. Note, however, that peace operations could 
theoretically come later than the second intervention in the trajectory; that is, mediation has a 
chance to precede any peace operation (or administrative strategy) that does not occur in the first 
intervention. Yet the simulation suggests that the likelihood of an operation drops after the 
second intervention in the trajectory. What causes this decline? The answer may lie in the 
success of initial mediations. Additional analysis reveals that when a mediation strategy begins a 
trajectory, it is more likely to succeed (roughly 70%) than if it comes within the trajectory itself 
(approximately 50%).  Initial mediations therefore increase the opportunity for peace operations 
to occur in the second intervention. As the likelihood of mediation (and its success) fall, so too 
does the selection of a peace operations strategy. 
 In practical terms, these findings give disputants and potential third-parties something to 
consider. The chances of mediation, arbitration, and adjudication9 decline over a trajectory’s 
lifetime. Similarly, if an administrative intervention or peace operation has not deployed by the 
second intervention, the chances of one occurring in subsequent interventions also decline. There 
is therefore no wisdom in free riding (that is, waiting for another third-party to handle a dispute) 
because the active involvement of third-parties decreases steadily after the initial two 
interventions. Disputants that desire assistance or potential third-parties that have an interest in 
effectively managing a conflict can certainly wait for the second intervention to occur. 10 If no 
                                                 
8 This does not contradict the findings in Chapter 4. While a peace operation may need to follow a mediated (or 
other) agreement, it may not appear in the intervention immediately after the mediation. See Chapter 4 for more 
information. 
9 Arbitration and adjudication are strategies within the legal category (see Table 1.1). 
10 To provide a sense of real time to this analysis, during the period 1993-2001, the median wait time between 
interventions within a trajectory was 11 days (mode=1, first quartile=2, third quartile=42). Waiting for two 
interventions therefore amounts to a period of about 22 days. 
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active third-party intervention materializes by that point, however, either disputants in need must 
strongly court potential third-parties to encourage more active intervention or interested third-
parties must step up to take a more active role. Otherwise, the trajectory will more than likely 
devolve into a series of appeals for cease-fires and negotiations. 
 The danger of a trajectory transitioning into a series of verbal pleas is not entirely 
theoretical. It occurs in practice as well. For example, when a United States plane collided with a 
Chinese plane in 2001, Taiwan and Pakistan followed the (failed) Japanese fact-finding mission 
(a form of mediation) with verbal interventions. The trajectory therefore ended with multiple 
verbal interventions. Other trajectories begin with a verbal plea and never escape from the grasp 
of cyclical verbal interventions. During two disputes between India and Pakistan in 1999, for 
example, eight different third-parties (made up of states, coalitions, and organizations) issued 
verbal pleas for the disputants to resolve their issues through diplomatic instead of military 
strategies.11 Both trajectories began with a verbal plea, after which third-parties refused to adopt 
more costly (and more involved) strategies in the management of the dispute. Thus, disputants 
(and third-parties) that seek the active involvement of third-parties must exercise caution. If 
disputants stall agreement early in the dispute (for example, by adopting a hard-line negotiating 
position and refusing to offer concessions) or if potential third-parties delay their own 
involvement too long in the hopes of free-riding, there is a great chance that third-parties will not 
become actively involved later in the dispute. In such situations, disputants and interested third-
parties may find themselves without the assistance of others.  
 The second conclusion derived from Table 5.2 involves the stabilization of third-party 
behavior. A comparison of the rows of Table 5.2 reveals few changes after the seventh 
                                                 
11 These third-parties included: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the United Arab Emirates, the 
United Nations, the European Union, the Commonwealth of Nations, and a coalition of European Union foreign 
ministers. 
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intervention in a trajectory. In other words, the likelihood with which third-parties use each of 
the five intervention strategies becomes consistent after about six interventions. This implies that 
once third-parties reach a certain point in the trajectory, their intervention decisions do not 
drastically change from one intervention to the next and are unlikely to change in the future. It 
therefore underscores one of the substantive conclusions noted above: there is no sense in 
waiting a long time for a specific, meaningful intervention to materialize. The probability of such 
a meaningful intervention (that is, a third-party intervening actively – with either a mediation, 
legal, administrative, or peace operations strategy) not only declines throughout a trajectory, but 
it never increases again. Instead, the likelihood of meaningful intervention (regardless of the 
particular, non-verbal strategy used) reaches an equilibrium at its lowest value in the trajectory. 
The message is fairly clear: we should not expect that repeated interventions or prolonged 
disputes will lead more often to the active involvement of third-parties to manage a conflict than 
their passive observance of that conflict. 
Finally, the simulated trajectory reaffirms the results noted in the previous chapter, 
particularly with respect to the merits of the limited commitments model.12 Third-parties 
regularly resort to verbal interventions and mediations. In fact, at any given intervention, the 
forecasted trajectory predicts that third-parties will use one of these two strategies over 90% of 
the time. Strategies that are more costly than mediation account for the remaining 10% of 
expected third-party behavior. Thus, there is a clear precipice between verbal and mediation 
strategies on the one hand and legal, administrative, and peace operations strategies on the other. 
Third-parties strongly prefer to limit the intervention costs they incur, and their limit seems to be 
                                                 
12 This is not entirely surprising, since I use some of those results to simulate the trajectory. Note, however, that the 
precipice within the simulated trajectory sharpens in contrast to that contained earlier. Table 4.4, for example, notes 
that third-parties rely on verbal pleas or mediation 77-96% of the time (depending on the prior strategy used in the 
trajectory). In contrast, Table 5.2 expects third-parties to resort to these two strategies over 90% of the time, and this 
expectation remains constant throughout the entire trajectory.  
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at the mediation category. Very rarely do third-parties foray beyond mediation and employ more 
costly intervention strategies. 
Each of the three conclusions presented so far depends (in part) on a starting assumption 
used to generate the simulated trajectory. In particular, the trajectory contained in Table 5.2 
assumes that the first move in the trajectory is not yet known. That is, it uses historical data to 
construct a historical distribution of initial interventions across the five broad categories. This 
distribution then sets the trajectory in motion. It is therefore reasonable to ask how a known 
starting point affects a potential trajectory path. If the initial intervention definitely involves a 
verbal plea, does that initial intervention forecast a different trajectory path than if third-parties 
first mediate in a dispute? Such an inquiry is extremely relevant, for potential third-parties might 
wait to see the initial intervention behavior of other third-parties before making their own 
intervention decision. Furthermore, these third-parties will examine the future based on their 
current position; in this case, that means future decisions will proceed with the initial 
intervention being known. 
In an effort to shed light on this matter, Table 5.3 simulates a trajectory in which third-
parties initially intervene verbally, while Table 5.4 forecasts a trajectory that begins with 
mediation.13 These tables offer two additional insights into third-party behavior. First, the 
likelihood of active (that is, non-verbal) diplomatic intervention rises over the course of a 
trajectory that begins with a verbal plea (although it stabilizes after the sixth intervention). For 
example, the likelihood with which third-parties use mediation grows from 19% in the second 
intervention to 24% by the fourth intervention. Similar patterns can be found within the legal, 
administrative, and peace operations strategies. This suggests that some of the more pessimistic 
                                                 
13 I focus only upon the initial use of verbal and mediation strategies because they cumulatively comprise over 90% 
of all initial interventions. Both trajectories rely on Table 4.4 for information about how third-parties move from one 
intervention to the next. I construct these trajectories using the same process as the one outlined in footnote 2. 
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findings above depend on the first move of the trajectory. For example, when third-parties first 
intervene verbally in a dispute, the greatest likelihood of administrative or peace operations no 
longer occurs in the second intervention. Instead, the probability that third-parties use these 
strategies rises throughout the trajectory, reaching its maximum value around the sixth 
intervention (at its equilibrium value of approximately 4%). 
Table 5.4 confirms that predicted behavior depends highly on the initial intervention. If 
mediation occurs first in a trajectory, that trajectory behaves almost identically to the one 
presented in Table 5.2. More costly (and involved) interventions (that is, those that use 
mediation, legal, administrative or peace operations to actively assist the disputants) decline over 
the life of the trajectory. For example, if a trajectory begins with mediation, the likelihood of a 
subsequent mediation falls to 35% by the second intervention, and 25% by the fourth 
intervention. Furthermore, the chances of a verbal intervention steadily climb, while 
administrative and peace operations strategies reach their peak likelihood in the second 
intervention. It therefore appears that initial mediations drive the results presented in Table 5.2.14 
Despite uncovering some sensitivity of a trajectory’s shape to the initial intervention, I 
hasten to note that each predicted trajectory reaches a similar equilibrium. By the sixth 
intervention, the likelihood of a verbal intervention stabilizes at approximately 68% across 
Tables 5.2-5.4. Similarly, mediation, legal, administrative, and peace operations strategies reach 
equilibrium values as well (likelihoods of about 25%, 1%, 2%, and 4% respectively). This 
reaffirms the earlier finding that intervention decisions stabilize by about the sixth intervention.15 
Any large shifts in the likelihood with which third-parties will use each intervention strategy 
therefore seem to occur early in the life of a trajectory. Initial interventions may cause third-party 
                                                 
14 This should not be surprising, since mediation occurs more often in initial interventions than any other strategy. 
15 Despite this, notice that only 2.8% of all militarized disputes receive six or more interventions (see Table 4.1). 
Thus, many trajectories never reach this equilibrium.  
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behavior to approach the common equilibrium in different ways (for example, compare the top 
rows of Tables 5.3 and 5.4), but each simulated trajectory eventually reaches that same 
equilibrium. 
Finally, each of the simulated trajectories uses historical information to predict third-
party behavior. These predictions therefore possess two notable limitations. First, the simulations 
are probabilistic, not determinative. As an example, Tables 5.2-5.4 do not imply that peace 
operations are impossible at the eighth intervention, only that third-parties are less likely to 
deploy a peace operation at that point in the trajectory than they are to rely on verbal or 
mediation strategies. Thus, while I can get a general idea of third-party intervention behavior 
from the simulated trajectories, the simulation does not predict the strategies that third-parties 
employ at each point in the trajectory with absolute certainty.  
Second, because the simulations result from historical data, their predictions assume that 
third-party behavior remains constant for the foreseeable future. This assumption, however, does 
not seem problematic. One of the greatest structural changes to the international community 
involved the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war (1989-1991). Despite such 
a systemic shock, I find that third-parties select intervention strategies similarly during and after 
the cold war.16 If strategy selection did not change at this watershed moment, it seems unlikely to 
do so any time soon. Regardless, if third-parties significantly alter their behavior, the predictions 
would need to be updated as well. For example, if third-parties begin relying on legal strategies 
(that is, arbitration and adjudication) more often than they have been, this information would 
need to be factored into the analysis in order to yield accurate predictions.  
                                                 
16 Note that I am referring here specifically to the selection of intervention patterns. The frequency of intervention 
may have changed across the two periods, even if third-parties make similar decisions regarding the strategies that 
they will employ in those interventions.  
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Despite these limitations, the simulations offer policy-makers a number of insights about 
third-party intervention behavior. First, when a dispute breaks out (and no intervention has yet 
occurred) the greatest opportunities for third-parties to intervene actively in the dispute 
(including through mediation) occur early in a trajectory.17  This provides important information 
to those hoping to free ride off of another third-party’s actions. If a non-verbal intervention does 
not occur by the second or third move in the trajectory, third-parties that desire one should not 
wait for another third-party, as the likelihood of such an intervention falls and does not increase 
again. Second, third-parties can update their expectations once the initial intervention is known. 
If the first intervention involves a verbal plea, the probability of a non-verbal intervention may 
rise slightly during the trajectory. In contrast, if the first intervening third-party mediates, the 
likelihood of a non-verbal intervention falls sharply after the first few interventions. Finally, 
intervention behavior eventually stabilizes, regardless of the initial intervention. This suggests 
that the first move of a trajectory matters, but that intervention behavior eventually reaches an 
equilibrium. After about six interventions, decision-makers can consistently expect third-parties 
to rely upon each of the strategies in a consistent fashion from one intervention to the next. 
Of course, disputants can draw implications from these conclusions as well. In order to 
simplify this discussion, suppose that there are two types of disputants: those that genuinely want 
third-parties to help them achieve a peaceful resolution of their dispute through diplomatic 
channels and those that exploit third-party intervention to achieve militaristic ends (that is, those 
with devious objectives; Richmond 1998). For the former, the above simulations suggest two 
policy prescriptions. First, disputants that desire peace through diplomatic channels should not 
adopt too extreme or inflexible of a bargaining position early in the dispute. Although disputants 
                                                 
17 Future research might investigate whether initial interventions of a trajectory occur too early in a dispute (that is, 
before the conflict is ripe for management; Zartman 2000). If these initial interventions do occur “too early,” then 
this might explain (in part) why intervention success rates are lower within trajectories than in isolated interventions. 
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may often fear that concessions or moderate positions (that is, flexibility in bargaining) will 
portray weakness or set precedents, there is a danger to being too inflexible. The greatest 
opportunity for disputants to receive the active involvement of third-parties occurs during the 
initial interventions. Yet if disputants’ positions are too extreme or inflexible, these initial efforts 
will be squandered, eventually leaving the disputants to manage the conflict themselves. 
Disputants that desire a peace brokered by third-parties must therefore balance the flexibility of 
their position with the knowledge that third-parties are most likely to help them early in the 
trajectory. 
Second, these disputants should actively seek the help of third-parties. Generally, third-
parties turn away from more involved (and costly) forms of intervention after the initial few 
interventions in a trajectory. Yet this decision is probabilistic, not determinative. Disputants can 
therefore actively pursue the involvement of third-parties if they seek it, knowing that a chance 
for greater involvement exists. Such a policy should aim to encourage more costly interventions, 
which is most likely to succeed if the disputants appear committed to diplomatic channels. In 
other words, third-parties that are already hesitant to incur greater intervention costs may only be 
persuaded to do so if the fighting has stopped, the disputants have tried bilateral negotiations, 
and the disputants take the initiative to request assistance. Without such signals, it may be 
difficult to convince third-parties to relinquish verbal pleas in favor of greater involvement. 
Finally, what about those disputants that prefer to use diplomatic channels as a means to 
further their militaristic goals (for example, by using mediation to recover from and prepare for 
battle)? At the risk of furthering such an objective, the simulations suggest a policy prescription 
for these disputants as well. Specifically, disputants in this situation should accept initial third-
party help but reject any proposed settlement. This is especially true if the third-party offers 
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initially to mediate. Because disputants retain the authority to accept any agreement produced in 
mediation (unlike in binding arbitration or adjudication) and mediation does not involve the 
deployment of a mission that might curb a disputant’s autonomy18 (unlike in administrative or 
peace operations strategies), mediation offers disputants the perfect strategy by which to achieve 
their objectives. By allowing mediation to occur, they buy time to recover militarily and plan for 
the next battle. Yet they also preserve a maximum amount of policy autonomy (including the 
ability to reject any proposed settlement produced in negotiations). Furthermore, with an initial 
mediation, the likelihood of more costly intervention strategies falls as the trajectory unfolds, 
while with a verbal intervention, that likelihood rises (slightly). Thus, mediation not only 
preserves a disputant’s policy autonomy now, but it also does so into the future of the trajectory 
by reducing the likelihood that a third-party will get more actively involved in managing the 
dispute. Through such a process, third-parties that want to avoid peace can manipulate third-
parties to produce the outcome that they prefer. 
 
Illustrations of the Trajectory Models 
The previous section highlights the predictive power of trajectories. Yet the concept of 
trajectories can do more than forecast future interventions. It can explain past intervention 
behavior as well. In this section, I therefore revisit each of the theoretical models presented 
earlier: the pure cost model, the limited commitments model, the learning model, and the random 
model. For each model, I describe a dispute during the period 1993-2001 in which the 
                                                 
18 An administrative or peace operation does restrict a state’s policy autonomy somewhat (although the exact 
amount may vary according to the mission’s mandate). For example, allowing a peace operation to observe a cease-
fire implies that disputants face a cost (of some sort) for violating the cease-fire. The disputant is therefore less free 
to violate the cease-fire – or at least cannot do so without incurring this additional cost. 
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intervention behavior of third-parties is best explained by that model.19 As the discussion below 
demonstrates, each of the models can find some referent in the empirical world.20 
 
The Pure Cost Model 
Since 1971, the Philippines has disputed Chinese sovereignty21 over several of the 
Spratly Islands (Huth and Allee 2002; Frazier and Dixon 2006). These competing claims have 
produced a series of militarized disputes between the two states (Jones et al 1996; Ghosn et al 
2004), one of which occurred in 1998. On 4 August 1998, the Philippines sighted Chinese and 
Vietnamese ships in the disputed area and ordered increased patrols of the Spratly Islands. 
During the course of their patrols in the months that followed, Philippine forces noted two 
peculiarities. First, they identified seven Chinese naval ships in the disputed area during a short 
period of time (28 October to 1 November). The Philippines interpreted this high concentration 
of Chinese vessels as a potential security threat to Philippine sovereignty. Second, the Philippine 
government documented the construction of unknown Chinese structures in the disputed area, 
which they subsequently protested. China claimed that the structures were rebuilt fishing 
shelters; the Philippines, however, was convinced that the structures functioned as a military 
barracks. Combined with the increased sighting of Chinese naval vessels, the Philippine 
                                                 
19 I focus on the 1993-2001 period because this project involves data gathering and the construction of narratives for 
this period. 
20 Certain models appear less frequently than others (for example, the random model rarely appears). This matches 
the findings presented in Chapter 4. Future research would need to determine the conditions under which the various 
models should develop through detailed case analysis. For example, the random model appears in the response of 
third-parties to the dispute between the United States and Afghanistan over the September 11 attacks (see below). 
This dispute, however, was extraordinarily unique. The international community immediately rallied behind the 
United States. For example, the United Nations Security Council unanimously expressed its willingness to help 
bring those responsible to justice and recognized the right of (presumably, the United States’) self-defense 
(Resolutions 1368 and 1373 of 2001; voting records available at http://un.org). The high level of worldwide support 
for the United States may have significantly altered third-party intervention behavior in this dispute, thereby making 
it random. Detailed case analysis would be needed, however, to confirm whether worldwide support affected 
intervention behavior within this dispute. 
21 The conflict over the Spratlys also involves Malaysia and Vietnam. Neither of the latter two states was involved in 
this particular dispute. 
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government therefore concluded that China intended to build a permanent presence in the 
disputed area, thereby increasing the Chinese de facto claim over the islands and undermining 
the Philippine claim.  
Believing that China posed an increasing threat to its sovereignty, the Philippines ordered 
additional patrols of the Spratly Islands on 10 November. These patrols persisted despite a 
bilateral attempt to resolve the matter (in March 1999; see below). Although such patrols often 
proved uneventful on a day-to-day basis, they periodically produced information or actions that 
heightened tensions between the disputants. For example, during the course of the patrols, the 
Philippine navy arrested Chinese fishermen (29 November 1998 and 7 June 1999), spotted 
Chinese frigates carrying missiles near one of the disputed islands (18 January 1999), collided 
with a Chinese fishing boat (23 May 1999), accused Chinese warships of threatening to attack 
the Philippines (May/June 1999, and chased, fired upon, and sank Chinese fishing boats 
operating in the South China Sea (19 July 1999). Such a description paints the picture of an 
aggressive China, but the Chinese also perceived and protested against Philippine aggression 
during the dispute. For example, China at one point thought the Philippines was constructing 
permanent military facilities on the disputed islands, which produced a Chinese protest (2 March 
1999). With persistent accusations and militarized encounters, the dispute continued. 
Efforts to address the dispute were minimal and generally failed. On 7 January 1999, the 
United States (US) offered to mediate, but China was vehemently opposed to such an 
intervention. The parties then tried bilateral negotiations on March 23, but these did not yield an 
agreement. The United States issued a plea for peaceful negotiations on 3 October. Finally, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) orchestrated the drafting of a “code of 
conduct” for the disputed area (good offices – a form of mediation) during their meeting from 
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24-28 November 1999. China rejected the ASEAN code, however. Once ASEAN’s efforts failed 
to secure the support of China, third-parties removed themselves from the dispute altogether and 
allowed the dispute to persist unaddressed. 
Minor military skirmishes and protests continued through early 2000. In January 2000, 
the Philippines expelled Chinese fisherman from the disputed area, prompting another Chinese 
protest. On 16 January, the Philippines protested to China over the continued presence of 
Chinese fisherman near Scarborough Shoal (part of the disputed area). Philippine officials then 
discovered four more Chinese fishing vessels in the area on 26 January and an additional two on 
29 February. Throughout the dispute, the Chinese repeatedly claimed unconditional sovereignty 
over the Spratlys and pushed for a bilateral solution, while the Philippine government advocated 
a multilateral solution and placed the issue on the agenda of numerous international 
organizations.22 The parties were unable to reconcile their opposing positions on both the issue 
and the appropriate method for handling it. 
 According to the preceding narrative, the involvement of third-parties remained very 
limited, primarily at China’s behest. The United States intervened verbally on two occasions – 
once to offer mediation services and later to urge the disputants to return to diplomatic solutions. 
After these verbal interventions, ASEAN then exercised good offices (a form of mediation) and 
facilitated the creation of a “code of conduct” for those operating in the disputed area. The 
pattern of these interventions adheres to the predictions of the pure cost model.23 From a cost 
perspective (see Table 1.1 for the cost continuum of strategies), third-parties tried low-cost, 
                                                 
22 The actions of the Philippines may have been part of a strategy to equalize its power imbalance with China. 
23 A similar pattern can be found within a dispute between Ecuador and Peru. Numerous third-parties (states, 
organizations, and a coalition) issued verbal pleas repeatedly (approximately 10 verbal interventions emerge in a 
row). After the barrage of verbal pleas, a coalition mediated a cease-fire agreement. Finally, once the mediation 
occurred, the coalition then established the Mission of Military Observers, Ecuador/Peru (MOMEP) – a peace 
operation. Third-parties therefore successively moved from relatively less costly to more costly strategies 
throughout the trajectory, exactly as the pure cost model predicts. 
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verbal interventions first. When those efforts failed to manage the dispute (that is, limit violence 
and encourage diplomatic solutions), third-parties escalated their involvement and used more 
costly strategies (in this case, mediation). Over the course of the dispute, we can therefore say 
that third-parties moved generally from relatively less costly strategies to more costly ones, 
exactly as the pure cost model expects (see Hypothesis24 1a).25 
The greatest factor inhibiting third-party intervention (and its success) in this case was 
China. The Chinese government did not want third-parties to mediate its dispute. This precluded 
the US from mediating initially, but it also undermined the success of ASEAN’s efforts. Based 
on this case, future research might investigate whether the cost model develops when a major 
state disputant does not want third-parties involved. To avoid a strong protest from the major 
state, third-parties may start off with low-cost strategies that allow disputants to preserve a 
maximum amount of autonomy. They may then escalate their involvement slowly as the dispute 
persists (and disputants become comfortable with their involvement). 
Of course, the cost model does not always appear within major states’ disputes. A 
conflict between Ecuador and Peru also produced this model (see footnote 23). While this latter 
dispute did not involve a major state, it shared two key characteristics with the Chinese-
Philippine conflict. First, both disputes involved territorial claims. Because territorial disputes 
are more salient than non-territorial ones (see Hensel 2001), disputants may not want third-
parties to unduly influence the final settlement (that is, the land over which they exercise 
sovereignty). They may therefore restrict third-party involvement until they “soften up” to the 
                                                 
24 Hypotheses are numbered throughout this chapter according to Table 4.21.   
25 The pure cost model predicts that intergovernmental organizations will begin their involvement in a trajectory 
with a more costly intervention strategy than that used initially by states (Hypothesis 1c). The China-Philippines 
dispute also supports that expectation. The United States first used a verbal intervention in the trajectory, while 
ASEAN first tried mediation. 
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idea of intervention. Such a restriction would allow third-parties to intervene initially using only 
low-cost strategies and to escalate their involvement slowly.  
Second, both disputes required a multilateral, regional intervention to move beyond 
verbal pleas. During the Chinese-Philippine dispute, a regional organization (ASEAN) escalated 
involvement beyond the verbal level. Similarly, in the Ecuador-Peru dispute, a regional coalition 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the US) pushed the trajectory beyond cyclical verbal interventions. 
It is therefore possible that the pure cost model appears when: (a) a trajectory involves territorial 
claims, (b) large (universal membership) organizations lack the will to address the conflict 
(perhaps because they are hamstrung by the veto of a major state disputant), and (c) a regional, 
multilateral organization possess the resources and desire to slowly escalate third-party 
involvement. Future research might consider these factors when investigating the conditions 
under which the pure cost model might appear. 
 
Limited Commitments Model 
In the mid-1990s, Uganda and Sudan each accused the other of supporting rebel groups 
operating within its borders. On 26 August 1994, Uganda deployed troops to its border with 
Sudan in an effort to prevent arms smuggling from Sudan to rebel groups inside Uganda. This 
deployment began a militarized dispute between the two states – one that was fueled not just by 
interstate actions, but by the violence of rebel groups as well.  
The disputants held bilateral talks to address the situation on 16 January 1995, but little 
changed as a result of these talks. Within two weeks of the bilateral meeting (on 5 February 
1995), Uganda accused Sudan of conducting air attacks within Ugandan territory. This violation 
of sovereignty prompted Sudanese and Ugandan representatives to meet subsequently with 
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Libyan mediators in Tripoli on 3-5 April 1995. The parties signed an agreement at this meeting 
that called for the end of military assistance to rebel groups in both countries.  
Although the Libyan mediation successfully produced an agreement, it did little to 
address a key, practical reality of the dispute – namely, that rebel groups often mounted attacks 
from one state against the other because they did not respect international boundaries. For 
example, Ugandan rebels attacked targets within Uganda from Sudanese territory on 20 April 
1995. As a result of this incident (which killed over 100 people), Uganda severed diplomatic 
relations with Sudan on 23 April 1995 and expelled Sudanese diplomats from their territory the 
next day.  
The severance of diplomatic relations captured the attention of regional conflict managers 
and encouraged intervention. The Malawian president, acting as chairman of the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), began to mediate the dispute on 11 May 
1995. COMESA then subsequently led talks over the next three months, during which the parties 
agreed to work toward the gradual resumption of diplomatic relations and signed an agreement to 
create a joint commission between Sudan, Uganda, and Malawi that would work toward the 
establishment of normal diplomatic relations. In the midst of COMESA’s efforts, Libya 
attempted to facilitate an easing of tensions through its good offices (a form of mediation). 
Beginning on 23 May 1995 (during COMESA’s intervention), Libya offered for the two parties 
to use its embassies in Sudan and Uganda as a go-between for diplomatic communication until 
normal relations were restored. 
Unfortunately, the successes of COMESA were short-lived. Within two weeks of the 
second COMESA agreement (that promised a path toward normal diplomatic relations), Uganda 
reported (on 17 August 1995) that Sudan was shelling its territory in an effort to attack Sudanese 
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rebels. This not only undermined the previous agreements, but further strained relations between 
the disputants as well. After a brief lull, Sudanese troops and Ugandan troops clashed near the 
border again on 29 October 1995.  
As the dispute persisted, so too did the efforts to manage it. Iran offered to mediate (a 
verbal intervention) in September 1995 and February 1996, but no talks moved forward under its 
auspices at those times. Libya continued exercising its good offices throughout this period, but 
began additional mediation efforts as well. Gaddafi claimed to reach an agreement with Uganda 
(through the additional mediation efforts) on 5 November. In this agreement, Uganda pledged 
again to work toward normal relations with Sudan. Libya then met separately with Sudan on 14 
November and continued meeting with the disputants throughout early 1996 (for example, Libya 
met with Sudan on 2-3 January 1996 and with Uganda on 16 June 1996). Finally, Russia 
appealed for a peaceful political solution on 14 December 1995. 
Despite the gains made by mediators, rebel actions (and the response to them) once again 
exacerbated the dispute. Uganda accused Sudan of shelling its territory in April 1996, and the 
two sides exchanged additional artillery fire in May 1996. Iran again offered to mediate the 
conflict, and this time, the disputants accepted. Iran therefore began mediating on 6 September 
1996. The parties met in Iran on 8-9 September and agreed at that time to create a mechanism for 
addressing the border conflict between them. Yet within two weeks, Uganda claimed that Sudan 
bombed its territory. Because Sudan denied the incident, Iran sent a delegation to investigate the 
claim (conciliation – a strategy within the mediation category). The parties met again with Iran in 
New York on 28 September and in Tehran from 1-5 October. These latter meetings, also 
attended by Malawi, produced a preliminary agreement. At a meeting with Iran and Malawi 
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shortly thereafter (on 3-4 November 1996), the parties signed a letter of agreement/draft peace 
agreement.  
Almost immediately, however, Uganda stipulated that it did not sign a peace agreement 
with Sudan. Within months, the violence mounted yet again. Sudan accused Uganda of massing 
troops at the border in January 1997. Iran immediately offered to mediate again, and the 
disputants accepted its offer. After additional bombing throughout February-March 1997, Iran 
and Malawi met with the parties on 13-14 March. These meetings failed to dampen the conflict, 
however, and Sudan mobilized its military forces on 15 March. Libya then tried again to mediate 
on 3-5 April and on 13 April. Finally, the Kenyan president, Daniel Arap Moi, acting as head of 
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), facilitated negotiations between the 
parties on 10 May. As a result of this final meeting, the disputing states agreed to stop hurling 
accusations at one another, and a summit was planned for later that month to discuss the conflict 
on a regional basis. The summit was eventually cancelled, however, as the leaders prepared for a 
meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). This left the dispute unresolved, and by 
the following fall (September 1998), violence broke out again (under a separate militarized 
dispute). 
Throughout the dispute, numerous third-parties displayed a willingness to intervene 
actively to help the disputants restore diplomatic relations and reduce the violence between them. 
Yet this involvement had clear limits. Third-parties fluctuated between verbal pleas (for 
example, those made by Russia and Iran) and mediation strategies (good offices, mediation, and 
conciliation), but at no point were they willing to employ strategies more costly than mediation.26 
                                                 
26 Detailed case analysis would need to investigate the motives of intervening third-parties to understand why they 
limited their involvement in this conflict. 
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This pattern conforms most clearly to the expectations of the limited commitments model. 27  
Third-parties demonstrated that they were unwilling to incur intervention costs greater than those 
associated with mediation (Hypothesis 1f). This unwillingness applied to both state actors and 
intergovernmental organizations (Hypothesis 1g).  
Furthermore, the pattern runs contrary to the predictions of the other models. Once third-
parties begin mediating, the pure cost model does not predict a return to less costly (verbal) 
strategies. Yet this is precisely what Russia did after Libyan mediation in 1996. The intervention 
behavior in this dispute also defies the logic of the learning model. If a strategy fails, the learning 
model expects third-parties to avoid its use in the next intervention. Yet when Iranian mediation 
failed in March 1997, first Libya and then IGAD tried to mediate shortly thereafter. Finally, 
intervention behavior does not appear to be entirely random either. Rather, it seems that third-
parties are turning regularly to verbal pleas and mediation, while eschewing strategies that are 
more costly (that is, there is never the random usage of a more costly strategy during the 
trajectory). Thus, the limited commitments model seems to best explain the intervention behavior 
found within this dispute. 
Why did third-parties limit their involvement in this dispute? Although understanding the 
motives behind third-parties’ decisions to limit their involvement requires more detailed case 
analysis, the limitation in this dispute may stem from the large intrastate component of the 
conflict. A dispute certainly existed between Uganda and Sudan, but it was fueled on the sub-
state level – by rebel groups seeking to overthrow the government of both states. These rebel 
groups do not respect international norms or agreements in the same way that states do (for 
                                                 
27 Similar patterns emerge in disputes between Eritrea and Yemen (1995-1996), Russia and Georgia (1996), Turkey 
and Syria (1998), Guyana and Suriname (2000), and Guinea and Liberia (2000-2001). 
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example, rebels regularly violate international boundaries without punishment in the 
international community).  
Third-parties that intervene in disputes such as this face a unique challenge: the parties 
responsible for the continued conflict may not care about the international community’s response 
or be present at the negotiating table (either because nobody considered inviting them or, more 
likely, because the disputants refuse to negotiate with them). This makes it possible for the sub-
state actors to spoil any progress the third-parties achieve. Because of this, third-parties might 
reasonably restrict their involvement in disputes that contain a heavy intrastate component (for 
example, Sudan-Uganda, Syria-Turkey, Guinea-Liberia, Russia-Georgia). The limited 
commitments model may therefore appear when the conflict: (a) is an internationalized civil war, 
(b) contains a significant sub-state actor capable of spoiling agreements (for example, a 
significant rebel group), or (c) includes a disputing state that was once governed by the other 
disputing state (for example, Russia-Georgia). Future research might consider these factors when 
investigating the conditions under which the limited commitments model develops. 
 
Learning Model 
As occurred during the Uganda-Sudan dispute (above), Eritrea and Sudan each accused 
the other of supporting rebel groups that sought the destruction of their respective states (Frazier 
and Dixon 2006). In December 1994, Eritrea asserted that Sudan was supporting anti-Eritrean 
rebels by establishing military training camps for the rebels near the Eritrean border. Sudan 
similarly claimed that Eritrea was providing military assistance to the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army (SPLA) rebels within Sudan.28 Because of these two sets of accusations, Eritrea broke off 
diplomatic relations with Sudan on 5 December 1994. The dispute then became militarized in 
                                                 
28 Eritrea denied this charge. 
226 
 
July 1996. On 21 July, Sudanese and Eritrean forces clashed near their border, killing two 
Sudanese soldiers in the process. In the months that followed, Sudan fortified its border with 
Eritrea (October 1996; as the Ethiopian-Eritrean dispute intensified) and placed its forces on alert 
in one of the border provinces (December 1996).  
The militarized dispute persisted for many years. As it continued, third-parties tried to 
restore diplomatic relations between the neighboring states.29 Qatar mediated first from 9-10 
November 1998. As a result of their efforts, the disputants signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding in which they agreed to resolve the dispute peacefully through additional, future 
talks. The success of Qatar’s efforts was short-lived, however, as Sudan claimed shortly 
thereafter that Eritrea was amassing troops along its border and placed its forces on alert. 
Gaddafi (Libya) then mediated between the presidents of Eritrea and Sudan in Tripoli on 16-17 
April 1999. Libya secured an agreement for further talks at this meeting. Finally, the presidents 
of Eritrea and Sudan held negotiations in Doha, Qatar on 2-3 May 1999. This Qatari mediation 
resulted in the signing of a reconciliation accord. Eritrea and Sudan subsequently resumed 
diplomatic relations on 4 January 2000.  
 The pattern of interventions contained within this dispute most closely matches the 
predictions of the learning model. From the outset, third-parties found that mediation effectively 
produced short-term success. For example, the first Qatari mediation produced an agreement that 
recommitted the disputants to diplomatic conflict management. Although this agreement failed in 
the long-term, it succeeded in its short-term goal of getting the parties to the table and obtaining 
a pledge to adhere to peaceful conflict management mechanisms. Given Qatar’s initial success, 
Libya turned to mediation when they intervened next in the trajectory. The Libyan mediation 
                                                 
29 In addition to the mediators that follow, Eritrea requested additional mediation efforts by Yemen. There is no 
evidence that Yemen acted upon this request. 
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once again produced a recommitment to negotiations (rather than violence). Qatar then used 
mediation shortly after Libya’s intervention to facilitate the signing of a reconciliation 
agreement. Thus, third-parties repeatedly employed strategies that recently proved successful, in 
accordance with the expectations of the learning model (Hypothesis 2a). 
 As noted earlier, the trajectory shape predicted by the learning model can look similar to 
the shapes predicted by other models. Distinguishing between the learning model and its 
alternatives can therefore be challenging, but it depends primarily on the repeated use of 
previously successful strategies and the avoidance of previously unsuccessful strategies. For 
example, the pure cost model and limited commitments model can account for the general shape 
of the intervention pattern within the Eritrea-Sudanese dispute. Third-parties did not use less 
costly strategies over the course of the dispute (the converse of Hypothesis 1a; pure cost model 
prediction), nor did they foray beyond mediation into more costly strategies (Hypothesis 1f; 
limited commitments model). Similarly, it is plausible that random behavior might occasionally 
produce three mediations in a row30 (thereby allowing the random model to explain this 
trajectory’s shape). Yet none of the alternative models can account for both the trajectory’s shape 
and the finding that third-parties always re-used a strategy that was previously successful in the 
trajectory. Because the learning model can account for both factors, it explains this trajectory 
better than the alternative explanations. 
This, however, does not address the question of when the learning model might occur. 
The Eritrea-Sudan and Uganda-Sudan disputes both share a key characteristic: the involvement 
of rebel groups that sought to overthrow the disputing states. They also contain a common 
                                                 
30 Within a trajectory, the probability of an initial mediation followed by two additional mediations is 0.0599 (or 
0.500*0.346*0.346; see Tables 4.5 and 5.1). 
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disputant (Sudan). Therefore, it seems reasonable to ask why third-parties learned in the Eritrea-
Sudan dispute but not the Uganda-Sudan one.  
Although a definitive answer to such a question requires additional casework, two key 
features separate these disputes. First, the Eritrea-Sudan case only involved third-party states. 
Unlike in the Uganda-Sudan dispute, organizations remained out of the Eritrea-Sudan conflict. 
Perhaps learning occurs poorly within coalitions and organizations. This seems plausible, as 
lessons may not be thoroughly felt by all state members (within a multilateral body) that 
collectively authorize multilateral action. State leaders may instead learn lessons only from 
events that affect them directly (Jervis 1978). If this is true, learning occurs best among third-
party states.31 
Second, all of the states that intervened within the Eritrea-Sudanese dispute came from 
the same region (the Middle East and North Africa; see Buzan and Waever 2003 for regional 
definitions). In contrast, the Uganda-Sudan dispute experienced intervention efforts by third-
parties from multiple regions (for example, Russia, Malawi, and Iran, among others). A similar 
regional context may facilitate learning across third-parties. When third-parties belong to the 
same region, they may view information through a similar cultural lens, understand the 
complexity of regional relationships, and subscribe to a similar interpretation of both security 
issues and how to address them (Buzan and Waever 2003). Each of these helps third-parties 
convey information to one another, particularly about regional security issues.  
Based on these premises, it therefore seems likely that the learning model occurs within 
disputes that: (a) contain a minimal number of multilateral interventions, and (b) elicit 
interventions from states within the same region. Future research might consider these factors 
                                                 
31 I note, however, that Chapter 4 did not find evidence of state actors learning in the manner proposed by the 
learning model. 
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when investigating the conditions under which the learning model might occur. I return to 
potential variations on this model in the next chapter. 
 
Random Model 
On 11 September 2001, two terrorist attacks occurred in the United States – one in New 
York and another in Washington, DC. Osama bin Laden (as the head of al-Qaeda) took 
responsibility for these attacks, and because he was allegedly in Afghanistan, a militarized 
dispute began between Afghanistan (the Taliban government) on the one hand and the United 
States (which wanted retribution for the attacks) and its allies on the other. In the days 
immediately after the attacks, the US proposed military attacks against the Taliban government 
(Afghan state) if the Taliban did not turn bin Laden over to them. On 15 September, the US, 
Britain, and France deployed naval forces to the Indian Ocean – both as a show of force and to 
prepare for any potential military action.  
In the first week after the 9/11 attacks, a stalemate developed between the US, which 
demanded bin Laden, and Afghanistan, which sought to preserve its government and protect one 
of its key constituents (Bueno de Mesquita 2010). The Taliban government responded to the 
deployment of western military forces by publicly protesting the threat of a military attack (on 
the grounds that such an action violated its sovereignty) and threatening its neighbors that 
providing any assistance to the US was essentially an act of war against Afghanistan. On 17 
September, US President George W. Bush reissued its demand that Afghanistan surrender bin 
Laden or face military strikes. In response to this second threat, Afghanistan placed its forces on 
alert and constructed anti-aircraft units around Kandahar.  
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As the stalemate solidified, Afghanistan’s neighbors both prepared for a US-led attack 
and tried to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Tajikistan (Afghanistan’s neighbor to 
the north), for example, placed its forces on alert immediately after the western deployment. 
Russia placed its forces in Tajikistan on alert shortly thereafter. Pakistan (Afghanistan’s southern 
neighbor) closed its border with Afghanistan. It also tried to mediate the dispute expeditiously. 
By 17-18 September, Afghan-Pakistani talks produced a list of conditions under which 
Afghanistan agreed to extradite bin Laden.  
President Bush would not agree to these conditions, however, arguing that bin Laden 
must be expedited unconditionally in order to be held responsible for the terrorist attacks upon 
the US. Without further movement from Afghanistan, the US moved military planes within 
striking distance of Afghanistan and threatened further military build-ups. Meanwhile, the 
international community tried to derail the impending attack and handle its potential 
consequences. Iran established camps for refugees that fled from Afghanistan to Iran, the 
Turkmen president offered to mediate (24 September), and the United Arab Emirates defense 
minister urged negotiations rather than violence (26 September). Despite these efforts, the 
Taliban foreign minister finally ruled out the extradition of bin Laden on 29 September 2001.32  
The US-led invasion of Afghanistan proceeded in two phases. First, approximately one 
week after the Taliban refused to consider bin Laden’s extradition (on 7 October), the US began 
its air campaign against Afghanistan and signed an agreement to use Uzbek territory, airfields 
and airspace. Afghanistan threatened the US and Uzbekistan not to launch a ground operation 
from Uzbekistan and deployed troops to the Afghan-Uzbek border (in the north) to preclude such 
an attack. As the air campaign unfolded, Japan sent humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees in Iran 
                                                 
32 On 29 September, a 10-member delegation of religious scholars from Pakistan visited Afghan officials to discuss 
various proposals for resolving the Afghan-US crisis. Because this intervention is not performed by a state, 
coalition, or intergovernmental organization, I do not currently include it within the trajectory analysis. 
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on 9 October. Second, after the aerial assault had continued for two weeks (on 19 October), the 
US started ground operations against Afghanistan. Japan again sent humanitarian aid – this time 
to Afghan refugees in Tajikistan (20 October).33  
On 14 November, the Taliban withdrew from Kabul and opposition forces captured the 
Afghan capital. This formally terminated the US dispute with the Afghan government, and the 
conflict converted to an intrastate nation-building operation. Throughout the dispute, various 
members of the US-led international coalition against those responsible for the 9/11 attacks 
entered and exited the dispute, as troops were deployed, attacked, or placed on alert. These 
participants included: Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Tajikistan, Canada, 
France, Turkey, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Australia, in addition to those already mentioned.  
 In retrospect, third-parties intervened regularly in the US-Afghan dispute. Yet these 
interventions follow no clear pattern. The interventions began with a Pakistani mediation, after 
which Iran offered humanitarian assistance to refugees (an administrative intervention – a more 
costly strategy than mediation). As the possibility of military action climbed, third parties turned 
to the least costly strategy at their disposal: verbal interventions. The UAE and Turkmenistan 
offered assistance and plead for negotiations. Finally, as the verbal pleas failed to halt the threats 
and violence, Japan sent humanitarian aid to Iran and Tajikistan (administrative interventions). 
Both of these latter interventions involved more costly strategies than either verbal interventions 
or mediation.34 
 Lacking a clear pattern, the interventions within this dispute lend support to the random 
model (Hypothesis 3). Further support derives from the inability of the other models to explain 
                                                 
33 Doctors Without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontieres) sent humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees via Turkmenistan 
on 13 November. Because this intervention is not performed by a state, coalition, or intergovernmental organization, 
I do not currently include it within the trajectory analysis. 
34 There is also no evidence that these efforts were coordinated. 
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them. For example, the pure cost model predicts that third-parties escalate their intervention over 
the course of a trajectory, from relatively less costly strategies to more costly ones. This 
expectation, however, does not describe third-party behavior within the US-Afghan dispute. 
Third-parties cycled regularly between relatively more costly strategies (for example, 
administrative interventions) and less costly strategies (for example, verbal pleas). No consistent 
escalation occurred. Similarly, the limited commitments model fails to fully account for third-
party behavior in this dispute. It predicts that third-parties do not regularly turn to intervention 
strategies that are more costly than mediation. Yet of the six interventions in this dispute, three of 
them (or 50%) involved strategies whose costs exceed mediation’s (that is, the administrative 
strategies). Such behavior does not display sensitivity to a critical threshold (at the mediation 
category), as the limited commitments model predicts. Finally, the learning model cannot 
account for this dispute’s intervention patterns either. It predicts that third-parties should repeat 
successful strategies in successive interventions. Yet when Pakistani good offices caused the 
Taliban to waiver on their initial position and offer conditions under which bin Laden might be 
extradited, the next third-party did not try mediation again. It therefore appears that third-parties 
did not learn in this dispute as the learning model might expect. Absent a clear pattern that 
describes the interventions within this dispute, it therefore appears that third-parties behaved 
randomly.35  
 The random model rarely appears empirically, so why did it develop in this case? Most 
likely, it results from the consensus within the international community about what actions the 
US could take in retaliation for the terrorist attacks. In the weeks after September 11 (but before 
the US invasion), the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted two resolutions that 
                                                 
35 Most trajectories do not contain random behavior, as evidenced by the empirical results presented in the previous 
chapter. 
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condemned the attacks, pledged support to bring those responsible to justice, and recognized the 
right of individual and collective self-defense.36 Although each of these implies international 
support for the US (and the United Nations regularly condemns violence), the latter point 
suggests that the international community tacitly (and unanimously) agreed to a US military 
response against bin Laden and, if necessary, Afghanistan.37  
Given such a clear consensus, it is not surprising that third-party behavior followed a 
random pattern. The international norm is for peaceful dispute resolution (for example, see the 
UN Charter).38 When the international community decides to suspend that norm, third-parties 
can no longer develop expectations or make intervention decisions based upon it. For example, 
third-parties cannot ascertain in such cases whether the community expects them to intervene 
diplomatically or non-diplomatically (that is, coercively). The absence of a stable norm creates a 
series of interventions that do not seemingly go together. It therefore appears that the random 
model may apply best to disputes in which the international community decides to permit 
(explicitly or implicitly) violent conflict management mechanisms.  
 
Conclusion 
At the outset of this chapter, I asked three broad questions that were designed to connect 
the concept of trajectories with the empirical world. First, how can trajectories inform those who 
practice conflict management within international disputes? Second, when a militarized dispute 
occurs between states, what can potential third-parties expect from those that might get involved 
in the management of that dispute? Finally, can the theoretical models of trajectories describe 
                                                 
36 See United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 of 2001. These resolutions and the voting record 
are available at: http://un.org. 
37 Many major states assisted in the US military response, particularly members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. 
38 The United Nations Charter is available online at: http://un.org. 
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empirical cases of conflict management within individual disputes? This chapter demonstrates 
that the concept of trajectories has something meaningful to say in response to each. 
Simulations address the first two questions directly, and they yield a number of concrete 
predictions to those making intervention decisions. These predictions offer policy-makers insight 
into how other third-parties are expected to intervene within a dispute, as well as information 
with which to make more informed intervention decisions. For example, one key finding of the 
simulations notes that the likelihood of a future mediation falls over the course of a trajectory 
when the initial intervention in that trajectory involved mediation. From such a finding, third-
parties understand what to expect from other potential third-parties at each point in a trajectory 
as well as how third-party behavior will likely evolve during a trajectory. Armed with these 
insights, they can then make more informed decisions. For example, the mediation finding above 
dispels the myth that interested third-parties (that is, those that want the dispute managed 
diplomatically) can afford to wait for someone else to intervene. In the end, these simulations do 
not change the reality that third-parties have limited resources with which to intervene. They do, 
however, offer third-parties more information that may permit them to deploy those resources 
more efficiently in the pursuit of peace. 
I address the final question through brief empirical illustrations of the theoretical models. 
Drawing off of the narratives constructed for this project, I demonstrate that each of the 
theoretical models listed earlier finds at least one empirical referent during the period 1993-2001. 
Thus, while the last chapter asserts that the limited commitments model and pure cost model best 
explain third-party intervention behavior overall, this chapter concludes that the remaining 
models (the learning and random models) have at least some empirical validity. The learning and 
random models may only explain a small percentage of trajectories, but their ability to explain 
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even this small set of cases cautions against discarding them entirely. Future research will need 
to develop the conditions under which these various models appear. 
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Tables 
 
Table 5.1: Initial Intervention – Distribution over Strategies 
 
 All Initiation 
Interventions 
(Trajectory and 
Non-Trajectory) 
Verbal 97 
(41.45%) 
Mediation 117 
(50.00%) 
Legal 8 
(3.42%) 
Administrative 4 
(1.71%) 
Peace Operations 8 
(3.42%) 
  
Total 234 
 
 
Table 5.2: Simulated Trajectory Path (Starting Point – Distribution over Strategies) 
 
 Likelihood of Using Each Strategy 
Intervention 
Number 
 
Verbal 
 
Mediation 
 
Legal 
 
Administrative 
Peace 
Operations 
1 0.4145 0.5000 0.0342 0.0171 0.0342 
2 0.6190 0.2851 0.0089 0.0292 0.0577 
3 0.6648 0.2556 0.0075 0.0246 0.0475 
4 0.6785 0.2479 0.0070 0.0231 0.0435 
5 0.6827 0.2455 0.0069 0.0226 0.0423 
6 0.6840 0.2448 0.0069 0.0225 0.0419 
7 0.6844 0.2446 0.0068 0.0224 0.0417 
8 0.6845 0.2445 0.0068 0.0224 0.0417 
9 0.6846 0.2445 0.0068 0.0224 0.0417 
10 0.6846 0.2445 0.0068 0.0224 0.0417 
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Table 5.3: Simulated Trajectory Path (Starting Point – Verbal Plea) 
 
 Likelihood of Using Each Strategy 
Intervention 
Number 
 
Verbal 
 
Mediation 
 
Legal 
 
Administrative 
Peace 
Operations 
1 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
2 0.7730 0.1930 0.0040 0.0130 0.0170 
3 0.7118 0.2292 0.0060 0.0195 0.0336 
4 0.6930 0.2397 0.0066 0.0215 0.0391 
5 0.6872 0.2430 0.0068 0.0221 0.0409 
6 0.6854 0.2440 0.0068 0.0223 0.0414 
7 0.6849 0.2443 0.0068 0.0224 0.0416 
8 0.6847 0.2444 0.0068 0.0224 0.0417 
9 0.6846 0.2444 0.0068 0.0224 0.0417 
10 0.6846 0.2445 0.0068 0.0224 0.0417 
 
 
 
Table 5.4: Simulated Trajectory Path (Starting Point – Mediation) 
 
 Likelihood of Using Each Strategy 
Intervention 
Number 
 
Verbal 
 
Mediation 
 
Legal 
 
Administrative 
Peace 
Operations 
1 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
2 0.5230 0.3460 0.0120 0.0390 0.0800 
3 0.6360 0.2719 0.0084 0.0277 0.0560 
4 0.6695 0.2529 0.0073 0.0241 0.0462 
5 0.6799 0.2471 0.0070 0.0229 0.0431 
6 0.6831 0.2453 0.0069 0.0226 0.0421 
7 0.6841 0.2447 0.0069 0.0225 0.0418 
8 0.6845 0.2445 0.0068 0.0224 0.0417 
9 0.6846 0.2445 0.0068 0.0224 0.0147 
10 0.6846 0.2445 0.0068 0.0224 0.0417 
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Chapter 6 
 
Implications and Conclusion 
 
 
“If conflicts have gone unresolved, it is not because techniques for 
peaceful settlement were unknown or inadequate.”  
– Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace 
 
 
What have we learned about third-party intervention behavior as a result of this study, 
and what are the implications of these findings for conflict management research and for those 
making policy decisions? Four broad conclusions follow from a synthesis of the material 
discussed earlier. First (and most importantly), third-party intervention behavior is not random 
over the course of a dispute. Instead, I find that there is a “method to the madness.” When third-
parties select intervention strategies (within a trajectory), they pay attention to two things: the 
efforts of the third-party that previously intervened in the dispute and the relative costs of 
intervention strategies available to them (the pure cost model).1 In the vast majority of 
interventions, third-parties overwhelmingly adopt low-cost strategies, rather than the relatively 
more costly alternatives. Furthermore, when they desire a relatively more costly strategy 
(especially for an initial intervention), third-party states frequently turn to coalitions and 
intergovernmental organizations. This multilateral action allows them to disperse the 
intervention costs over a number of state actors, thereby reducing the costs borne by any one 
state. Simply put, third-parties care greatly about intervention costs. 
Yet costs are not the only factor third-parties consider when making intervention 
decisions. If they were, we would expect to see low-cost verbal pleas used almost exclusively 
                                                 
1 The results of this study suggest that third-parties do not pay attention to the success or failure of previous 
interventions (the learning model). I discuss potential variants of the learning model below. Testing the predictions 
of those variants would allow more definite conclusions regarding the validity of a behavioral learning model. 
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(when intervention occurs), a consistent adoption of relatively less costly strategies (as opposed 
to the higher cost alternatives), or an escalation of third-party involvement that proceeds from 
low-cost to high-cost strategies over the course of a trajectory. I find none of these things. 
Instead, I note that third-parties rely on mediation frequently – in some cases, as often as they 
issue verbal pleas – and are significantly less likely to use any strategies more costly than 
mediation. A precipice (or threshold) emerges between the frequent use of verbal and mediation 
strategies on the one hand and the much rarer use of legal, administrative, and peace operations 
strategies on the other.  
Why does this precipice occur? Two potential explanations exist that offer insight into 
the phenomenon. The first focuses upon the third-party, whose behavior may result from two 
sources – a lack of opportunity or willingness (Most and Starr 1989). On the one hand, it is 
possible that third-parties do not possess the resources to intervene in disputes with more costly 
strategies either because their resources are tied up in separate interventions (that is, third-parties 
have reached their carrying capacity) or because they simply have no resources with which to 
intervene. In other words, perhaps third-parties do not have the opportunity to intervene with the 
relatively more costly strategies. While certainly a possible explanation, it seems unlikely that 
third-parties frequently want to intervene, but lack the resources to do so. Were this true, we 
might expect verbal pleas (which cost little substantively) to reference a lack of intervention 
resources or encourage the involvement of another third-party with excess resources (for 
example, the United States). In other words, if third-parties care to have the conflict managed 
more actively by someone, they should be intervening with the resources they have while 
simultaneously campaigning for a more costly strategy – perhaps even encouraging potential 
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third-parties with resources to get involved. I do not, however, observe this behavior within 
verbal pleas.  
On the other hand, third-parties may have the resources with which to intervene but may 
not want to do so. This argument is admittedly more pessimistic than the previous one, but it 
makes sense empirically. Potential third-parties are aware of the full menu of conflict 
management strategies, but many of those strategies remain underutilized nonetheless (see 
Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1995; see also Claude 1984). Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the failure of a key constituency to support intervention regularly undercuts third-party action. 
This holds for state actors, as well as coalitions and organizations. For example, during the 
Rwandan genocide, neither individual members of the United Nations (Albright 2003) nor the 
organization itself (Barnett and Finnemore 2004) desired or advocated on behalf of greater third-
party involvement. Although an intrastate conflict setting, Rwanda demonstrates that 
constituencies that do not support intervention efforts can successfully block third-party action.  
Of course, responsibility for inaction does not lay entirely with third-parties. A second 
possible explanation for the precipice therefore involves the disputants’ desires. Most of the 
strategies contained in the full menu (see Table 1.1) require the consent (either active or passive) 
of disputants in order to function well or occur at all.  For example, a third-party can conduct a 
fact-finding mission (a form of mediation) without the disputants’ consent, but the intervention 
proceeds more easily when the disputants cooperate. Other forms of mediation (in which the 
third-party facilitates negotiations between the disputants), arbitration, adjudication, 
administrative strategies (for example, overseeing elections), and peace operations cannot occur 
without the disputants’ permission.2 It is therefore possible that the disputants, not the third-
                                                 
2 Adjudication does not demand the disputants’ consent in each case, but it does require states to grant the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction (in some capacity) before the ICJ can hear a case. States can also 
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parties, create the precipice.3 Perhaps the disputants withhold permission for third-parties to use 
strategies that are more costly than mediation.4 
Whether third-party or disputant behavior produces the observed precipice, it exists in the 
same place along the cost continuum of strategies. Third-parties regularly rely upon mediation 
and verbal strategies, but limit their use of strategies that are more costly than mediation. I argue 
earlier that mediation serves as the threshold because it offers the third-party a way to balance its 
desire to intervene actively (that is, to get directly involved in the management of a dispute, as 
opposed to issuing verbal pleas) with their preference to reduce intervention costs. It also 
generates fewer resource and audience costs for the third-party. 
In addition to the advantages afforded to third-parties, disputants benefit from mediation 
as well. As third-parties move from relatively less costly to more costly strategies, disputants 
lose an increasing amount of control over the conflict management process. For example, in 
mediation, disputants retain final veto authority over any agreement. Although the mediator can 
assist the disputants with crafting an agreement and pressure them to sign it, the disputants must 
ultimately accept it. In contrast, arbitration usually requires disputants to agree in advance that 
they will accept the arbiter’s decision, even if they do not like that subsequent decision. 
Similarly, adjudication can produce rulings that disputants do not support (and can even force 
disputants to make restitution, as the International Court of Justice did with Uganda regarding its 
involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s civil war). Finally, administrative tasks 
                                                                                                                                                             
attach conditions to their acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction (for example, that it is valid for only a certain period 
of time). For more information, see the Statutes of the ICJ, which are available online at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0.  
3 Disputants may especially restrict the use of legal strategies, since arbitration and adjudication generally require 
them to give up control over both the conflict management process and outcome (that is, ruling). See Gent and 
Shannon (2011). 
4 A third explanation might note that relatively more costly strategies are not amenable to repeated use within a 
trajectory. Yet this explanation is not satisfying, for the precipice exists consistently across every intervention within 
the trajectory. In other words, it is not the case that each trajectory has one more costly intervention and cannot 
sustain another. Third-parties always choose to rely significantly less on the more costly strategies. 
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(for example, temporary administration of a territory, election monitoring, repatriation of 
refugees) and peace operations require disputants to accept a civilian or military mission that 
inhibits their policy autonomy. With a third-party overseeing elections, providing aid to civilians, 
or overseeing a cease-fire, disputants cannot pursue any policy they choose, at least not without 
flagging the attention of and (possibly a) response by the third-party (see Claude 1984).  
As third-parties adopt more costly intervention strategies, they therefore become more 
involved in the dispute itself, thereby limiting the policy options available to disputants. It stands 
to reason, then, that disputants can maximize their policy alternatives (and autonomy) by 
restricting the role of third-parties. Yet third-parties will often want to manage disputes actively 
(for the reasons outlined in Chapter 2), which suggests that disputants need to allow more than 
mere verbal pleas. Disputants can therefore balance the third-party’s desire for active conflict 
management and their preference for a limited third-party role by consenting to intervention 
strategies that are no more costly than mediation. This allows third-parties a larger, more direct 
role in the management of the dispute, but preserves the greatest number of policy options and 
amount of autonomy possible for the disputants.  
More than likely, a combination of third-party (un)willingness and disputant consent 
work together to generate this result, for both factors are required for an intervention to occur. 
Whatever the explanation for the precipice, it consistently appears throughout the analyses 
contained in this study and therefore lends strong support to the limited commitments model.5 
Note, however, that finding empirical support for the limited commitments model is not simply a 
statement that third-parties do not like to send troops abroad. Such a statement is consistent with 
the conclusions of this study, but the findings I present go beyond this statement. In particular, I 
                                                 
5 Future research might consider investigating whether third-parties or disputants play a larger role in causing this 
precipice.  
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identify a precise threshold (both theoretically and empirically) that third-parties are generally 
unwilling to cross. When conflict management strategies are arranged along a cost continuum, 
the analysis suggests that third-parties are reluctant to employ strategies that are more costly than 
mediation. This certainly includes the deployment of military forces under a peace operation, but 
third-parties avoid other strategies as well. For example, third-parties generally do not employ 
legal or administrative strategies either, even though neither one demands the deployment of 
troops.  
The identification of a precise threshold is novel, and it offers a number of policy 
implications. First, disputants that want more active involvement from third-parties need to seek 
it. Similarly, potential third-parties that would like a more active intervention must undertake 
one. These seem like rather obvious statements, but they are necessary to articulate nonetheless. 
Absent such findings, potential third-parties might believe that they can afford to wait for 
someone else to conduct an intervention on their behalf (that is, free ride). After all, peace is a 
public good, and the cheapest intervention is the one for which an actor pays nothing. The results 
of this study, however, strongly undercut such free-riding arguments. Third-parties may believe 
that they can wait for another actor to intervene, but this is highly unlikely to occur. Disputants 
might similarly expect third-parties to come to their aid with costly interventions (especially if 
they are weaker than their opponent), but such interventions are not the norm. As this analysis 
shows, third-parties are highly unlikely to do anything more than mediate.  
Although this is bad news for those that want third-parties to be more involved, it is good 
news for disputants that seek to constrain third-party interventions. Richmond (1998), for 
example, proposes that states can use mediation sessions as a reprieve from battle and to prepare 
for renewed military hostilities. If it is true that third-parties will do little more than mediate, then 
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the implication is that disputants can safely use mediation for such “devious objectives.” In fact, 
disputants may even authorize the involvement of “weak” mediators (that is, those that lack 
leverage over the disputants) to accomplish this goal (Beardsley 2009). As the disputants prepare 
for further hostilities, they can then rest assured not only that the mediator will be unable to 
compel them to accept an agreement, but also that third-party involvement will likely not 
escalate. 
Second, once third-parties begin using strategies that are more costly than mediation, they 
are more likely to continue doing so. In practical terms, this implies that the main obstacle to 
costly interventions involves getting any third-party to use legal, administrative, or peace 
operations strategies. Once one intervention exceeds that threshold, others are more likely to 
follow. Disputants that want greater third-party intervention might therefore strategically focus 
upon the potential third-parties that they believe are most likely to cross the threshold. Even if 
the first third-party to cross that threshold lacks the resources for a long-term commitment or is 
not the disputant’s first preference for an intervening third-party, the disputant may have an 
easier time securing a commitment for intervention from a more desirous third-party once the 
threshold has been breached. Similarly, third-parties that have a vested interest in a dispute’s 
management but prefer to free-ride on another’s intervention should watch this threshold closely. 
If it is crossed, the chances increase that another third-party will intervene with a relatively costly 
strategy (that is, using strategies more costly than mediation if they intervene), and this might 
allow them to remain on the sidelines. 
In addition to the policy implications, this finding raises a theoretical issue as well. 
Although it is understandable that third-parties may not want to deploy large civilian or military 
missions (for administrative and peace operations interventions respectively), the failure to use 
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legal strategies causes some concern. I consistently find that legal strategies are used less 
frequently than any other strategy. In practical terms, this means that third-parties deploy peace 
operations more often than they turn to arbitration or adjudication. Such a finding echoes the 
work of others. For example, Bercovitch and Jackson (2009) note that arbitration is rare, 
especially within the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). Furthermore, they find that the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) averages two decisions a year and remained out of every 
serious conflict during the twentieth century (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009:56).6  
Given the low marginal cost of adding an additional case to a docket, one would expect 
this strategy to be used much more often than it is.7 More than likely, the infrequent resort to 
legal strategies rests in the hands of disputants, who do not want to lose control over the 
resolution of their dispute by permitting arbitration or adjudication (Gent and Shannon 2011; see 
also Claude 1984). Regardless of which actor(s) causes the trend, it is clear that international 
legal bodies (for example, the PCA or ICJ) have been established to handle international 
disputes, that they are not at their carrying capacity, and therefore, that third-parties might make 
better use of them. This will undoubtedly require third-parties to pressure disputants to work 
through legal channels, but given the success of legal strategies at addressing interstate territorial 
disputes (for example, that between Honduras and El Salvador), these channels hold great 
promise for helping manage international disputes over numerous issue areas. 
A second conclusion drawn from the synthesis of this study’s results involves the (lack of 
a) connection between third-party characteristics and intervention decisions. Simply put, third-
                                                 
6 ICJ hearings also proceed very slowly, which partially explains the low decision rate. 
7 Not all disputes will involve legal issues. Yet this does not mean that third-parties cannot make use of legal 
strategies. For example, arbitration need not involve legal issues (although it often does). As Isenhart and Spangle 
(2000) note, arbitration is an informal process that does not (need to) follow standard rules for introducing evidence 
or issuing rulings. Furthermore, the disputants can choose the arbitrator if they like. It therefore differs substantially 
from adjudication, which is often more formal, follows strict legal procedures, documents the rationale for rulings 
thoroughly, and does not permit disputants to select the judge(s) that will hear the case. 
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party characteristics do not seem to strongly affect the selection of intervention strategies within 
trajectories (given that the decision to intervene has already been made). In other words, once a 
trajectory is underway, intervening third-party IGOs select strategies in a manner similar to 
coalitions and states. Furthermore, major states intervene similarly to minor states, allies like 
non-allies, and neighbors like non-neighbors.8 Although there are certainly minor variations in 
behavior that depend upon third-party characteristics, these differences are not (statistically) 
significant. This is an important revelation, for much of the existing conflict management 
research tends to focus upon third-party characteristics. It asks questions about which third-
parties are most likely to intervene (for example, Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Frazier 2006; 
Greig 2001, 2005; Greig and Regan 2008) or restricts its attention to the behavior of only one 
third-party (for example, Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006). The (sometimes implicit) assumption 
is that third-party characteristics drastically change intervention behavior.  
This study demonstrates, however, that such an assumption is not always valid. I find that 
when one examines multiple third-parties and focuses upon strategy selection within trajectories 
(instead of the initial decision to intervene), third-party characteristics do not matter. Instead, 
third-parties make similar decisions about how to intervene, despite the different characteristics 
and resources that they possess. From a theoretical perspective, this finding calls upon scholars 
to rethink their assumption that third-party characteristics always affect intervention decisions. 
Such a conclusion, however, does not refute the earlier work that finds third-party 
characteristics important, as I ask a slightly different question than they do. In particular, I focus 
upon strategy selection decisions within trajectories, given that the decision to intervene has 
already been made. In contrast, most conflict management research examines the decision to 
intervene while (often) holding the selection of strategy constant (the converse of this study; see 
                                                 
8 The results do not change if I consider regional powers instead of major powers. 
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Chapter 2 for more information on these decisions).9 It is entirely plausible that third-party 
characteristics matter for the former decision, but not the latter.  
Despite this limitation, a number of theoretical implications result from my finding. First, 
although examining variation in third-party characteristics has provided a number of insights 
about their intervention behavior, it only tells part of the story. Third-party characteristics do not 
matter in every context; therefore, researchers need to consider in more detail the conditions 
under which third-parties might behave similarly and those under which intervention behavior 
should differ. We should not always assume that third-party characteristics affect intervention 
decisions.  
Second, from a more practical perspective, disputants that want a particular intervention 
need not court only one actor. For example, the United Nations is as likely to select mediation 
along each point of a trajectory as a major power, a neighboring state, an ally, or even a minor 
power. This holds for relatively low-cost and high-cost strategies, and suggests, as before, that 
disputants desiring third-party intervention should cast their net wide. There is no need to wait 
for a specific third-party, as third-parties will make similar decisions once they commit to 
intervention.  
Finally, although the United Nations (UN) holds a place of prominence in the 
international community and has extensive experience with certain strategies (for example, peace 
operations), potential third-parties should not rely on it as a panacea for producing peace. Once 
involved in a dispute, the UN makes decisions that are similar to those of other third-parties.10 
Therefore, if the UN (or regional organizations or major powers) is unable or unwilling to act, 
                                                 
9 When researchers restrict a study to include only one conflict management strategy, they are, in effect, holding the 
selection of strategy decision constant. 
10 I also note that this finding echoes realist arguments that institutions simply reflect the desires of state members. 
See Mearsheimer (1994/1995). 
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the international community can turn to other actors, confident that those other third-parties will 
make similar intervention decisions. Relying on other third-parties may cause the UN’s (or 
another’s) experience to go to waste in a given dispute, but sometimes intervening matters more 
to conflict management than withheld expertise. 
The third broad conclusion addresses the timing of intervention. The greatest chances of 
mediation generally occur early in a dispute. In fact, between the first and sixth interventions 
within a trajectory, the likelihood that mediation will occur at each intervention gets cut in half. 
This finding (derived from simulated trajectories in Chapter 5) contains policy implications for 
both disputants and third-parties. First, although some disputants may use mediations to plan for 
future hostilities (Richmond 1998), others may legitimately need the involvement of a third-party 
to effectively manage their dispute. Yet desiring third-party involvement does not translate easily 
into a greater likelihood of reaching an agreement. Even if disputants want third-parties to help 
them, they may need multiple mediations before even approaching an agreement – either because 
they adopt an extreme negotiating position, fear making concessions (due to domestic audience 
costs or the potential precedent that those concessions might create), or simply need time to 
understand the mediation process (on this latter point, see Greig and Diehl 2006). Unfortunately, 
this study finds that the chance of multiple mediations is not great.11 Disputants therefore should 
exercise caution when withholding consent for mediation or adopting tough bargaining positions 
early in a dispute. Although these actions may appease domestic constituents or avoid a 
precedent-setting concession, they also may let the chance for an agreement slip away. 
Second, by monitoring the first two moves in the trajectory, the international community 
learns quickly whether the chances of a meaningful intervention (that is, something involving 
                                                 
11 The reason for this needs to be examined further. Earlier, I propose two potential avenues to investigate – namely, 
that third-parties either must turn their attention to other events (which moves the dispute to a back burner) or simply 
“give up” on the dispute altogether (that is, decide not to “try harder”).  
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more than a verbal plea) are increasing or decreasing.12 As noted above, the chances of 
mediation generally fall over the course of a trajectory. Furthermore, the likelihood of a legal, 
administrative, or peace operation tends to decline after the second intervention in a trajectory. 
Simply by watching the first two interventions, then, third-parties receive a strong indication of 
whether others are likely to meaningfully handle a dispute. Armed with such knowledge, the 
international community can better decide where to deploy its limited resources. An 
overburdened (or free-riding) third-party (for example, the UN) may decide to let others handle a 
dispute, but if it persists, these third-parties may need to step in, lest the trajectory devolve into a 
cycle of verbal pleas.  
It is worth reiterating that this conclusion results from simulations. In order for it to retain 
its accuracy, intervention behavior must remain relatively constant in the future. If it does not, 
then the simulation may inaccurately predict third-party behavior. For example, if third-parties 
suddenly increase the frequency with which they resort to legal strategies, this may alter the 
simulation’s forecasts. Despite this (minor) limitation, any drastic changes in intervention 
behavior could be incorporated into a revised simulation that would then produce updated 
predictions. 
As a final conclusion derived from a synthesis of this project’s findings, I note that the 
selection of strategies within trajectories does not change drastically after the cold war ends. At 
first glance, this seems like a benign finding. Yet scholars and practitioners regularly assert that 
the cold war’s end brought a new spirit of cooperation to international conflict management (for 
example, see Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1995; Mingst and Karns 2000). Although this watershed 
moment may have affected the decision to intervene and caused third-parties to intervene more 
                                                 
12 To provide a sense of real time to this analysis, during the period 1993-2001, the median wait time between 
interventions within a trajectory was 11 days (mode=1, first quartile=2, third quartile=42). Waiting for two 
interventions therefore amounts to a period of about 22 days. 
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frequently in intrastate conflicts (as opposed to interstate ones), it does not seem to have affected 
their selection of intervention strategies. This finding provides a sense of stability to the 
conclusions noted above. If the selection of intervention strategies does not change as a result of 
such a systemic shock, we should not expect it to change significantly in the future. Policy-
makers can therefore take solace in the fact that the conclusions and predictions listed above 
should retain validity for the foreseeable future. 
 
Toward A (Future) Research Agenda of Trajectories 
 Although this project demonstrates that researching conflict trajectories can provide 
insight into the diplomatic behavior of third-parties, it also uncovers a number of theoretical 
questions that remain to be answered. In particular, four questions seem particularly important 
for a future research agenda involving trajectories.13 First, what is the exact role of verbal 
interventions? Third-parties regularly intervene verbally in interstate disputes – either to plead 
for the use of diplomatic conflict management mechanisms instead of violence, to demand a 
cease-fire or troop withdrawal, or to offer their assistance in resolving a dispute. In fact, the 
preceding analysis suggests that such verbal interventions are used more often than any other 
category of strategies within trajectories (48% of all interventions; see Table 4.2) and comprise a 
significant number of initial interventions (that is, those that potentially begin trajectories – 41%; 
see Table 5.1). The empirical analyses also suggest that trajectories can easily devolve into a 
cycle of verbal strategies. It is therefore critical to understand these interventions better. 
 The current project provides some preliminary insight into why verbal interventions may 
be used so often – both at the outset of a (potential) trajectory and as a trajectory unfolds.  I 
                                                 
13 In addition to the questions listed below, one might also relax the rationality assumption and investigate altruistic 
interventions. Although I suspect that there are few such interventions during the 1946-2001 period, such 
interventions may grow if the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) movement grows (see Bellamy 2010). 
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proposed earlier that third-parties may try to first manage a dispute through a verbal intervention 
as a way to indicate their interest in a dispute and to allow disputants to signal back to the third-
party regarding their readiness for a more involved diplomatic intervention. If disputants cease 
the violence, return to the negotiating table, or withdraw troops in response to verbal pleas, this 
may signal to potential third-parties that more costly interventions (using mediation, legal, 
administrative, or peace operations strategies) are likely to yield successful results. In a world of 
limited resources, such signals may have an important place, as they would allow third-parties to 
efficiently deploy conflict management resources within conflict contexts that involve great 
uncertainty.14  
 If it is true that initial verbal interventions and the response to them function as signals of 
the third-party’s interest in and the disputants’ readiness for more involved forms of diplomatic 
intervention, we might expect to see two intervention behaviors after successful verbal 
interventions. First, third-parties should intervene faster after successful verbal interventions than 
after unsuccessful ones. Furthermore, during such interventions, these third-parties should use 
more costly conflict management strategies than verbal pleas. Having received the signal from 
disputants that third-parties should get more actively involved in managing the dispute, third-
parties should do just that – and more quickly than if the signal indicated that greater third-party 
involvement was not yet appropriate (that is, a failed verbal intervention). If support for this 
prediction can be found, it would suggest that disputants tell potential third-parties when the 
conflict is “ripe” for effective management efforts (see Zartman 2000), thereby giving third-
parties an added incentive to issue verbal demands initially and to watch the disputants’ 
response. 
                                                 
14 Verbal pleas may also play a role in norm development or reinforcement or might complement more costly, 
ongoing interventions. I leave the former possibility for future research to consider and address the latter below. 
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 Second, the preceding logic suggests that the same third-party should intervene (using 
more involved strategies and more quickly than other third-parties) after it successfully 
intervened verbally in a dispute. This prediction stems from the verbal intervention as an 
indication of a third-party’s interest in a conflict, rather than the disputant’s desire for 
intervention (as above). Simply put, if it is true that verbal interventions imply that a third-party 
would like to get more involved in a dispute, we should see them (as opposed to other third-
parties) get more involved in the management of a conflict when disputants give them the green 
light to do so. By testing these two related predictions, it will be possible to determine whether 
initial verbal interventions have a strategic role in third-party intervention or merely amount to 
“cheap talk.”15 
 In addition to using verbal strategies during initial interventions, third-parties also rely on 
them regularly as a trajectory develops. For example, verbal strategies are always among the top 
two strategies chosen by third-parties, regardless of the previous intervention strategy used in the 
trajectory. Furthermore, simulated trajectories reveal that the likelihood of third-parties using a 
verbal strategy at any given point in a trajectory is about 70%. This suggests that verbal 
strategies occupy a place of prominence in third-parties’ intervention toolbox. 
The theoretical models presented earlier suggest an explanation for this behavior as well. 
In particular, the limited commitments model predicts that third-parties regularly use both verbal 
and mediation strategies (as opposed to more costly strategies) to intervene in disputes because 
these strategies limit the intervention costs they bear. Future research could delve deeper into 
individual cases to determine whether the same third-parties are cycling between mediation and 
verbal interventions and whether verbal interventions come during mediation (or other 
interventions) as a way to complement the mediator’s (or other third-party’s) activities (see 
                                                 
15 On cheap talk within mediation, see Kydd (2003). 
253 
 
below). Only with more in depth case analysis can we understand why certain third-parties issue 
verbal pleas (and others do not) and appreciate what value these statements have. 
 The second question in a research agenda on trajectories involves overlapping 
interventions. I find that third-parties regularly perform overlapping interventions (that is, third-
parties intervene during another ongoing intervention). To what extent are these overlapping 
interventions complementary? Preliminary evidence suggests that connections exist between 
overlapping interventions. The most obvious connection occurs when the same third-party 
performs more than one intervention at a time.16 For example, during a dispute between 
Nicaragua and Honduras in 1957 over the border town of Mocoron, Honduras, the Organization 
of American States (OAS) intervened three times (Frazier and Dixon 2006). It first established a 
commission of inquiry to investigate the dispute. While the commission collected facts (and 
before it officially issued its report), the OAS deployed a military observation force to the 
disputed area. Finally, with the military observation team in the field, the OAS created a 
conciliation commission to mediate an agreement between the disputants. In cases such as these, 
where a third-party intervenes during another ongoing intervention conducted by it, we would 
expect these interventions to complement one another.17 Returning to the Honduras-Nicaragua 
dispute, the military observation team more than likely facilitated the efforts of both the fact-
finding and conciliation teams. 
 A second manner in which overlapping interventions might be related involves the 
connection between intergovernmental organizations (IGO) and their members. As noted earlier, 
                                                 
16 Earlier, I referred to these as simultaneous interventions. Such interventions are a subset of overlapping 
interventions. 
17 The United Nations performs overlapping interventions regularly. 
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76% of overlapping interventions occur during an IGO-led intervention.18 If the IGO members 
that authorized the collective intervention are also intervening during it, that behavior could offer 
a second connection between overlapping interventions. For example, during a dispute between 
North and South Yemen in 1972, the Arab League created a conciliation commission composed 
of representatives from Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, and Syria (Frazier and Dixon 2006). This 
team mediated two cease-fires, after which the Arab League deployed a military observation 
commission to monitor the cease-fire. It was during that team’s deployment that Libya mediated 
again between North and South Yemen, building upon the earlier efforts of the conciliation 
committee (of which it was a member) and ultimately securing a merger agreement between the 
two Yemen states. In this case, a member that authorized and participated actively (and 
prominently) within the IGO-led interventions undertook its own mediation while the IGO 
intervention kept the peace.  
 A cursory review of the data suggests that this second explanation could account for a 
significant number of overlapping interventions that occur during an ongoing IGO-led 
intervention. Once cases of simultaneous interventions19 are removed, 62% of overlapping 
interventions that occur during an IGO-led intervention are conducted by state actors. This 
provides prima facie evidence that IGO members might be intervening alongside the 
organization (states, rather than other organizations or coalitions, perform the majority of these 
interventions). Yet this alone does not indicate a clear (complementary) connection between 
overlapping interventions. It is one thing to observe a state intervening alongside an IGO to 
which it belongs, but it is quite another to assert that those interventions complement (or 
                                                 
18 Because simultaneous interventions are a subset of overlapping interventions, they are included in this figure. If 
simultaneous interventions (described above) are excluded, the reported statistic falls to 62%. 
19 These are cases in which the same third-party performs multiple concurrent interventions. In this case, because I 
am examining behavior during IGO-led interventions, these are instances of IGOs conducting concurrent 
interventions. 
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contradict) one another.20 Detailed case research would need to explore these interventions in 
depth in order to establish whether a complementary relationship truly exists between them.21  
Third, a research agenda focused upon trajectories needs to address the possibility that 
there are variants of the learning model that explain third-party behavior better than the one 
advanced earlier in this project. In particular, I proposed earlier (Chapter 2) that a simple, 
behavioral learning model required third-parties to repeat successful intervention strategies and 
avoid failed ones in successive interventions. This model implicitly makes two assumptions. 22  
First, it assumes that third-parties learn from each other’s interventions (that is, learning occurs 
across actors). Third-parties can see what strategies others have employed and adjust their 
interventions based on how the previous intervention fared, regardless of who performed that 
previous intervention. Second, it presumes that actors do not carry lessons from one dispute to 
the next (that is, learning occurs within disputes). When a new dispute begins, third-parties “start 
from scratch.” 
These assumptions have solid theoretical grounding. On the one hand, militarized 
disputes are well-publicized events, as are the interventions within them. Because third-parties 
therefore have access to information about the success or failure of the previous intervention (or 
can obtain it), it seems plausible that learning can occur across actors. On the other hand, each 
                                                 
20 Interventions need not complement one another. It is also possible that a third-party intervention undermines (that 
is, works against the goals of) an ongoing one. Case analysis would help identify such instances and the factors that 
differentiate them from complementary overlapping interventions. 
21 Another reason for detailed case analysis involves universal membership organizations (Pevehouse et al. 2004). 
To the extent that the IGO interventions involve universal membership organizations (such as the United Nations), 
we get no additional information by considering the relationship between the IGO and its members. For example, 
because all states are members of the UN, any state intervention can be connected to the organization. It therefore 
becomes meaningless to identify potential, complementary interventions according to state membership within such 
organizations (in methodological terms, we lose the control group because there are no potential non-members). 
Detailed casework, however, can determine whether interventions are complementary, even if they involve 
universal membership organizations.  
22 This model also presumes that a comprehensive resolution has not been achieved (or the trajectory ends). Given 
the focus on short-term success, however, this is not a problematic assumption for the construction and analysis of 
trajectories. 
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dispute presents a slightly unique set of circumstances. The disputants, their relative positions 
(both with respect to the issues under dispute and the location of military units), the issues under 
dispute, and numerous other factors change from one dispute to the next. It therefore seems 
plausible that third-parties do not merely apply old templates to new situations, but rather that 
they approach each dispute as if it was unique.  
 Despite theoretical arguments in support of the assumptions behind the learning model, it 
is possible to alter these assumptions in three ways and obtain slightly different predictions of 
how third-parties learn from interventions. First, instead of assuming that learning occurs across 
actors, it is possible to assume that learning is actor-specific. In other words, maybe disputants 
learn only from their own previous intervention, thereby restricting the interventions from which 
a third-party might draw inferences. Under such an assumption, a third-party must perform an 
intervention itself to learn the lessons about the strategies that succeed or fail in a given conflict. 
I suspect that this variant is rather myopic, since it requires third-parties to draw no lessons from 
others’ behavior. Yet it is theoretically plausible. Jervis (1976), for example, proposes that actors 
learn from direct experience with dramatic events (see also Reiter 1994). Conducting an 
intervention provides a more direct and dramatic experience to a third-party than merely 
watching the activities of others. 
 Second, perhaps disputants learn from one another, but lessons are not dispute-specific. 
In other words, maybe third-parties carry lessons from one dispute to the next. Such a model 
predicts that third-parties pay attention to the most successful intervention strategy overall, rather 
than the one achieving the most success within a specific conflict. More specifically, one strategy 
will have a better track record than the others at any given moment in time – across third-party 
actors and disputes. As new conflicts arise, third-parties might simply apply this most successful 
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overall strategy to the nascent dispute. For example, suppose that mediation attains a higher 
success rate than the alternatives. As new disputes arise, third-parties may simply rely on 
mediation – until it is either no longer the most successful overall strategy or it fails within a 
dispute (and is therefore not a feasible strategy to use in that dispute). 
 Although plausible, I also suspect this variant to be rather myopic as well. It comes 
dangerously close to arguing that third-parties ignore conflict context and apply old templates to 
new conflicts, a behavior that policy makers explicitly reject.23 To say that third-parties do not 
care where they are intervening does not match empirical reality. In the aftermath of Somalia, for 
example, the United States avoided Rwanda precisely because leaders perceived it as similar to 
Somalia. In contrast, the United States became more involved in Bosnia because it differed from 
Rwanda in many respects (particularly geographic location). Similarly, states send organizations 
to difficult conflict contexts (Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Stedman 2003), which suggests that they 
do distinguish between different conflict contexts. Nonetheless, because it is plausible, future 
research should consider whether learning might occur across disputes. 
 Finally, a research agenda about conflict management trajectories needs to eventually 
address intrastate conflicts. Do trajectories within intrastate conflicts develop in ways that are 
similar to those found within interstate disputes, or do they display unique characteristics? 
Extending this project into the realm of civil conflicts is both natural and relevant. Not only do 
intrastate conflicts consistently outnumber interstate conflicts (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, 
Sollenberg, and Strand 2002; Harboom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008; Sarkees and Wayman 
2010), but third-parties regularly intervene within them (Bercovitch and Derouen 2005; Doyle 
                                                 
23 For example, former United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (2003:161) notes that “One of the most 
basic lessons taught by our experiences in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti was that an arbitrarily rigid or cookie cutter 
approach would not work. Each situation was different, with a unique blend of history, personality, culture and 
politics.” 
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and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Fortna 2004; Greig and Regan 2008; Regan, Frank, and Aydin 2009). 
In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests that diplomatic interventions within intrastate conflicts may 
exceed those found within interstate conflicts. For example, as early as 1992, the United Nations 
felt its peace operations resources shift substantially from interstate to intrastate conflict 
(Boutros-Ghali 1992).24 Similarly, regional organizations deploy peace operations almost 
exclusively to intrastate conflicts (Balas, Owsiak, and Diehl 2010). Furthermore, the publicity 
received by conflicts within Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, and Sudan (among others) suggests that intrastate conflicts both capture the attention of 
the public and have at least some place on the agenda of policy-makers.  
 How might trajectories differ within intrastate conflicts, as opposed to the interstate 
disputes analyzed in this project? Although a definitive answer requires further research, two 
factors derived from this project deserve consideration. First, it is highly likely that the limited 
commitments model generally explains intrastate trajectories as well. The more costly 
intervention strategies (for example, administrative and peace operations) generate additional 
costs when applied to intrastate conflict, since they often require the third-party to rebuild the 
institutions that undergird a functioning government and the provision of social services (see 
Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1995; Diehl 2006a). The incentive of third-parties to get involved may be 
high, but so too should their desire to limit intervention costs, which can easily balloon out of 
control. 
 Yet the limited commitments model may not explain everything. I proposed in Chapter 5 
that this model might apply best to interstate disputes that contain a significant sub-state actor 
                                                 
24 Although this implies that the UN did not deal with civil conflicts prior to 1992, such an implication is misguided. 
UN peace operations within the Congo (MONUC, 1960-1964), Lebanon (UNOGIL, 1958; UNIFIL 1978-present), 
and Yemen (UNYOM, 1963-1964) indicate that the organization did intervene in intrastate conflicts prior to the fall 
of the Berlin Wall. Coalitions and other organizations did likewise. For more information, see the data on peace 
operations compiled by the Henry L. Stimson Center at: http://www.stimson.org/fopo/. 
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capable of spoiling interstate cooperation. When applied to intrastate disputes, this prediction 
changes somewhat. In particular, we might expect the limited commitments model to do best 
when there exists more than one significant rebel group (that is, more than one rebel group 
capable of competing for power against other rebel groups). In the intrastate setting, these 
competing sub-state groups may undermine any potential agreements. Their presence may 
therefore make third-parties weary of costly interventions. For example, one of the obstacles to 
effective intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s involved warlords that competed for local 
power and interfered with (United States) intervention goals. As the potential for violence 
becomes more decentralized (that is, the number of rebel groups increase), third-parties may 
choose to limit their involvement, lest they incur casualties.  
 Second, I noted that the intervention behavior of regional powers did not differ from non-
regional powers (at least concerning strategy selection). Yet third-parties within the same region 
as an intrastate conflict may pay that conflict greater attention than an interstate conflict. 
Interstate conflicts often must follow certain norms (for example, against killing civilians, 
respecting or returning to agreed upon international boundaries, abiding by international 
agreements). Intrastate conflicts do not generally follow such norms. Civilians are often not just 
killed, but also specifically targeted (for example, in Rwanda or Bosnia). International 
boundaries do not exist within states (by definition), so there is no reference point to which 
parties can return. And international agreements do not apply, since sub-state actors cannot 
create them. In short, many of the “rules of war” do not hold in intrastate conflicts. 
 This greater level of uncertainty may prompt regional actors to behave differently than 
non-regional actors within intrastate conflicts (even though they do not do so in interstate 
conflicts). In particular, regional actors may get more involved in the management of civil 
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conflicts using relatively more costly strategies. Preliminary empirical evidence supports this 
speculation. For example, Balas, Owsiak, and Diehl (2010) find that regional organizations 
deploy peace operations almost exclusively to intrastate conflicts. Future research should 
therefore investigate the intervention behavior of regional actors (states, coalitions, and 
organizations) within intrastate disputes in greater detail. Their lack of unique behavior at the 
interstate level may change substantially when one considers intrastate disputes. As this 
possibility makes clear, understanding intervention within interstate conflicts covers significant 
ground, but the picture remains incomplete without also accounting for interventions within 
intrastate conflict. 
 
Some Concluding Thoughts 
At the outset of this study, I asked two related research questions. First, how does third-
party intervention evolve over the course of a conflict? Second, what guides the choices that 
drive this evolution? I proposed that the answer lay in the construction and evaluation of conflict 
management trajectories. After outlining and testing a number of competing theories, I uncover 
an explanation of and predictions for how third-party interventions evolve during interstate 
disputes. Furthermore, I propose the mechanism by which third-parties select strategies from 
among a menu of possible options. Although the conclusions I reach are not the final word on 
this topic, they provide a strong foundation for future research and indicate that the concept of 
conflict management trajectories deserves greater attention.  
Perhaps more importantly, one of the central goals of this project is to encourage scholars 
to broaden their approach to studying conflict management. Researchers regularly think in terms 
of one conflict management strategy at a time (as if mediation were unrelated to arbitration, 
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peace operations, or verbal pleas) and study instances of isolated interventions. Quite simply, this 
approach does not match the empirical reality. As I argue earlier, policy-makers, third-parties 
and disputants do not think in terms of isolated interventions, but rather, they pay attention to 
each others’ interventions as they strive to manage interstate disputes. Therefore, in order to 
provide relevant advice to those making decisions, researchers need to broaden the scope of their 
investigations and theorize at a level above the isolated conflict management attempt. Only by 
doing this will scholars align theory with practice, thereby assisting those that actively work in 
the field in pursuit of peace. 
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